DEUT844 See [[DEUT52]] Deuteronomy 4:6 peoples SPERO 32

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DEUT875 We have already noted that the codes of law found in the Torah were primarily designed not as broad principles to be interpreted by judges but as practical rules of behavior to be studied and applied by ordinary men and women in the normal course of their everyday lives (See the comment of Rashi on Exodus 21:1). Only when the law as written does not give clear guidance in the particular case in question or when rival claims raise issues of interpretation should we go to court [Deuteronomy 17:8–10].

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DEUT887 See [[DEUT634]] Deuteronomy 13:11 stone SPERO 233-4

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DEUT973 See [[DEUT381]] Deuteronomy 8:11 forget SPERO 138

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DEUT1055 It, therefore, must be granted to the determinist, as one of the requirements of moral agency, that there are wide areas of human conduct within which free will as a rule is not exercised and human behavior flows in its predictable course (See J. Grunlatt, "Freedom of the Will--A Traditional View," Tradition 10, no. 4.) The Talmud in general and the halakhic process in particular are replete with instances where assumptions are made as to how people will behave in certain situations. "If a person transgresses and repeats the transgression, it becomes as if permissible to him," and "If a person had the opportunity to sin once and again and resists the temptation, he is assured not to sin." Most revealing is the rabbinic discussion on the question of the law of the "rebellious son" [this verse and 19-21]. The harsh punishment ordained by the Torah was explained on the basis of a projection of this person's future. Although at the moment he is guilty of disobeying his parents and of stealing in order to satisfy his appetite, transgressions which hardly justify the death penalty, the Torah judged him according to the way he will end up. A person such as this, it said, will in the end kill people to get what he wants. There are also a number of halakhic principles based on assumptions of psychological regularity which the rabbis relied upon in establishing the law. Free will does not operate in a vacuum. It operates only within the limits and possibilities of my given wants, abilities, understanding, and environment. "Our free will is freedom within limits of a person's inborn capabilities and of the world in which he lives" (C.A. Campbell, "Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?" in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards and A. Pap, Glencoe, Ill.: 1960), p. 368). Ample room can thus be provided for the social sciences and for all those activities which rely on predictability in human affairs. The one area that must be reserved for the possibility of contra–causal freedom is in the moral realm: "Situations in which the agent is aware of a conflict between strongest desire and duty," or situations where the agent believes that his essential character or integrity as a self hangs on his decision.

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DEUT1063 See [[DEUT634]] Deuteronomy 13:11 stone SPERO 233-4

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DEUT1064 See [[DEUT1055]] Deuteronomy 21:18 wayward SPERO 264

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DEUT1078 The relationship between the dignity of man and the kavod of God is sharply expressed in a remarkable homily quoted by Rashi on the biblical passage which states that the body of a man sentenced to death should be buried the same day because "he that is hanged is a reproach to God" [this and preceding verses]. Said Rabbi Meir: "This may be compared to two twin brothers in one city. One became king and the other became a brigand. The latter was caught and hanged, and all who passed by exclaimed, 'The king is hanging!'" (Sifrei Shoftim 192). It follows, therefore, that to inflict indignity upon man is ultimately to dishonor God.

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DEUT1083 Another source of the Pentateuch that shows concern for what we are calling "human dignity" is to be found in the rabbinic inference from the command [this verse]. The rabbis infer that there is a circumstance when one may "hide himself" from the obligation to chase after his neighbor's ox, and that is if he is "an elder or a scholar," because such activity would be beneath his dignity. The accepted interpretation here is that since an elder or a scholar would not suffer this indignity even if his own property were involved, he need not act differently to save another's property. (Bava Metzia 30a-30b. See Rambam, Hilkhot Gezelah ve-Avedah 18:11. The rabbis in Berakhot 19-20 ruled that considerations of Kavod ha-beriyot cannot overrule a biblical negative command but only a rabbinical ordinance or a biblical positive command).

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DEUT1086 See [[DEUT760]] Deuteronomy 15:9 base SPERO 139

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