EXOD693 [This verse] is the basis for the positive precept of extending interest-free loans. It is interesting to point out that although the Hebrew word “im” is usually translated as “if,” in this verse, the sages considered it to mean “when.” This interpretation made giving interest-free loans a binding obligation rather than a voluntary act. This positive commandment to lend money to a fellow Jew is one of the examples in Judaism of chesed, an act of loving kindness, as distinct from acts of charity as discussed in chapter nine. These acts were considered to be obligations to which the law prescribed no limits, since chesed was something rendered to people primarily when they were not entitled to it. Maimonides ruled that the interest-free loan is the highest form of charity, being an expression of the biblical commandment “Thou shalt give him [the needy] support” [Leviticus 25:35). Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh u Loveh, chapter 1, halakhah 1. Charity is something one gives to the poor, whereas an act of g’milut chesed is one that can be directed both at poor and rich alike. To the poor person the interest-free loan represents a chance to establish himself in a craft or business, thus breaking the cycle of poverty. In the case of the rich, the interest-free loan represents a form of assistance during periods of extreme liquidity problems, thus preventing bankruptcy. It is easy to look upon the interest-free loan commanded by the Torah as something pertinent to a primitive agrarian economy, where most financial transactions would be between a neighbor and his fellow farmer, primarily to tide one over for the next harvest. This, however, is not the way the sages saw it. In the course of explaining the ideological basis of the mitzvot, the fourteenth-century Sefer Hachinukh, of Barcelona, comments as follows regarding the interest-free loan: “One who is not a pauper but who needs assistance is actually worse off than one whose poverty is public knowledge and who is used to collecting charity. If we will give [the former] assistance through the interest-free loan, he may be able to earn a livelihood and not become dependent on others [with its resulting degradation].” Mitzvah 56. This explanation was written at a time when the Jews, both in Spain and in other countries, were no longer farmers but were engaged in sophisticated international trade and banking. From the earliest days of Jewish society, the interest-free loan was relevant beyond the needs of an agrarian economy and was not limited to the simple act of making small temporary loans. Irrespective of the country in which Jews lived, the sophistication of its economy, or the particular economic conditions of the Jewish community, these free loans were an integral part of the Jewish economic world. Throughout history and down to the present day, almost no Jewish community in an organized form has ever existed without the free loan as a permanent part of its communal structure.

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EXOD696 Maimonides represents the biblical verse, “To the Gentile you may [tashikh] lend upon interest ” (Deuteronomy 23:21) as a positive injunction; He views the Hebrew tashikh as meaning “You shall” rather than “You may,” so receiving interest from or paying interest to a Gentile is not something left up to one's discretion but rather a mitzvah. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh u Loveh, chapter 5, halakhah 1. We can perhaps understand his view in the light of his interpretation of the Jewish people as a chosen people. Maimonides maintains that the choosing of the Jewish people was a result of the rejection of God by the rest of creation and their adoption of idolatry. It was the failure of mankind from Adam onwards to maintain their relationship with God which led to the isolating of a specific group to carry out that which was originally given to all men. Thus, they were released from the laws of the Torah including the injunctions against receiving or paying interest. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avoda Zara, chapter 1, halakhah 1-3. There are other commentators, like the Ramban (Nachmanides), who argued, on various grounds, that the taking of interest from Gentiles was permissible, but not obligatory. The Raivad, in his gloss on Maimonides’ Mishnah Torah, avers that we are to understand the Torah as granting permission to lend Gentiles money at interest rather than obliging us to do so. Rav Hiya, in the Talmudic discussion on the ruling in the Mishnah quoted above [Mishnah, Baba Metzia, chapter 5, mishnah 6], felt that one should be engaged in money lending to Gentiles only if there was no other occupation open to one, or only to the extent of providing a livelihood. Talmud Bavli, Baba Metzia 70b-71a. It seems, however, that their disagreement with Maimonides was based not on grounds of morality but rather on other considerations. For instance, in the same Talmudic discussion, Ravina held that moneylending to Gentiles led to general intercourse with them and should be limited in order to prevent Jews from learning from the evil ways of the Gentile world. On the other hand, Rabbeinu Tam, in the eleventh century, argued that since the Jewish-Gentile commerce was no longer limited, neither therefore should the practice of moneylending be limited. Finally, other sources like the Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael (commenting on the parallel verse in Exodus [22:24] forbidding interest-bearing loans), argue that acts of chesed enjoined on the Jew, such as the interest-free loan, should be extended to non-Jews--in accordance with the principle in Jewish law that, “for the sake of peace,” Jews act on various principles of righteousness and kindness in their dealing with non-Jews, even when such behavior is not biblically obligatory.

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EXOD699 The Torah does not view interest taking as an intrinsically evil action, akin to murder or theft, or a would have forbidden it altogether. After all, those acts that are intrinsically evil are forbidden irrespective of whether they are done to Jew or Gentile. If, indeed, Judaism does not view interest as inherently evil, why, then, was interest taking (or giving) forbidden among Jews? The author of the Sefer Hachinukh, which is devoted to explaining the ideological basis for the commandments, seems to sum up the general opinion of Jewish authorities. Commenting on [this verse], it comments: “According to the normal morality of the world one should be entitled to charge for the use of one's money. However, since the whole purpose of the mitzvot is to purify the Jew, [God] instructed us to give up that which is acceptable by normal moral standards.” Mitzvah 66. (One may see as a parallel the injunction on the Jew to refrain from eating non-kosher food in order to elevate his material needs to a higher plane. The eating of such food is not detrimental, per se, and so, at their discretion, Gentiles may eat or not of it.) Following this idea, the Torah Temimah (a twentieth-century commentator) writes (on Deuteronomy 23:21) that “Our refraining from taking interest from one another is similar to the regulations of many trade and other associations in which the members provide each other with special benefits. Such benefits are not available to outsiders. Yet there is nothing to prevent others from establishing similar associations and providing the same help.”

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EXOD720 ... certain assets can serve as pledges only temporarily, while others are completely beyond the reach of the creditor. So we find the Talmudic injunction that a craftsman’s solitary set of tools, used as a pledge, had to be returned to him each morning. Talmud Bavli, Baba Metzia 113a, b. This injunction was based on the biblical verse (Deuteronomy 24:6) forbidding the taking of a millstone as security for a loan. Since millstones are essential for the crushing or grinding of wheat and barley into flour, their possession by the creditor, would mean that the debtor's family would be unable to eat. A similar biblical injunction (Exodus 22:25-26) is explained by Rashi as enjoining the taking of basic necessities such as a pillow or a cloak. It was understood by halachic authorities throughout the ages as preventing the use of all essential items as pledges. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh u Loveh, chapter 3, halakhot 5-6. See also Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, section 96, subsections 6-18. The protection afforded by the Torah to the debtor did not only extend to the goods or articles which could properly serve as security for the loan; his privacy, too, was protected. Thus, creditors are not allowed to enter a debtor's house without his permission.

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EXOD730 See [[EXOD720]] Exodus 22:25 pledge TAMARI 175

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EXOD803 The demand of Jewish sources that one act to protect others [e.g. Leviticus 19:16] is not only concerned with the prevention of bodily harm. The Sefer Hachinukh, the thirteenth-century Spanish study of the reasons behind the mitzvot, explains the biblical commandment in Exodus “and if you see the donkey of your enemy straining under its burden,... you shall surely help him.” [this verse]. (As to the scriptures saying a donkey, it does not mean a donkey specifically, but any beast. It is only that scripture spoke of what is the usual purpose of a donkey-- for carrying burdens.) “It is a religious duty to help unload a man laden with a burden as well. Furthermore, even if he suffers only the loss of his goods and possessions, it is a religious obligation for us to take pity on him. At the root of this precept lies the purpose: to teach our spirit the quality of compassion, which is a noble trait of character. [A fortiori] there is no need to say that a duty lies on us to take pity on a man who is suffering physical pain.” Parshat Mishpatim, Mitzvah 80.

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EXOD880 The Kli Yakar, a biblical commentary, comments on this verse. [Exodus 23:11] that “the purpose of the law is to teach us not to regard man as absolute lord over the produce of the land, and that one is required to have faith in God that he will provide adequate crops in the sixth year, not only for that and the seventh year, but also for the eighth, until the new harvest is gathered.” Kil Yakar. This idea of trust in God to provide adequately for all of man's needs permeates many mitzvot, such as the free loan requirement, the allocation of time for studying Torah, and the extensive obligations of charity. The Sefer Hachinuch, explaining the same verse, adds “This teaches us the attribute of voluntary renunciation of property and the resultant generosity which flows from this attribute. [since in the sabbatical year the land was ownerless and its fruit public property]. Man learns from this mitzvah that there is an owner to the earth who produces his fruits, and at His will they become ownerless. Furthermore, this renunciation of the fruit of the land teaches us faith and trust in God. A man who, at the Divine commandment regularly relinquishes his ownership over his land for this year will never lack for trust in the bounty of God. Sefer Hachinuch.

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LEV164 In the Torah there are a number of injunctions based on a two-fold ideology: the prevention of illness and the removal of “unclean” things from areas of human habitation. [Deuteronomy 23:14]. The temporary quarantine and purification of garments, utensils, and houses prescribed in Leviticus was aimed both at eradicating the physical results of spiritual deficiencies and at preserving the physical health of the community. All the laws of Tumah-- impurity-- which required expulsion from the community and purification before re-entry [e.g.., Leviticus 15: 2- 23; Numbers 19: 7- 22] served the same dual purpose. In the same way, the Talmud, the halachic codes, and the rabbinic literature all include the discussion of health problems, nutrition, and preventive medicine as part of the religious pattern of life. Man, created in God’s image, is required to care properly for his body and is enjoined against harming himself or others through neglect of that body.

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LEV317 The poor have the right to participate in the Jewish farmer’s harvest: the Jewish poor in accordance with the Torah and the Gentile poor mip’nei darkei shalom (for the sake of peace). (It is obviously not feasible to grant by right all the poor of the world a share in the bounty of such a small entity as the Jewish farming community.) Although at first glance the effect of these gifts on the poor of a modern nonagrarian society seems to be severely limited, this is not really so. Even today, even in industrialized societies, the specter of hunger is such that mitigating it in this form would seem to retain some importance. More importantly, perhaps, the influence of the ideology underlying these gifts in shaping the attitudes of Jews toward wealth and responsibility for each other's welfare inherent therein is as great today as ever. Similarly, the institution of gifts to the poor is based on principles that are relevant to many of the issues confronting the modern welfare state. It is this relevance, both to the concept of wealth and to the perfection of the welfare system, which, we suggest, is as important as an analysis of the role of the gifts themselves. Logically, the gifts enumerated [in this and related verses] are applicable, in one form or another, to the Jewish farmer today.

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LEV327 See [[LEV317]] Leviticus 19:9 harvest TAMARI 251

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