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EXODUS — 18:20 words

EXOD300 Let us first consider the question of the authority or source of obligation of these wider and more vague areas of Jewish morality. We find that the Rabbis had a proof-text or biblical source upon which to append their notion of lifnim mi-shurat da-din: "And thou shalt show them the way they shall walk therein and the actions which they shall do." Rabbi Eliezer of Modi'in says: "and the actions" refers to din proper; "and they shall do" refers to lifnim mi-shurat ha-din [this verse; Mekhilta, Yitro; Bava Kamma 100]. Thus, the Torah itself urges us to conduct ourselves beyond the measure of the law. Indeed, Rabbi Isaac of Corbeil lists the obligation of lifnim mi-shurat ha-din as one of the 613 commandments (Sefer Mitzvot Katan). (Continued at [[DEUT290]] Deuteronomy 6:18 right SPERO 169)

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EXODUS — 20:8 keep

EXOD386 As to the reason why a positive precept has the power to overrule a negative one, the suggestion has been made that the two kinds of precepts appeal primarily two different attitudes in man and involve different motivations. To go out and expend energy and substance in the bidding of one's master is generally prompted by love, which in turn evokes a response of compassion; i.e., the divine attribute of mercy, rachamim. However, to refrain from doing that which is forbidden by one's master is generally prompted by fear, to which God responds with his attribute of justice (din). But since love of God is greater than fear of God, the power of the positive precept is greater than the power of the negative, so that in cases of conflict, the positive overrules the negative [Nachmanides on this verse]. This may also explain why the Torah prescribes penalties of all sorts for violation of the negative precepts while generally no penalties are ordered for nonfeasance or neglecting to perform the positive commands.

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EXODUS — 20:12 honor

EXOD415 Another example of a moral rule handled halakhically is the hallowed: "Honor thy father and thy mother" [this verse] and "You shall fear every man his mother and father" [Leviticus 19:3]. In the analysis given to these commands by the rabbis, vague admonitions were spelled out in concrete terms so that these moral concerns could be realized in the ordinary and varied situations of life. Thus, "honor" is construed as the obligation, should it be necessary, to feed, clothe, shelter, and escort one's parents, from the parents' resources when possible, but if not, from one's own resources. "Fear" is interpreted as reverence, to be expressed in not sitting in one's parent's chair and in not interrupting their conversation -- being respectful in speech and gesture, no matter how great the provocation. Parental authority is limited to the framework of the Torah. That is to say, parents need not be obeyed when their commands are contrary to the rules of the Torah. The rabbis also ruled that one did not have to follow his parent's advice in the selection of a mate. They also discuss the priorities that should obtain in honoring father, mother, and teacher. The principle was expanded to include one's older brother and the obligation to honor parents even after their death. (Sefer HaChinukh, mitzvot, 33,48, and 212.)

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EXODUS — 20:14 covet

EXOD483 The negative commands of the Torah dealing with human relations attempt to restrain a person from harming or causing any loss to another individual. This includes his life, limbs, possessions, and even his reputation and ego. (A. Kariv, Shivas Amudei Ha-Tanakh, p. 231). The range of these rules as indicated on the second table of the Decalogue, which begins with "Thou shall not murder" and ends with "Thou shall not covet thy neighbor's house… nor anything that is thy neighbor's" [this and previous verse; see also Deuteronomy 5:18). But coveting is hardly a crime punishable by a court of law and can hardly be considered something which in itself causes harm to one's neighbor. And indeed, in terms of the Halakhah one violates this commandment only when some particular action follows upon the "coveting." Yet Judaism, wished to penetrate to the root of the evil and in the process revealed the profound depth of its moral sensitivity. The Pentateuch, in declaring, "Thou shall not covet" and "Thou shalt not desire," teaches us that to cast an envious eye on the possessions of our neighbor is already to cross the line between mine and thine (See Sefer ha-Chinnukh, Mitzvah 38 ... the Chinnuch, in mitzvah 416, following the Rambam (Hilkhot Gezelah ve-Aveidah 1:10-12), considers lo titaveh, "Thou shalt not desire" in Deuteronomy 5:18 as prohibiting the desire alone even if it is not followed by any action designed to acquire the object). But even if it does not bother my neighbor, Judaism would have us rid ourselves of such feelings because there very presence within a human being is destructive of human personality and pollutes the self. "Rabbi Eleazar ha-Kappar said, 'Envy, desire, and ambition drive a man out of the world,' (Avot 4:28) and the rabbis noted that there is a sense in which "thinking about transgressions is worse than the transgression itself" (Yoma 29a, see Rashi).

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EXODUS — 21:12 strikes

EXOD546 Another characteristic of Jewish morality becomes manifest when we focus upon the dimension of death or inwardness. This includes what is sometimes referred to as personal morality. That is to say, Judaism is not really concerned with actions and their consequences, with overt behavior, but seeks to penetrate the consciousness of the agent and demands good thoughts and attitudes, benevolent intentions and sincere motivation. As the rabbis expressed it: "The Merciful One requires the heart." (Sanhedrin 106b) If confronted by an "either–or" choice between thought and deed, intention and action, Judaism would indeed select the deed over the thought and the consequences over the intent as the prime moral element. This is reflected in the following teachings: "He [Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa] used to say, "He whose deeds exceed his wisdom, his wisdom shall endure; but he whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, his wisdom shall not endure" (Avot 3:12, 3:22) Not learning but doing is the chief thing (Avot 1:17). The emphasis on deeds is also seen in the phrase which is used most frequently in rabbinic literature to designate moral virtue or the life of piety: ma'asim tovim --"good deeds." Moral value is to be found in the real world of action and consequences rather than in the amorphous realm of motives and intentions (See Kiddushin 40b; Albo, Ikkarim, vol.II, p. 263). Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the perfect moral experience is a total process in which the motivation, the sustained kavanah (directed consciousness), is incorporated into the fully executed action.… Hence, the Pentateuch distinguishes the murderer from the accidental homicide, condemning the first to death and providing the second with asylum [this and following verses]. The rabbis ruled, however, that good deeds performed out of ulterior motives are acceptable, because the agent, it is hoped, will ultimately learn to develop the proper motives (Pesachim 50b).

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