DEUT1096 As important as this mitzvah is, and as strict as the Jewish laws are about returning lost objects, not all objects need to be returned. If the lost object is very common (such as a dollar bill) and has no specific identification marks and is found in a public area, then the finder may pick up the object and keep it immediately, as it is assumed that the owner, when realizing the object has been lost, will give up hope of ever retrieving the object due its unidentifiable nature. How does the finder ago about returning the object in Jewish law? Based on [this] verse "Until thy brother require it." The Midrash (Midrash, Mechilta Mishpatim 20) says this verse means that the finder of the object must publicly announce its finding. Thus, the finder must announce that he has found an object and wait for the owner to identify it with specific signs unique to that object, or by the specific amount, weight, number, or place lost (Maimonides, Hilchot Gezeilah Ve'aveidah 13:5). How does the finder specifically announce the object? ... Today, a person would announce by advertising the found object in the general area or neighborhood that the object was found. Of course, the cost of the advertisement would have to be repaid by the owner, once identified. How long would a finder have to keep announcing the found object before he would be allowed to "give up" and fulfill his obligation? ... After the destruction of the Temple, no set time limit was officially established, although sources list a thirty-day maximum for announcing (Tosefta, Bava Metzia 2:6). What happens if no one claims the object after it has been sufficiently announced or no one claiming to be the owner sufficiently identifies it as his or her own? In most societies today, the police will eventually let the finder keep the object if no one comes to claim it (even if not announced), usually after thirty days. In Judaism, a finder cannot ever take the object for himself or herself if it is identifiable and must leave it forever or until Elijah comes and returns it to the "rightful owner" (Maimonides, Hilchot Gezeilah Ve'aveidah 13:8).

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DEUT1101 See [[DEUT1106]] Deuteronomy 22:3 anything AMEMEI 146 and 238

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DEUT1106 [This] commandment obligates Jews to return any lost object, much more so than any other society. One cannot merely walk by a lost object and ignore it (See chapter "Returning Found Objects"). The Talmud (Bava Kamma 91a) states that this mitzvah is not limited to physical objects. If a person has lost his or her away on the road, this falls under the obligation of returning a lost object. A Jew is obligated to help the person find the way back. According to many opinions (Among others, Minchat Chinuch, Mitzvah #239), the obligation to return someone's Judaism also falls under this obligation. Since at one time everyone had the "proper" spirituality, people who no longer feel the importance of Judaism have "lost" this feeling of Judaism. Therefore, the return of Jewish spirituality to a Jew falls under the commandment to return any lost object to a Jew. Perhaps this is why the process of coming closer to Judaism is called teshuvah, returning, and one who returns is called a baal teshuvah.

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DEUT1143 The commandment to send away the mother bird before taking the eggs in the nest [this verse] sends a message to man to have mercy on the mother bird and not let her see her eggs being taken from her.

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DEUT1167 According to the implication of the Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 550), since different species of animals plow at different rates, putting two different species together will inevitably cause pain for the animals. It is for this reason that it is forbidden.

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DEUT1173 The Torah is sensitive to make sure that man does not alter the world or destroy it. Commenting on a verse in the first chapter of the Torah where the Torah commands each species to reproduce itself [Genesis 1:11], Samson Rafael Hirsch comments that the mitzvah given to man not to create a mixture of species in plants or animals in general, or between wool and linen specifically [this verse], indicates that the Torah did not want man to alter the world or to "play God." Creating hybrids alters the commandment by God to keep species separate.

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DEUT1174 Since free will is indeed basic to Jewish belief (See chapter "Choices and Freedom"), then, logically, each person who freely chooses to perform any particular action must accept full responsibility for that deed. Therefore, even though a person's action was incited and brought about by some other individual, the perpetrator of a crime out of free will must assume full responsibility. Inciting the deed by another person may explain why the person committed the sin, but it should not excuse him or her. And if the sinner takes full responsibility, then logically the inciter bears no responsibility, even if the inciter urged that the deed be effected and knew what was happening at the time of the deed. This concept seems to have support from specific Jewish sources. Maimonides rules (Maimonides, Hilchot Kelayim 10:31) that if one man clothes a second individual with a garment of wool and linen, a Torah prohibition [this verse], and if the person wearing the garment was unaware of the illicit mixture in the clothing, then the one who caused the sin by placing the garment on the individual is the blameworthy party and is punished, while the wearer is exonerated. However, if the wearer knew about the illegal garment, then he is guilty. In a similar manner, if a man sends his shepherd with cattle to graze in someone else's field, the shepherd, and not the sender, is responsible for the damages (Kiddushin 42b). ... What is the logic for making the shepherd guilty (or the Mafia hitman guilty) for merely following the instructions of the sender or inciter? Can't he claim that "I am only acting as his messenger" and assume no personal guilt? The answer is that in the Talmud (Kiddushin 42b), there is a concept that there is no agency to commit a sin. While I may generally act at someone's behest to do a mitzvah and my action makes it as if he performed the action, if a person asks me to commit a sin, I may not listen to him or her and carry out this sin even in the other person's name. If I do the act, I am doing it of my own free will.

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DEUT1203 The preceding discussion shows that the sexual act, in the Jewish view, is much more than physical pleasure and must remain special and unique. We know from the reaction of people out to the subject of sex (a joke, a book, or a movie) that it is part of man's nature to look at this topic in a special way. It is not just another bodily function or even just another appetite like food, but it is different. Since the sexual act is so exceptional and integral to the relationship between a man and a woman (as discussed earlier), it is antithetical to Judaism to have a one-time sexual encounter, a "one-night stand," because there must be a relationship between two people both before and after the sexual act. There must also be a responsibility for the sexual partner after the sexual act, for the relationship must continue. For example, if a woman is raped, in addition to all the punishment involved, the man is obligated to marry her [this verse] (of course, only if she agrees). The reason for this is that after the sexual act, even in a forced sexual act such as rape, a person must take responsibility for the partner and the relationship must continue. Thus, Judaism does not permit sexual relations between partners prior to marriage. Even if two adults say that they are in love with each other and are living together to see if they should get married, they still may not engage in sex if they wish to observe Jewish law. These individuals may say that they will continue the relationship after sex and that they will take responsibility for each others' feelings. However, the sexual act itself is such a powerful force in defining a relationship between a man and woman that it has been known to happen that despite all the promises, if the act of sexual intercourse is not a satisfying one, the relationship between the two individuals may abruptly end. A sexual failure can destroy a relationship despite all the declarations of love beforehand and all the promises to stick together. Since this type of abrupt ending following sex in a Jewish relationship is not permitted, that is, no sex without responsibility afterward, Jewish law has forbidden sexual intercourse prior to marriage. The only way to ensure that there will be some degree of responsibility after sex is through the act of marriage.

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DEUT1210 The Torah [this verse] commands that Amonite and Moabite men can never convert into Judaism, and even if they choose to convert, they may never enter and be considered a part of the Jewish community. This is clearly spelled out in the Mishnah (Mishnah Yevamot 3:8) and codified in Jewish law (Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha'ezer 4:2). Is this not prejudice and discriminatory? There is a Jewish law codified by Maimonides (Maimonides, Hilchot Avodah Zarah 10:3) that a Jew may neither rent nor sell a home in the neighborhood to an idol worshiper. Not only would this law violate existing laws guaranteeing equality in most Western countries, but this seems to demonstrate the worst kind of prejudice, running counter to ideas in Judaism stated earlier. Why is this law, apparently sanctioning discrimination, permitted? In order to fully understand, it is important to re-examine our definition of prejudice. [Continued at [[DEUT643]] Deuteronomy 13:16 AMEMEI 222-3 sword]

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DEUT1216 See [[DEUT643]] Deuteronomy 13:16 sword AMEMEI 222-3

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