LEV980 Until this point, we have discussed only the obligations of the advertiser. But the Talmud also places some obligations on the buyer. Because the commandment not to wrong another person is repeated twice in the Torah in the span of three verses [this verse and Leviticus 25:17], the Talmud teaches that one verse refers to wrongdoing someone monetarily by charging too much for a product and the other verse refers to wronging someone verbally (Bava Metzia 58b). Among the prohibitions of wronging someone verbally is the custom of what is commonly called window shopping. Although widely practiced, the Mishnah (Mishnah, Bava Metzia 4:10] says that one may not ask a sales person or store owner the price of an item that he or she has no intention to buy. The salesperson or owner is "wronged" because asking the price or window shopping (trying on clothes or even browsing) clearly raises the expectation of a sale on the part of the store. This is especially wrong if the store person spends time with the (non) customer. Therefore, just as the advertiser cannot misrepresent to the potential buyers, the potential buyers may not misrepresent to the product owners. This entire concept of misleading others is not merely a business concept in Judaism, but should be with a Jew in all aspects of life. Although Maimonides does mention it prominently in his section on business laws (Hilchot Mechirah 18:1), he emphasizes it even more in his section on how fundamentally to act as a Jew at all times (Hilchot De'ot 2:6). One cannot truly separate the two. Thus, the idea of not misrepresenting should be with the Jews not only when they play the roles of advertisers and customers, but in all walks of life.

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LEV984 See [[LEV957]] Leviticus 25:10 jubilee AMEMEI 130

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LEV1008 See [[LEV980]] Leviticus 25:14 wrong AMEMEI 6

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LEV1018 See [[LEV957]] Leviticus 25:10 jubilee AMEMEI 130

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LEV1063 There are usually numerous people involved in any business deal or loan transaction. If interest is charged in the loan, Jewish law is violated [Exodus 22:24 and this verse]. Therefore, in such a business loan, says the Talmud, not only has the actual loaner sinned, but all the parties involved have as well, including the guarantors, witnesses, and scribes, and all have violated "placing a stumbling block" by enabling the sin of interest being charged. Tosafot (Tosafot commentary, "Minayin" on Avodah Zarah 6b) says that this prohibition against enabling a sin applies to all sins in the Torah, not only the ones cited in the Talmud. By actively helping or enabling any person to sin, you violate the Torah prohibition of "placing a stumbling block," even when the sinner is clearly aware of this sin. Certainly, any inciter or initiator of sin, even with the full knowledge of the sinner, would also violate this prohibition.

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LEV1081 See [[LEV957]] Leviticus 25:10 jubilee AMEMEI 130

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LEV1113 See [[LEV261]] Leviticus 18:25 vomit AMEMEI 126

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LEV1131 If an uncommitted Jew is totally unaware that a particular action is a sin in Judaism, then the transgression performed is done out of ignorance and it is not judged as harshly as for that of a person who is aware of the sin and still transgresses. If a Jew approaches an uncommitted Jew and informs him or her that a particular action is a sin, and this person chooses to continue the action, then the person has been changed from an accidental, unaware sinner into an aware sinner. The act of telling the person who continues actually makes matters worse. That is why the obligation to inform the person exists only if there is a possibility of change. If change is not all realistic, then it is indeed not permitted to inform a transgressor that here she is committing a sin (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 608:2 and Ramah). The same concept can be demonstrated from the talmudic passage (Sanhedrin 27b) that says that each Jew is bound to every other Jew. This is based on [this] Torah verse that seems to say that one Jew is punished for the sins of another Jew. The Talmud then asks: How can this be--is it fair to punish one Jew who did not commit the sin? The answer is that if a Jew could have prevented this sin from taking place, then indeed he or she is punished (although not to the same degree as the actual transgressor). If there was no possibility of preventing the sin, the other Jew is not punished. Only if a Jew can prevent another Jew from sinning is there an obligation to step in. If not, there is no obligation.

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NUM3 In the desert the Jews also remained together by families. When the Jews were counted as a people, they were counted by families [this verse]. Even after the forty years in the desert, the distribution of the Holy Land, which would mark the permanent status of the people, was apportioned by family (Numbers 33:54). Thus, the concept of the centrality of the Jewish family was firmly established then and would continue to be throughout Jewish history. Even today, when Jewish tradition wishes to perpetuate the story of the redemption, it must be accomplished in the family setting. Just as that first "seder" in Egypt was held in the family setting, so, too, it is no mere custom today that the Passover seder is conducted by families. The family is an integral part of the ceremony, as the Talmud (Pesachim 108b) lists numerous devices to keep the children awake and participating in the seder experience. There are even sections of the Haggadah that were specifically set up just so that the children would ask questions, in order that they participate and be part of the experience [Pesachim 114b, which shows that the purpose of instituting the Karpas and its dipping, the third step in the seder process, was specifically designed to get children to be curious and encourage them to participate].

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NUM5 A minor does not have true understanding in the moral sphere (Yoma 43a). A minor has no true moral intention (Chullin 13a). The father traditionally recites a blessing at the time of bar mitzvah, Baruch Sheptarani Mei'onsho Shel Zeh, Blessed be God who has freed me from the punishment of this boy. Since, before the age of thirteen, a child cannot be held responsible for his or her moral choices, the parent must accept the responsibility. After the age of thirteen, the child is held responsible Jewishly for all moral choices. It should be noted that in other areas, Judaism recognizes that a thirteen-year-old boy and twelve-year-old girl are not truly adults, as reflected in the numerous Jewish laws where a Jewish boy and girl may not be considered an adult until much later. For example, although legal in the Jewish sense to marry and work for a living after bar mitzvah, the same mishnah that declares thirteen the age of mitzvot declares the ideal of marriage to be at eighteen and pursuit of a livelihood at twenty years of age (Avot 5:25). The Torah [this verse] declares the age of twenty to be the minimum age of a Jewish soldier. It is interesting to note that in the last few years in Western countries, while the ages of voting, joining the Army, and drinking remain between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, the age at which a person can be tried for crimes such as murder has been lowered in many places to ages twelve, thirteen, and fourteen. Therefore, even Western society has come to recognize that in the moral sphere, a child this age can recognize the difference between right and wrong.

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