DEUT1077 The earliest leading responsum on autopsy is authored by 18th century Rabbi Ezekiel Landau (Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Tanina. Yoreh De'ah, No. 210. Paris. Lang Pres, 1947). It is this responsum upon which all subsequent inquiries and rabbinical and legal decisions are based. … Rabbi Landau [ruled] that autopsy constitutes a desecration of the dead, and is only permissible to save the life of another patient who is immediately at hand (lefaneinu). ... "if we would be lenient in this matter, heaven forbid, they would dissect all dead people in order to learn the arrangement of the internal organs and their functions, so as to know what therapy to give to the living." ... The prohibition of desecrating or disgracing the dead is based upon the biblical passage [this and preceding verses]. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 47a) interpret this phrase to mean that just as hanging all night is a disgrace to the human body, so too any other action which constitutes a disgrace to the deceased is prohibited. If the Torah was concerned for the body of a convicted criminal, certainly, a fortiori, the body of a good citizen should be treated with the proper respect, and be properly interred without being subjected to shame or disgrace. ... The next major objection in Jewish law against autopsy is the multi-faceted problem of burial of the dead. Firstly, the Biblical phrase, "Thou shalt surely bury him… "[this verse], tells us that it is a positive commandment to bury the dead (Sanhedrin 46b). Secondly, whoever keeps his dead unburied overnight transgresses a negative commandment. This is deduced from the earlier part of the same Biblical phrase: "his body shall not remain all night…" Thirdly, the body must be interred whole, for if one leaves out even a small portion, it is as if no burial at all took place (Jerusalem Talmud, Nazir 7:1). ... A fourth facet of the burial problem is the question as to whether burial, in addition to averting disgrace (by later putrefaction of the body), also represents atonement for the sins committed during life (Sanhedrin 46b). If one performs an autopsy, one is in fact transgressing the prohibition of delaying burial of the dead. If one fails to return all removed organs to the body for burial, one also prevents atonement since such a burial is incomplete. Another serious objection to autopsy in Jewish law is the prohibition of driving any benefit from the dead as deduced in the Talmud (Avodah Zara 29 and Nedarim 48a). ... The consensus of rabbinic opinion today seems to permit autopsy only in the spirit of the famous responsa of the Noda bi-Yehudah, Rabbi Ezekiel Landau, i.e., if it may directly contribute to the saving of a life of another patient at hand. In the case of hereditary diseases, the family or future offspring of the deceased are considered to represent patients at hand and this autopsies are allowed.

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DEUT1078 The relationship between the dignity of man and the kavod of God is sharply expressed in a remarkable homily quoted by Rashi on the biblical passage which states that the body of a man sentenced to death should be buried the same day because "he that is hanged is a reproach to God" [this and preceding verses]. Said Rabbi Meir: "This may be compared to two twin brothers in one city. One became king and the other became a brigand. The latter was caught and hanged, and all who passed by exclaimed, 'The king is hanging!'" (Sifrei Shoftim 192). It follows, therefore, that to inflict indignity upon man is ultimately to dishonor God.

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DEUT1079 Courts may impose lashes for trespasses of the law, but in doing so, even they had to take due care to preserve the dignity of God and of the culprit, who is, still, God's human creature. (For the Torah's rescriction on the number of lashes, see Deuteronomy 25:3). Nowadays, when Jews live under the jurisdiction of national legal systems that treat Jews as equal citizens and do not carve out separate civil and criminal authority for Jewish courts over Jews, even Jewish courts no longer have the authority to beat others; individuals have even less authorization to do so. Indeed, the Rabbis took the notion of the integrity of the individual so far as to say that those who slander others (and certainly those who cause them physical injury) are as though they had denied the existence of God. J. Pe'ah 1:1. Conververely, Rabbi Eliezer said, "Let your fellow's honor be as dear to you as your own." M. Avot 2:15.

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DEUT1080 It appears that one may indeed hate those people try to destroy the Jews, for example, Haman, Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and so forth. But how can his hatred be permitted when the verse in Proverbs (11:10) and later the Mishnah say "One may not rejoice when your enemy falls"? At the time one's enemies fall, one may not rejoice. But afterward (and before), one may indeed hate them and what they stood for. Why should we not be happy at the time of their death? As with the angels who were instructed by God not to rejoice when the enemy of the Jews, the Egyptians, drowned in the sea, these enemies are still human beings created in God's image. For that part of them that is destroyed, one cannot rejoice when they die. Afterward, one certainly can be happy that these people are no longer around to destroy the Jewish people. This concept is reflected in the killer or sinner who is to be hanged by a Jewish court. Although this person was evil, Judaism does not permit the community to let the body publicly hang more than a few hours (Sanhedrin 46b) based on [this] reverse in Torah. Here, too, says the Talmud, this evil person is still created in the image of God and is the reflection of that image. Thus, at the time of death, one cannot rejoice afterwards. However, one certainly can be happy that an evil person and the evil he or she caused is eradicated from the world. It is only the shame reflected upon God at the time of death when hatred is forbidden. After all, the Jewish community does celebrate the downfall of Haman and the defeat of the Egyptians. Part of Purim and Passover certainly is being happy that the enemy is defeated. Hating an enemy, especially during time of war, is part of warfare. When Ecclesiastes says "a time to hate" [Ecclesiastes 3:8), the Midrash (Kohelet Rabbah 3:10) clearly explains this refers to an enemy during time of war.

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DEUT1081 K'vod ha'meit [the honor due to the dead] also dictates that burial occur as quickly as possible, ideally within a day of the death. To leave a body unburied and exposed for longer than that is regarded as an affront both to God (in whose image human beings are created) and to the dignity of the deceased. This ruling is based on the biblical law that even a person executed because of a capital offence must be buried on the day of his death [this verse]. If the Torah regards it as an affront to leave the body of a person who committed a capital crime unburied, how much more so, Jewish law reasons, should one not allow the body of a regular person to remain unburied. … although burial within a day (or at least on the day following death; a person might die at 8 a.m. and the funeral take place the following morning at eleven) is generally adhered to, Jewish law permits a delay in certain circumstances, these also dictated by k'vod ha-meit. The most common reason is to allow for the arrival of close relatives coming from a distance. Since it is assumed that the dead person would have wanted these people present, delaying the funeral in effect honors his or her wishes. Such a situation happens, for example, when relatives must fly in from another country. [The reason, though, has to be substantial. David Zinner notes that families will sometimes ask to delay a funeral for inappropriate reasons, such as to allow a grandchild time to finish a research paper for school.] There are other reasons for delaying a funeral. For example, funerals are not generally conducted on mid-to-late Friday afternoons, since this can lead to extreme time pressure or even to desecration of the Sabbath. Therefore, if somebody dies on Friday, the funeral usually takes place on Sunday.

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DEUT1082 (Continued from [[GEN501]] Genesis 4:9 keeper SINAI1 xxii). If our primary purpose through life's journey is moral, to ever develop and grow in moral character, mussar is vitally necessary--to learn it and teach it--that we and our fellow Jews may improve in spiritual health. It is our obligation to show a neighbor the error of his ways and to help him avoid sin with its tragic consequences. In Scripture we read, "If you meet your enemy's ox or donkey going astray, you shall surely bring it back to him" (Exodus 23:4). Who is the owner of this animal that you are required to rescue? Even if he is not a friend but your enemy, hashev t'shivenu lo, says the Torah, doubling the verb: literally, "return shall you return it to him." And to the Sages of Talmud and Midrash this means that even if you keep taking the animal back and it keeps running away, though this happens four or five times, you must continue to bring it to the owner, knowing that he bears you enmity (T.B. Baba Metzia 30b; Midrash haGadol to Exodus 23:4). So, suppose it were not an enemy's animal, but the valued property of a friend. We should surely go out of her way to rescue it. Then what if instead of the animal, the friend himself goes astray in the pathways of life? How much stronger should our heartfelt concern, our deep obligation to return him to the proper path. ... We must cast away cold indifference born of selfishness and callousness. In its place let us accept the Jewish way of responsibility for our neighbor, deep concern for our people. Let us therefore turn to mussar, the moral wisdom and lore that we should learn and teach.

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DEUT1083 Another source of the Pentateuch that shows concern for what we are calling "human dignity" is to be found in the rabbinic inference from the command [this verse]. The rabbis infer that there is a circumstance when one may "hide himself" from the obligation to chase after his neighbor's ox, and that is if he is "an elder or a scholar," because such activity would be beneath his dignity. The accepted interpretation here is that since an elder or a scholar would not suffer this indignity even if his own property were involved, he need not act differently to save another's property. (Bava Metzia 30a-30b. See Rambam, Hilkhot Gezelah ve-Avedah 18:11. The rabbis in Berakhot 19-20 ruled that considerations of Kavod ha-beriyot cannot overrule a biblical negative command but only a rabbinical ordinance or a biblical positive command).

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DEUT1084 This teaches us that he must return it to his [i.e., his "brother's"] domain. Therefore, if he returned it to a place where others saw it, but did not care for it, and it was stolen or lost, he must make restoration, his obligation being to return it to the owner's domain (Sifrei)

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DEUT1085 This tells me only of "the ox of your brother." Whence do I derive [as included in the mitzvah] the ox of your foe? From (Exodus 23:4): "The ox of your foe" -- in any event. If so, why is it written [here] "Your brother"? Scripture speaks anent the evil inclination [i.e., Restore not only the oxen of your brother, but even the ox of your foe -- above the protestations of your evil inclination] (Sifrei)

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DEUT1086 See [[DEUT760]] Deuteronomy 15:9 base SPERO 139

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