LEV478 God's ownership of our bodies is also behind every Jew's obligation to help other people escape sickness, injury, and death. (Leviticus 19:16). This duty does not rest on some general (and vague) humanitarian reason or on anticipated reciprocity; it rather grows out of our role in helping God preserve what is His. Specialized training makes physicians especially able and, therefore, especially obligated to aid people in overcoming illness (S.A. Yoreh De'ah 336:1), but we all share in that duty. On the basis of (this verse, "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow"), the Talmud proclaims that obligation to provide medical aid encompasses expenditure of the community's financial resources for this purpose. And Nahmanides understood the community's obligation to provide medical care as one of many applications of the Torah's principle "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." (Leviticus 19:18). Conversely, the individual Jew, when ill, has the reciprocal obligation to seek medical care.

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LEV484 See [[LEV39]] Leviticus 5:1 testify DORFFLOV 181-2

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LEV488 Witnesses to the Act or Results of Abuse. As I mentioned earlier, the Talmud interprets the Torah's command not to stand idly by the blood of our neighbor [this verse] to mean that we must take positive steps to save people's lives. Furthermore, the Torah's command to come forward with testimony (Leviticus 5:1-6) would make it seem obvious that Jews who witness abuse or its results must testify to it and help people extricate themselves from it. The following four commands within Judaism, though, are sometimes misinterpreted to prevent witnesses to abuse from testifying to government officials or to others in authority about an abusive situation: • The prohibition against defaming another human being (lashon ha-ra) • The prohibition against shaming someone else (boshet) • The prohibition against handing a Jew over to non-Jewish authorities (mesirah) • The prohibition against desecrating God (hillul ha-Shem). In addition, in the specific case of child abuse, some Jews worry that informing the authorities will violate the prerogatives of parents and make it impossible for them to carry out their biblical duties to educate their children. I shall examine each of these concerns in turn.

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LEV485 The claim to privacy is set aside when it is necessary to protect an individual, family, or group. So for example the Torah imposes a duty to testify in court when one knows relevant facts, even though they may be incriminating. (Leviticus 5:1. see also B. Bava Kamma 56a; Tucker (1984), 105; and Cohen (1949), 307. This may be parallel to the U.S. Supreme Court's concept, quoted earlier, of rights having effect only within a context of "ordered liberty.") In private settings as well, Jewish law insists on breaking confidentiality when keeping the secret would harm someone. This is based, in part, on the balance that the tradition strikes between the Torah's command, "Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (this verse) with its prohibition of lashon ha-ra, "speaking of the bad " or "evil speech." Under the first law, we have a positive duty to come to the rescue of another person's life or property, and that would argue for divulging whatever is necessary to accomplish those aims. Under the second law, though, one may not slander someone else –– that is, tell truths about someone that will cast a negative light on that person. That would apparently argue for never saying anything negative about anyone else. The tradition balances these two rules by limiting the latter rule. Specifically, the prohibition of defamation is not violated, according to the Rabbis, when there is a practical need for the hearer to know the negative truth. So, for example, under the Torah's rule, "Reprove your kinsman," [Leviticus 19:17], later Jewish sources specify that leaders' sins should be revealed when that is necessary to dissuade people from following their example in committing those sins.

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LEV471 … even the historical context of traditional Jewish law did not raise the question of special privacy requirements for professionals, in our day we may apply its concern for the general welfare to protect professional – client confidentiality. So, for example, if a lawyer knows that a client has a criminal record of fraud, (this verse, "Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor") would seem to require the lawyer to warn any of the client's potential business partners of the extra risks involved in doing business with him or her. Because society needs legal services, though, and because people will seek the aid of an attorney only if they can be assured of confidentiality, we may interpret Jewish law as permitting – – or even insisting--that the lawyer keep quiet about the client's past. That clearly impinges on the potential partners' welfare, for they may be taking on a larger level of risk than they realize or want to; but the need of the community for legal help and for confidentiality in attaining that help may outweigh the partners' individual or collective well-being. In interpreting Jewish law in this way, I am narrowing the domain of (this verse) to exclude professionals who are keeping confidences made known to them in their professional roles. (Cohen (1984), 224-227, takes this position and I agree with it). On the other hand, if there is no practical need to reveal negative facts about a person, disclosing them is itself a sin. (Continued at [[NUM168]] Numbers 15:32 man DORFFLOV 65).

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LEV477 Defamatory speech is an important thing to avoid as much as possible, but there are some very clear exceptions to the prohibition. One exception occurs when failure to defame the person will result in harm to someone else. If someone routinely defrauds customers, for example, you are duty-bound to warn potential victims and to inform the authorities, however negative your report may be. In fact, as a general rule, when failure to disclose a financial or physical abuse to the proper authorities will result in continued illegal activities, the victim and anyone who notices the wrongdoing are obliged to report such activities. Even though that will inevitably defame the abuser, such action is not only permissible but mandatory when it is done in an effort to prevent harm to oneself or someone else.

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LEV476 Because of the enormous value placed on human life, we are expected to spare virtually no effort to save human life, even for a short time. And conversely, the deliberate taking of a human life is considered one of the most grievous sins a person can commit. Not only is the active taking of human life a terrible crime, but the Jewish tradition also considers an abtension from saving a life as a serious offense. In contrast to the Western notion of individualism under which a person is not obligated to come to another's aid, the Torah specifically admonishes us: "Do not stand idly by your fellow's blood." [this verse]. Allowing someone to die while taking a laissez-faire attitude is not acceptable either for a physician or for a layman. Thus there is a virtual unanimity that active euthanasia, even for a suffering human being who is imploring the physician to take action to terminate the suffering, is simply not acceptable. Shortening a patient's life by deliberate injection or other similar means remains murder even if life is shortened by just a few moments, and even if the intention is compassionate. No less forbidden is suicide or assisted suicide. One has no more right to take one's own life than to take another's life. It has even been suggested that suicide is, in a way, worse than murder. A murderer has an opportunity for repentance after the dead, and indeed death itself is regarded as a mechanism of forgiveness. But the person who commits suicide forfeits the possibility of repentance, for the very act of death, which might redound to a person's credit, is in this case itself the result of a venal sin.

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LEV487 When we see that someone's life is in danger, we are forbidden to stand idly by if we are able to save him (Chinuch 237). We are obligated to trouble ourselves with a lost ox or sheep; all them more so, we must aid their owners (Shaarey Tshuvah 3:71). Below are the basic laws of this commandment: 1) If you see that someone's life is endangered (for example, if you see someone drowning or being attacked by robbers), you are obligated to save him. If you are unable to rescue him yourself, you must hire someone to save him (for example, call the police). Failure to save someone is a violation of a Torah prohibition. (Choshen Mishpot 426:1). 2) There is an opinion (Yerushalmi cited by Bais Yosef, Choshen Mishpot 426:2) that one must be prepared to risk a possible threat to one's life in order to save someone whose life is definitely in danger. The rescuer takes only a doubtful risk while the other person faces a certain danger and saving one soul is equivalent to save an entire world. But the Shulchan Aruch, Rambam, Tur, RIF, and ROSH do not cite this opinion as law (SMA, Choshen Mishpat 426:1). The Chofetz Chayim writes that a person is not obligated to jeopardize his own life to save someone else. But he must weigh the matter carefully before he decides that his own life will be jeopardized by his action (Mishnah Brurah 329:19). The Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chayim 329) adds that in such matters everything is dependent upon the particular circumstances. 3) If you overhear someone's plans to harm another person, you are obligated to inform the intended victim. When you are able to convince the schemer not to perpetrate the crime, you are obligated to do so. (Choshen Mishpot 426:1). 4) A doctor who fails to try to heal someone or is lax in his efforts violates this prohibition. (Eved Hamelech, Vayikra, p. 92b). 5) If you are able to admonish someone and fail to do so, you violate this prohibition. We are obligated to save someone's body; all the more so are we obligated to save his soul. (Minchas Chinuch 239:4). 6) If you unnecessarily told Reuven that Shimon spoke against him or wronged him, and Reuven grew angry to the extent that Shimon's life is in danger, you have an even greater obligation than usual to remove the danger. If you are unable to do so yourself, you must ask others to help you. (Shmiras Haloshon vol. 2, ch. 17). 7) It is advisable for every city to have volunteers who are prepared to rescue others from distress. (Shaarey Tshuvah 3:71). 8) If you hear that someone is planning to do something that might endanger his life, you are obligated to try to dissuade him from carrying out the act. (Pele Yoatz, section Yoatz).

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LEV475 [This verse]. Duties toward our fellow men are described in Leviticus 19:11-16. According to Hertz (The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, London, Soncino Press, 2nd edit. 1962, pp. 499-501), these precepts restate the fundamental rules of life in human society that are contained in the second tablet of the Decalogue. These moral principles were expanded by the Sages and apply to every phase of civil and criminal law.

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LEV483 See [[EXOD229]] Exodus 15:26 diseases ROSNER 20-1

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