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LEVITICUS — 19:14 stumbling-block

LEV428 Separate and distinct from this mitzvah [i.e., the interest-free loan as a positive religious act in Judaism] is the negative mitzvah of not taking interest, which is repeated numerous times in the Bible. In the eyes of the halachic authorities, this repetition of the injunction against taking interest serves to compound the severity of the crime, making the participants liable on a number of different counts. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh v Loveh, chapter 4, halakhot 1-2. Even the use of two different Hebrew terms, neshekh and tarbit, both to mean “interest,” is seen as reflecting the desire of the Torah to make a man liable for two transgressions from making the same single interest-bearing loan. It is interesting to see the Jewish social attitude toward interest expressed in Rashi’s comment on the use of the word neshekh (literally, a “bite”). A snake bite is at first only slightly uncomfortable, but later increases in pain and severity. So, too, interest (neshekh) is at first bearable, but as the debt mounts, the debtors suffering increases. Rashi on Exod. 22:24 From the Torah’s viewpoint, the transgression involved in making interest-bearing loans is not limited to the lender, even though he is obviously the major factor and so bears the brunt of the responsibility. Rather, all parties to the transaction are guilty of violating religious injunctions. The lender is guilty, inter alia, of putting a stumbling block in the path of the blind open (Leviticus 19:14), which the rabbinic authorities always understood as referring to giving prejudiced advice to somebody or providing him with things that are to his spiritual or physical detriment. See Rashi and Sefer HaChinukh, Mitzvah 232; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotzeah u Shmirot Hanefesh, chapter 12, halakhah 14. Agents or other go-betweens in the transaction are considered to be guilty of the same crime. In keeping with Judaism’s symmetry of justice, even the borrower is not left untouched. After all, it is his need or desire for the loan which has implicated the lender in a moral crime. Even the witnesses to the transaction, as well as the guarantors of an interest-bearing loan, are considered to have violated the injunction of “you shall not take interest from him.” Without their participation, it is highly improbable that the transaction would have taken place. It is only fitting, therefore, that they share in the guilt attached to the maker of the interest-bearing loan by the Torah. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh u Loveh, chapter 4, halakhah 2.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 people

LEV498 The law that states, "Do not go about as a talebearer among your people" [this verse, emphasis added] seems to be directed only toward Jews; in other words, don't bear tales or speak negatively and unfairly about your fellow Jews. In legal works on lashon hara, it is generally assumed that we are forbidden to speak lashon hara only of fellow Jews. In a democracy like United States, however, Jews have full equality, and are regarded, both by themselves and by non-Jews, as part of the American people. Therefore the laws prohibiting lashon hara should apply as well to the non-Jews among whom we live (unlike, for example, medieval Europe or Jews living under Roman occupation). In short, American Jews, as Americans and Jews, belong to two people, and have obligations to both.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 stand

LEV504 Jewish moralists have been quick to point out, in considering our ongoing obligation to rescue the lives and property of others when they are in danger [this verse], that we must train ourselves to make quick and effective responses to new situations and must develop ability to make a realistic judgment as to what is possible. Rabbi Jonah Gerondi makes this important practical suggestion: "It is good and very proper that there be in every community volunteers consisting of intelligent people who should be prepared and equipped for all means of rescue work [hatzalah] in the event that any man or woman be in trouble. For behold, we are obligated to bestir ourselves for the lost ox or sheep of our neighbor and mind it until the owner claims it, how much more should we be prepared to work for the well-being of their owners themselves. As the prophet Isaiah says: "… Bring the poor that are cast out to the house" (Gerondi, Sha'arei Teshuvah, p. 68. Isaiah 58:7).

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 love

LEV655 Effective medical care... not only involves the cost of a physician and hospitalization, but also requires a support system to alleviate the effects of illness on the peace of mind of the sick person and on the family unit. Modern medicine recognizes such a support system as an intrinsic part of communal health care and therefore expects home care and personal counseling to be funded either by the patient's health insurance or by the state. Such supports have always been part and parcel of the Jewish welfare system. The following ruling of Maimonides shows this support system to be legally binding and not just desirable. “It is a rabbinic commandment, incumbent on all, to visit the sick... and this may be done many times in the day... except in those cases where it is a bother to the sick. He who visits the sick removes part of his illness and eases his situation. He who does not visit the sick, it is as though he has shed blood [since visitors took care of all the patient’s needs, by refraining from such visits, one is harming the patient, perhaps even fatally.] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel, chapter 14, halakhot 1-5. See also Talmud Bavli, Nedarim 40a. Maimonides goes on to rule that visiting the sick is an act of righteousness performed with one's body, and thus without legal limit in its fulfillment (in contrast to monetary acts of righteousness, which the sages had limited to 20 percent of one's wealth). He sees the visiting of the sick as a fulfillment of the Torah’s commandment “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” [Leviticus 19:18]. This support system, like most moral and ethical injunctions in Judaism, is not left to the choice of the individual, to be observed or not according to his degree of religiosity.

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LEVITICUS — 19:36 honest

LEV814 The Sefer Hachinuch, in discussing the ideology behind all biblical precepts, writes: “The Torah tells us [in Leviticus 19:36] that ‘Just weights and measures shall you have.’ Even though this is included in the general commandment not to cheat one another, the Torah mentions each type of weight and measure separately in order to emphasize the enormity of the crime.” In the same verse in Leviticus, God reiterates that “I am the lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt”; explains the Sifra (an extended legal commentary on Leviticus), because God took the Jews out of Egypt precisely in order that they should take upon themselves the mitzvah of just weights and measures. The sages of the Talmud reiterate the connection: “The God who distinguished between the seed of the first born who died in the plague and the other Egyptians, a distinction based on the most intimate knowledge, shall surely punish he who soaks his weights in salt in order to cheat [in secret].” Talmud Bavli, Baba Metzia 61b. In the same vein, Rashi, the quintessential commentator on the Bible, linked the abuse of weights and measures to physical calamity of great proportions. Discussing the attack of Amalek on Israel just after leaving Egypt, the first unprovoked action against Israel after the miracles at the Red Sea, he notes the proximity of the verse obligating the Jew to eternally remember Amalek [Deuteronomy 25:17] to the restatement in Deuteronomy of the above verse prohibiting false weights and measures. “If you falsify weights and measures,” notes Rashi, “be concerned about awakening the enemy.” Mere moralizing, however, does not exhaust the Jewish treatment of any problem, so our sources are replete with legal and communal enactments to prevent economic abuse through fraudulent weights and measures.

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LEVITICUS — 24:20 eye

LEV946 Special place [in Jewish law] is given in the context of damages to the prevention of damage to the human body. Here, in addition to the economic loss caused by the loss of limbs or by death itself, there are obviously also moral and psychological costs, both to the individual and to society. Halakhic sources are careful to translate even these costs into monetary ones, since a human court would not be able to inflict punishment commensurate with the moral or psychological damage. Thus, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” [Leviticus 24:20], has always been understood by the Oral Law to mean monetary compensation, as defined in the following Mishnah: “He who damages his fellow man bodily is liable to pay for five types of damages: namely, damage [a monetary assessment of the physical damage done]; pain [payment for the pain incurred on account of the injury]; medical costs; enforced idleness [as a result of the sickness or damage done]; and shame [it is an affront to human dignity for a man to have been involved in the kind of situation in which the damage resulted.] Baba Kama, chapter 8, mishnah 1.

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