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LEVITICUS — 19:18 vengeance

LEV718 Do not take vengeance against your fellow Jew. Each of us must realize that whatever happens to him is only because Hashem decrees it. Therefore, if someone causes us pain or suffering of any sort, he must realize that he is not the root cause. Rather, the root cause is our sins, and Hashem decreed that the pain or suffering befall us. If this fact is clear to us, we will not take vengeance on those who harm us or cause us suffering. In addition, a great benefit derives to us from this mitzvah, for it quells hatred before it has a chance to grow, so it prevents outbreaks of strife and quarrelling. When people do not take vengeance and do their best to live in peace with one another, Hashem will bless them and grant them peace.

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 vengeance

LEV721 Part of what we generally mean by justice is retribution... Granted that the Mishnah later made it virtually impossible to carry out the death penalty (M. Makkot 1:10) and that it transformed these modes of retribution into compensation (M. Baba Kamma 8:1), still the standard of justice is lex talionis, the law of fitting the punishment to the crime in an attempt to achieve an exact balance of one for the other. That, in the view of both the Torah and the Rabbis, is justice. So how is justice different from vengeance such that the former is praised and a latter condemned? Several things mark the difference. First, justice is meted out by communal authorities—courts and/or kings in the ancient world--while the vengeance banned in Leviticus 19 [i.e., 19:18-AJL] is that of individuals against each other. The presumption is that the court or king will be neutral and fair in deciding whether punishment is warranted and, if so, what it should be. Judges, therefore, according to Mishnaic law (M. Sanhedrin 3:4), may not be related to each other or to the accused or litigants... Second, justice requires that people be treated fairly--that is, that everyone be subject to the same rules. Those taking revenge, by contrast, decide by themselves what they think is appropriate to do to get even with a particular person or people from whom they are wreaking vengeance. Finally, the agents and motives of justice and vengeance differ radically. Justice is meted out by neutral government authorities. Judges may be upset that they must inflict punishment on particular offenders, but if they are unrelated to them, as they should be, the judge’s motivation will not be to harm particular people but rather to uphold the law so that society can live in peace. In contrast, vengeance is inflicted by victims of their families or friends. Vengeance is therefore much more personal. As such, it can eat up the person who bears a grudge and seeks vengeance, sometimes to the point of making gaining revenge the focus of their lives. (By Elliot N. Dorff)

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 vengeance

LEV716 "You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of your people." If you are angry at someone because he refused to grant you some favor and in revenge you speak loshon hora about him, you have violated these two prohibitions, in addition to having spoken loshon hora. For recalling that person's refusal to render you assistance, you are guilty of bearing a grudge. For slandering him, you are guilty of taking vengeance. You are obligated to forget the entire incident. To illustrate the extent of these two prohibitions, a certain scholar related the following anecdote: Lost and wandering in the desert, Gavrial finally spotted a man leading a herd of camels. Half–crazed from thirst, Gavrial crawled up to the man and begged for water. The camel owner refused and left Gavrial to the elements. Gavrial miraculously managed to get back to civilization and in a short time became very wealthy. One day, Gavrial's secretary announced that a camel dealer was interested in obtaining a loan from him for the purpose of enlarging his stock. When the man entered Gavrial's office, Gavrial immediately recognized the face. It was the person who had refused to aid him in his hour of need. Gavrial is obligated to grant the loan without recalling the desert incident. This is a true and difficult test Gavrial's strength of character, but it is required of him by these two mitzvos.

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 vengeance

LEV724 We are forbidden to take revenge or bear a grudge. Rabbi Moshe Chayim Luzzatto writes that it is very difficult for a person not to take revenge. People are sensitive to humiliation and suffer greatly from it. To a person who was wronged, revenge is sweeter than honey. To go against one's nature and not take revenge when one is able to, but rather to forgo the entire incident takes great strength of character. This is easy only for angels who do not have human attributes and shortcomings. Nevertheless, it is the King's decree; the verse states so explicitly, and needs no interpretation [this verse]. Not only must you lend your possessions to someone who has refused to lend you his, but you must completely forget about the person's refusal. The evil inclination wants the incident to leave its mark, or at least be partially remembered. The evil inclination will tell you that even if you do bestow a favor on someone who refused you, at least do not do so cheerfully or do not assist him too much, or do not become too friendly with him. Therefore, the Torah writes, "Love your fellowman as yourself," literally as yourself, without distinction. (Mesilas Yeshorim, ch. 11). ... We are required to emulate God. Although a person sins and goes against God's will, He still bestows life upon that person. Moreover, at the very moment the person sins, God is endowing him with the ability to move his limbs and thus enables him to transgress! Therefore, if you do someone a favor and that person goes against your wishes, emulate God and continue to perform chesed. (Tomar Dvorah) [Transcriber's note: Author provides discussion of prohibition against revenge and bearing a grudge.]

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 yourself

LEV725 … the scope of this virtue [i.e., gemiluth chesed] is not limited to free loans, as some believe, but extends through all the good and kind deeds which a person does to another without receiving recompense. One can perform a chesed with his possessions: by lending his livestock, utensils, money or the like. This constitutes the kindness done with one's property, and is so called by Chazal. One might also extend kindness with his person, this latter category being divisible into two classes: kindness towards the living and kindness towards the dead. Towards the living, one extends chesed by welcoming guests into one's house and exerting oneself on their behalf, and by escorting them on their way; by gladdening the groom and his bride; by visiting the sick and by comforting mourners, or by any similar act towards one's neighbor.… Then there is the kindness extended toward the dead: taking out the coffin, helping with all necessary for the burial, acting as a pall bearer, joining the funeral procession, rising to deliver the eulogy, digging the grave and completing the interment. All such acts are included in the topic of gemiluth chesed. (See Sukkah 49b, Rashi there; Rambam: Laws of Mourning, Chap. 14 -- the sources from which our remarks are derived.) They are included in the positive covenant of [this verse]: "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself"--meaning that whatever you would want others to do to you, you should do to others.

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 yourself

LEV730 Jewish Sexual Responsibility. Today, when casual partners hook up for sex with no apparent strings attached, it may seem naive even to talk of obligations to one another. Yet … questions … still trouble us: What do I have to tell my partner, and does it matter what kind of relationship we have? Jewish traditions emphasize duties, which in turn rest on timeless ideas about our relationships and responsibilities. I want to focus on two such Jewish principles. First, duties toward ourselves flow from the principle that our bodies and lives are the creation and property of the Divine. We do not own our selves, but rather hold and care for them as stewards or custodians. This is why, for example, many Jewish authorities across all denominations forbid smoking cigarettes, since we do not have the right to pollute and to put at grave risk what is not entirely ours. A literal understanding of the source of this duty may suggest a theology that some contemporary Jews do not share. Still, whatever one’s beliefs, the idea that we have a duty to care for and protect ourselves that goes beyond just doing what we want may still resonate. The second Jewish principle I want to highlight is the Golden Rule, first put forward in Leviticus 19:18: “Ve-ahavta l’re’ekha kamokha,” “Love your fellow as yourself.” This makes empathy an obligation and the chief engine of our duties to others. In our deliberations, we must show respect and consideration for others. We are required to put ourselves in the other’s shoes, to think and feel about the impact of our actions. But how should that impact count in our decision-making? And how much? Our specific duties to others derive from the details of our relationships. My obligations towards strangers, neighbors, friends, parents, children, and my spouse may differ in substance and urgency. And in the course of an evolving romantic or sexual relationship, my duties toward the other person also evolve. How then, should we understand these duties toward lovers and sexual partners? If we take the Ve-ahavta seriously, a good starting point might be this: At a minimum, I should treat my partner as I would wish to be treated. I ought, for example, to disclose as much information as I myself would want to have in order to make informed decisions. But this “informed consent” stance does not go far enough. Taken together, the demands of stewardship and empathy generate additional responsibilities--those of protecting and respecting myself and others. Beyond merely being truthful, I should act to avoid my partner’s suffering, even in circumstances in which the partner does not take responsibility for doing so him/herself. If a female partner yearns to go ahead with unprotected sex, it is still the male partner’s duty either to insist on contraception, or to limit activity to sexual acts that cannot get her pregnant. If a potential partner insists he or she does not mind taking the risk, an HIV-positive person likewise still has a duty to insist on using condoms, or to limit their sex to less risky activities. (By Jeffrey Burack)

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 yourself

LEV727 (Continued from [[NUM300]] Numbers 27:16 spirits DORFFDRAG 52-3). These classical rabbinic sources also indicate that pluralism is a divine creation; human beings have difficulty imitating it. To achieve the ability to be pluralistic is, in fact, the ultimate ethical and spiritual challenge, according to [Rabbi Simon] Greenberg [1986, “Pluralism and Jewish Education” Religious Education 81 (winter): 19-28. Just as “love your neighbor as yourself” -- which, for Rabbi Akiva, is the underlying principle of all the commandments (Sifra to Leviticus 19:18) -- requires a person to go beyond biologically rooted self-love, pluralism requires a person to escape egocentricity. It is not possible for human beings totally to love their neighbors as themselves, and neither is it possible to be totally pluralistic; we are by nature too self-centered fully to achieve either goal. The tradition, however, prescribes methods to bring us closer to these aims. Many of its directions to gain love of neighbor appear in that same chapter 19 of Leviticus in which the commandment itself appears. The later tradition’s instructions on how to become pluralistic are contained, in part, in the talmudic source quoted earlier describing the debates of Hillel and Shammai [J. Yevamot 1:6 (3b); B. Yevamot 14a-b. Compare also T. Yevamot 1:12]; One must, like Hillel, be affable and humble and teach opinions opposed to one's own, citing them first. (B. Eruvin 13b)

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