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DEUTERONOMY — 22:10 together

DEUT1171 We should not ask two people who are unsuited for each other to work together. The Torah prohibits us from plowing with two animals of different species. The Chinuch (550) states that one reason for this prohibition is that it will distress the two unlike animals to be together. Every animal needs to be with others of its kind. The Chinuch adds that this has practical applications relating to people. Do not appoint two people for a joint task if they are so different that working together will be uncomfortable for them. Educators and employers should be aware of this principle whenever they need to appoint people to work together on a project.

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DEUTERONOMY — 22:10 together

DEUT1166 (Continued from [[GEN1181]] Genesis 24:19 camels SACTAB 217). Our ancestors relied heavily on animals in their agricultural pursuits, and so the Torah provides clear guidance in the treatment of work animals. One such law (this verse) teaches that if these two animals were yoked together, one may be injured by the other. Another law asserts the right of an animal to be nourished as it works (Deuteronomy 25:4). This prohibition acknowledges that one must not prevent an animal who is threshing the field to follow its basic instinct to eat along the way. (By Rayna Ellen Gevurtz, "Kindness to Animals: Tzaar Baalei Chayim") (Continued at [[EXOD369]] Exodus 20:10 cattle SACTAB 217).

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DEUTERONOMY — 22:10 together

DEUT1170 Several Biblical laws deal with the treatment of animals for agricultural work [This verse] prohibits plowing one's field with an ox and a donkey harnessed together. Being of unequal size and strength, both animals, particularly the weaker one, will suffer; the donkey will experience strain, and the ox frustration. By implication, although the Torah speaks only of a donkey and ox, one should not yoke together any animals of significantly equal unequal strength.

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DEUTERONOMY — 22:10 yoke

DEUT1172 Do not work two different species of animal under the same yoke. Key concept: According to the Rambam this mitzvah is connected to the Torah’s prohibition on crossbreeding (See [[LEV742]] Leviticus 19:19 mixed CHINUCH 154-5). Were it permitted to tie different species of animals to the same yoke, the animals probably would be housed in the same barn and the owners would be tempted to engage in crossbreeding. For this reason, working different species together is prohibited. The Sefer HaChinuch offers a different reason: The Torah forbids us to cause pain to any creature. Animals and birds experience great discomfort when they dwell with creatures that are not of their kind. All the more they experience discomfort when they are forced to work side by side with a different species. We observe that when animals are allowed to roam free, they cling exclusively to their own kind. The wise at heart should be take note of the above and be aware that when two people must be appointed for any given project or task, one should not appoint people who are vastly different in terms of their nature or behavior. For example, do not make a righteous individual work with someone who is known for wickedness. Do not pair up someone of noble character with someone who acts as if he has no shame. We see that the Torah forbids unfit pairing of animals--creatures that are practically devoid of all intelligence. All the more so must we be careful not to create inappropriate pairings of human beings, who think and understand.

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DEUTERONOMY — 22:11 combining

DEUT1173 The Torah is sensitive to make sure that man does not alter the world or destroy it. Commenting on a verse in the first chapter of the Torah where the Torah commands each species to reproduce itself [Genesis 1:11], Samson Rafael Hirsch comments that the mitzvah given to man not to create a mixture of species in plants or animals in general, or between wool and linen specifically [this verse], indicates that the Torah did not want man to alter the world or to "play God." Creating hybrids alters the commandment by God to keep species separate.

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DEUTERONOMY — 22:11 wear

DEUT1174 Since free will is indeed basic to Jewish belief (See chapter "Choices and Freedom"), then, logically, each person who freely chooses to perform any particular action must accept full responsibility for that deed. Therefore, even though a person's action was incited and brought about by some other individual, the perpetrator of a crime out of free will must assume full responsibility. Inciting the deed by another person may explain why the person committed the sin, but it should not excuse him or her. And if the sinner takes full responsibility, then logically the inciter bears no responsibility, even if the inciter urged that the deed be effected and knew what was happening at the time of the deed. This concept seems to have support from specific Jewish sources. Maimonides rules (Maimonides, Hilchot Kelayim 10:31) that if one man clothes a second individual with a garment of wool and linen, a Torah prohibition [this verse], and if the person wearing the garment was unaware of the illicit mixture in the clothing, then the one who caused the sin by placing the garment on the individual is the blameworthy party and is punished, while the wearer is exonerated. However, if the wearer knew about the illegal garment, then he is guilty. In a similar manner, if a man sends his shepherd with cattle to graze in someone else's field, the shepherd, and not the sender, is responsible for the damages (Kiddushin 42b). ... What is the logic for making the shepherd guilty (or the Mafia hitman guilty) for merely following the instructions of the sender or inciter? Can't he claim that "I am only acting as his messenger" and assume no personal guilt? The answer is that in the Talmud (Kiddushin 42b), there is a concept that there is no agency to commit a sin. While I may generally act at someone's behest to do a mitzvah and my action makes it as if he performed the action, if a person asks me to commit a sin, I may not listen to him or her and carry out this sin even in the other person's name. If I do the act, I am doing it of my own free will.

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