NUM411 (Continued from [[DEUT1382]] Deuteronomy 24:15 poor SPERO 52-3). In dealing with punishment, which is, in a sense, an area bain adam le-chavero, the rabbis were guided by the principle "and the congregation shall deliver" [this verse] to lean toward leniency and mercy in their interpretations.

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NUM412 See [[NUM417]] Numbers 35:30 murderer SPERO 239-40

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NUM415 See [[NUM417]] Numbers 35:30 murderer SPERO 239-40

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NUM417 Some specific laws of the Torah distinguish sharply between intentional and unintentional acts. When there is evidence of intention such as prior enmity, lying in ambush, or other signs of premeditation, such as if there are two witnesses to the act, we have a case of murder and the penalty is death (this verse). For an act of unintentional manslaughter, the Torah prescribed the penalty of exile in one of the cities of refuge. This was a rather unusual institution, consisting of a group of six easily accessible cities settled by the Levites, where the hapless manslayer could live in comfortable and sympathetic surroundings "until the death of the high priest." [Numbers 35:25, 28; Deuteronomy 19:4-7). The system of "cities of refuge" seems to have served several different purposes. First, it was clearly a protective measure designed to guard against the blood-avenger (See Ramban and Sforno). According to S. D. Luzzatto, at this point in history, the blood feud was considered a sacred obligation by every family and clan. This procedure, by placing the manslayer into protective custody, assuaged the outraged feelings of the family of the victim with the thought that the slayer of their kinsman was being "punished." Others saw in the exile an expiation or therapeutic purpose to ease the burden of guilt from the shoulders of one who, after all, had been instrumental in the death of a human being.

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DEUT41 Does God interfere with the mechanisms of volition and the decision-making process that is within man? One would think that to do so would surely compromise the integrity of man's freedom and the inviolability of his very selfhood! Yet the Torah records several instances of what is described as God "hardening the heart" of an individual or nation [this verse, Joshua 11:20]. The classic case of this is, of course, the Pharaoh of the Exodus. Time after time, God hurls devastating plagues upon Pharaoh and Egypt, but no sooner is the plague removed in response to Pharaoh's plea, than he reverts to his stubbornness and refuses to let the Israelites go. But if Pharaoh's stubbornness is due to God's "hardening of the heart," and not to his own volition, how can he continue to be punished for his refusal? In response to this problem, Maimonides develops a new doctrine to the effect that sometimes, in punishment for a particularly grievous transgression, God indeed removes a person's freedom, making it impossible for him to repent. Nevertheless, the blows he continues to receive are deserved because of the evils he performed while he still had his freedom (Rambam, Hilkhot Teshuvah 6:3). A number of other writers, however, are uncomfortable with the idea that God should ever deprive any person of his power or interfere with his freedom (See Abarbanel). Therefore, they interpret the "hardening of the heart" to the contrary; not as interfering with his volitions but actually as making it possible for Pharaoh to carry out his true inclinations. The earlier plagues had created personal and social pressures which Pharaoh would have found hard to withstand. One more blow and Pharaoh would have released the Israelites, although he did not really want to and was thoroughly unrepentant of the cruelty he had committed. Thus, the "hardening" did not constitute the actual decision but merely was an artificial stiffening to offset the corrosive effects of the plagues so that Pharaoh could again do what he wanted to do.

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DEUT52 From passages in the Book of Deuteronomy, it seems clear that moral principles like tzedek were regarded as "second-order" standards by which "first-order" rules and statutes were judged. Evidently, the Torah realized that there was nothing unique or terribly impressive in the mere fact of the people being given "statutes and judgments," no matter how elaborate or particular they may have been. The highly developed Hittite and West Semitic codes must have been known to the ancient Hebrews. What the Book of Deuteronomy did find noteworthy was the special moral quality of Israel's God-given "statutes and judgments" [Deuteronomy 4:5-8]. This remarkable passage assumes that each nation will have its own set of statutes and judgments but makes the bold claim that Israel's code will be acknowledged superior when judged by the moral standards of righteousness. This is also seen in the passage, "And ye shall judge the people with righteous judgment" (Deuteronomy 16:18).

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DEUT96 The Decalogue As Evidence Of The Centrality of Morality. It cannot be the case that the significance of the Decalogue lies simply in its being the revelation or even the very first revelation of God's will. The theophany at Sinai, which resulted in the Decalogue, is immediately followed by a series of detailed laws and commandments that seem to constitute the main legislation of the Torah (Exodus 21). For what reason, then, were these Ten Commandments (if there be ten; commentators differ as to the number of actual mitzvot contained in the Decalogue) or ten statements given separately as a unit before the others, given publicly to the people without intermediaries, and recorded in a different manner than the others? The Bible itself provides the answer. On several occasions the Decalogue is referred to as "the words of the covenant" or "the tablets of the covenant" [this verse, Exodus 34:28. See also I Kings 8:9 and 8:21]. That is to say, the Decalogue represented the conceptual expression of the covenanted-relationship that was now being entered into between God and a group of people who are now committing themselves to become a covenanted community called Israel. Once Israel has come into existence, the legislation follows through the mediation of the prophet. But the act that establishes the covenant is the giving by God and the accepting by Israel of the two tangible and permanent tablets of stone inscribed with the words which promulgate the unified common life which must now characterize Israel (M. Buber, Moses (Oxford: East & West Library), p. 130. "It is both legislation and promulgation.") It is in this sense that the Ten Commandments are "the words of the covenant," and the tablets, "the tablets of the covenant," and the ark where they were stored, "the ark of the covenant," a sense which does not apply to the other Commandments. Thus considered, recitation of the Decalogue can be seen as a "speech act" which reenacts the covenant at Sinai and constitutes a reaffirmation of its terms and conditions by the individual. This explains why the Decalogue was often associated with the Shema and with the tefilin as a Jewish affirmation of faith (Talmud, Berakhot 12a. It was discontinued out of fear that the Decalogue might tend to replace the other commandments).

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DEUT127 Freedom As The Ground For The Call To Repentance. While, as we have seen, the concept of free will is a "great principle and pillar of the Torah and the mitzvah," its most dramatic expression in Judaism is undoubtedly to be found in the concept of repentance, called teshuvah, or "return." This is the call that issues forth repeatedly from the Torah: "Return, O Israel, unto the Lord thy God, for thou hast stumbled in thine iniquity. Take with you words and return unto the Lord" (Hosea 14:2-3). No matter how far Israel may stray, he will ultimately return [this and following verses]. And speaking of repentance, the Torah assures us: (Deuteronomy 30:11-14]. In innumerable teachings, and a variety of ways, the rabbis reinforced and elaborated this basic teaching of the Torah and the prophets that the gates of repentance are always open, that God is anxious for man to repent, and that it is never too late (Deuteronomy Rabbah 11,12; Ezekiel 33:11; Kiddushin 40b). Clearly, it is one thing to believe that man has freedom of will and, in an open field of alternatives, can respond to moral imperatives. It is quite another, however, to believe that man who has sinned, who has soiled his soul, and who has beclouded his reason by succumbing to the temptations of lust and pride, can ever extricate himself from the clutches of entrenched sin that has become habit. Does not the sinner cease to be called a "child of God"? The answer of the Torah is a thundering no! The sinner can return (Isaiah 55:7).

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DEUT191 See [[DEUT1619]] Deuteronomy 30:19 choose SPERO 239

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DEUT210 Acting Out of Duty Or Out of Inclination. It was pointed out in the previous chapter that since moral deeds are intrinsically good, it is appropriate that they be performed for their own sake. Bearing in mind that God is at once the Good One and the embodiment of the Good, we can appreciate the teaching of Antigonus, "Be as the servants who serve the Master without the expectation of receiving reward" (Avot 1:3). Such rabbinic teachings may be said to be implicit in the biblical command [this verse]. To truly love with all one's heart would not leave room for any other motivation. In terms of the usual distinctions made in ethical theory between a deontological ethic and a teleological ethic, one would expect to categorize Judaism as a deontological system where the emphasis is upon duty for duty's sake, simply determining what is right in every situation and then doing it (see the discussion of this distinction, p.9.) However, as we examine the Torah, we find many expressions wherein actions and policies are urged in terms which appear to be plainly teleological and almost utilitarian in spirit. Certain special conditions of explicitly pleasurable and happy nature are held out as rewards. "In order that it shall be good for you, and you shall lengthen your days." "Because of this God will bless you." "That a man may do them and live by them." (Deuteronomy 22:7, 15:10; Leviticus 18:5). Also, certain states which are plainly negative and unpleasant are threatened as punishment to the individual for violating the commandments, as, for example, "… that soul shall be cut off." (Exodus 12:15). Clearly, then, the morality of Judaism is much too complex to be classified simply as a deontological system.

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