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LEVITICUS — 19:13 robbery

LEV367 Another illustration of an important area of moral instruction that developed out of a broad rabbinic interpretation of the biblical text is the injunction against genevat da'at -- deliberately creating a false impression in a person's mind even where no monetary loss is involved. It is interesting to observe how the various texts bearing on theft or stealing were variously interpreted so as to give broad coverage. 1. "Thus shalt not steal" (lo tignov) refers to stealing people. (Exodus 20:13). 2. "nor rob him" (lo tigzol) refers to taking another's possessions openly by use of force [this verse]. 3. "you shall not steal" refers to theft of objects by stealth (Leviticus 19:11). "and if thou sell… or buy… ye shall not wrong [onoah] one another" (Leviticus 25:14) refers to cheating in price in which the seller over charges or the buyer underpays or in regard to weight, measure, or quality of goods. In all cases of onoah there is monetary damage although the buyer gave up his money voluntarily. In considering the concept of "stealing" (genevah), the rabbis perceived the unqualified nature of the injunction and realized that "stealing the mind" of a person--replacing truth with falsehood in his consciousness--constituted a grievous deprivation even where there is no monetary damage (Mekhilta, Mishpatim 13). They understood that the "psychological anguish" suffered by the victim and his loss of peace of mind was probably more damaging than monetary loss. Thus, if the seller creates an impression in the mind of the buyer that the object is other than it in fact is, he is in violation of this moral-legal rule even if the price he asks and gets is proper. This injunction applies even if a person "steals" for a joke and latter returns the "stolen" item. Therefore, Samuel teaches, "It is forbidden to 'steal the minds' of people [deceive them], even of an idolator." (Chullin 94).

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 stand

LEV509 The obligation to save a person from any hazard to his life or health devolves on anyone able to do so. Every person is duty-bound not only to protect his own life and health, (Yoreh De'ah, 116; Hoshen Mishpat, 427:9-10) but also those of his neighbor (Hoshen Mishpat, 426:1, 427:1-10). Anyone refusing to come to the rescue of a person in danger of losing life, limb or property is guilty of transgressing the biblical law "Thou shall not stand upon the blood of thy neighbor" [this verse, Rashi a.l.] It is questionable, however how far one must, or may, be prepared to risk one's own life or health in an effort to save one's fellow; the duty, and possibly the right, to do so may be limited to risking a less likely loss for a more likely gain. (Bet Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat, 426; for details, see Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics, p. 96f). In any event, when there is no risk involved, the obligation to save one's neighbor from any danger is unconditional. Hence the refusal of a doctor to extend medical aid when required is deemed tantamount to bloodshed, unless a more competent doctor is readily available (Yoreh De'ah, 336:1).

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 stand

LEV500 … the law of the rodef, the "pursuer"… states that if A is pursuing B to kill him, either directly or indirectly, anyone may save B even at the cost of A's life. This is inferred from the biblical law that a betrothed woman may be saved from rape at the cost of the assailant's life [this verse, Sanhedrin 73a]. The traditional capital charge with its formal court proceedings applied to acts that have already been committed; when the person himself had committed the murder and only when a human life had been taken. By contrast, the rule of the rodef applies to individuals before they have committed the crime and are only threatening. In other words, we are dealing here with prevention rather than punishment. The law of the rodef applies to crimes that are indirectly caused, even if the action is directed only against the property of the victim ... This kind of sentence does not depend upon properly constituted courts and formal rules of procedure, but any person who is witness to such a pursuit is obligated to take action.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV541 Who is considered a talebearer? He who loads himself with talk and goes from one person to another, saying: "This and this is what such and such said. Thus and thus have I heard about such and such." Even though what he says is true, he thereby destroys the world. We have been exhorted against this [this verse]: "Do not be a talebearer among your people." What is talebearing? Revealing to one's friend things that were said of him in secret. And we learned (Sanhedrin 31a): "How do we know that a judge emerging from a trial should not say: 'I ruled for non-liability and my colleagues for liability. What can I do if they are in the majority?' In this connection, it is written: 'Do not be a talebearer among your people,' and (Mishlei 11:13): 'One who reveals a secret is a talebearer.'" Guard yourself greatly against slander, for through it you shame yourself. All who void others are themselves unfit. They cannot speak well of others and tend to brand them with their own faults (Kiddushin 70a); the fact that they utter it with her mouths stems from the fact that it is always in their consciousness.

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LEVITICUS — 19:17 reprove

LEV598 … one should not judge the piety of a deed by the initial impression it makes. Rather, one must appraise, as far as his intelligence will permit, the overall implications until he is able to objectively assess what will serve him better – doing [the deed] or not doing [it]. [For example,] the Torah has commanded us [this verse]: "Continually reprove your fellow man." So on numerous occasions one undertakes to rebuke sinners at a place or time where his words will not be accepted, thereby causing them to press onward with their wickedness and to desecrate the name [of the Eternal], adding rebellion to the sins [already committed]. Acting in such a manner is not piety, and one should rather be silent, as our Sages of blessed memory have said (Yevamos 65b): "Just as it is a mitzvah to say what will be heard, it is also a mitzvah not to say what will not be heard." [Likewise,] it is obvious that a person ought to run to fulfill a mitzvah and try to be among those who occupy themselves with its performance. But there are times when this may lead to disputes, and then a mitzvah will be debased and the name of Heaven will be desecrated more than it will be honored. Under such circumstances, it is surely incumbent upon the pious person to forgo the performance of the mitzvah rather than to pursue it.

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 love

LEV664 In order to fully understand the relationship between the self and the other in the moral system of Judaism, we must first submit to careful scrutiny of two classic formations of the general principle of man's duty to his fellow man. The first, of course, is "And Thou shalt love thy fellow man as thyself"] this verse].… The second is the formulation apparently given to the command by Hillel in his famous response to the would-be convert's request for a concise expression of the essence of Judaism: "That which thou despisest, do not do to thy fellow man" (Shabbat 31a, see also Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel on Leviticus 19:18). Maimonides in his treatment of this mitzvah speaks exclusively of behavioral rather than emotional implications. Although the Torah here speaks only of "love," which is a human feeling, the rabbis, either on the basis of grammatical considerations or because of the psychological difficulty of legislating emotions, saw the fulfillment of this command as primarily involving certain kinds of behavior (See comments of Nachmanides and Malbim, on Leviticus 19:18. The verb "to love" is usually used in the Hebrew in the accusative case (as in Deuteronomy 6:5), with the article et, which denotes a more direct object, but in this case the object stands in the dative case (le ...), which generally signifies a more indirect relationship. Thus, this passage should perhaps be translated as, "Be loving to thy fellow man" with the emphasis on deeds or works of love rather than emotions. Toward God one is directed to develop a more personal and intense love. See Rambam, Hilkhot Teshuvah 10:3).

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 love

LEV704 We suggested earlier that the moral rule "Love thy neighbor as thyself" posits a standard of impartiality and equality between the self and the other. "Do not do to your fellow man what you would not want done to yourself." Nachmanides makes it clear that this rule cannot be a requirement for the individual to become as involved with the other, and as devoted to him, as he is to himself (Commentary on this verse). We all obviously have certain duties to ourselves that take priority. As Rabbi Akiva said, "Thy life is prior to the life of others" (Bava Metzia 62). What the rule does require is that we cherish the person and property of the other even as we do our own, so that we do not cause any harm to him or damage to his property. The rule further implies that we must be concerned with his needs when it does not necessitate the neglect of our own. It also implies that we should desire for our fellow all that we wish for ourselves and not be envious of him.

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