LEV970 Alongside the[] moral exhortations and administrative actions taken by the halachic authorities to prevent economic suffering through restraints on the market mechanism, additional redress was provided through the application of the just price -- ona’ah -- limitation. The concept of ona’ah does not seem to flow merely from a concept of fraud or theft but rather as a form of exploitation in commercial transactions. It is instructive that the codes deal with it in the laws of buying and selling and not together with those of theft. There is valid ground to consider it primarily as a price different from that of the market price, as a result of lack of knowledge on the part of one of the parties or the use of undue influence by either of them. The basis for this interpretation lies in these observations: 1. The rabbinic concept of just price -- ona’ah-- derives from the biblical verse (Leviticus 25:14). In most places in the Bible where the word ona’ah is used, it refers to the exploitation of status or strength as for instance in the commandments (Exodus 22:20) “And a stranger you shall not oppress” and the parallel injunction in Leviticus 19:33. 2. All the commandments forbidding theft or robbery are understood to include non-Jews as well, whereas ona’ah applied only to Jews. Thus, it cannot be understood as fraud or theft, but rather as an extra duty devolving on the Jew to refrain from taking advantage of a position of, say, superior information. This duty could be implemented only in a reciprocal relationship; Therefore, it had to be limited to Jews only. 3. Ona’ah exists not only in business transactions but also in speech (ona’at d’varim). For instance, one is not allowed to vex a convert to Judaism by saying to him, “Remember the actions of your idolatrous ancestors.” The sages of the Talmud, commenting on this example, pointed out that such “Ona’ah in speech is far more serious than ona’ah in business, since the latter can be rectified by restitution, whereas the injury inflicted by speech cannot be. Ona’ah in business, after all, only affects one’s material goods, whereas one’s very being is affected by other forms of ona’ah. In the biblical text [Leviticus 25:17], the name of God is added to the injunction against [i.e., that which is traditionally understood to prohibit] ona’ah in speech but not to that [in Leviticus 25:14, quoted above] concerning ona’ah in business, making it a far more serious crime. Talmud Bavli, Baba Metzia 58b. Additional evidence that the concept of the just price is primarily a moral concept, concerned with the exploitation of ignorance or duress, may be seen from some of the halakhot in the codes, which disallow the claim of ona’ah in cases of full disclosure. Thus, for example: [Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mekhirah, chapter 13, halakhah 4, based on the Baraita, Baba Metzia 51b].

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LEV983 ... we see that we have to judge matters pertaining to buying and selling as matters commanded us by the Torah. Furthermore, we learn from [this verse], that one may not exploit or oppress the other party in business, neither as regards the price nor the quality of the goods. Sefer Hachinuch on Lev. 25:14. The Mishnah objected even to nonmonetary exploitation. “Just as there is exploitation in buying and selling [the reference is to overcharging or exploiting ignorance], so there can be verbal exploitation. So one is not permitted to ask [the seller] ‘What is the price of this article?’ when one has no intention of buying.” Mishnah, Baba Metzia, chapter 14, mishnah 10. The variations and possibilities of stealing through ordinary everyday economic activities are almost unlimited. Nevertheless, it is essential from a moral point of view to limit them wherever possible. Not to do so not only causes hardship to others, but destroys the moral fabric of society and negates Divine law. So it is natural that halachic codes and communal enactments sought to minimize the scope of theft and dishonesty in legitimate commerce in many different ways.

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LEV1009 See [[LEV970]] Leviticus 25:14 wrong TAMARI 96-7

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LEV1029 URBAN PLANNING. We have already seen that industries or personal property representing a danger to the members of a town may be forced to close down or relocate if it is not otherwise possible to prevent such damage. We have also learned that stores and factories can be relocated out of residential areas. Both these opinions provide a halachic framework for urban planning. There is, however, a further provision regarding urban planning which, it would seem, has ramifications for what is probably the most important issue involved in contemporary environmental problems: viz., striking a balance between urban growth and the ecological needs of society. Land is one of the most important of all economic resources, and its intelligent allocation forms the basis of all healthy economies--while its misuse often dooms societies to poverty and hunger. In most developed countries, an intelligent balance between the competing needs of housing, industry, agriculture, and the amenities of health and recreation is the aim of economic policy. The Torah requires the maintenance of a green belt around each walled city, as we learn from the laws regarding the cities that were given to the Levites [Leviticus 25:34]. Each walled city had an area of 2,000 square cubits around it; the inner 1,000 were called migrash ha’ir -- the city common -- and were reserved for the animals and social amenities of the citizens. The other 1,000 (or 2,000, according to Maimonides) were reserved for their fields and vineyards. The biblical text tells us that the migrash ha’ir cannot be sold, and the Talmud explained that this means that the city common cannot be rezoned. In other words, the fields and vineyards cannot be converted into a common, nor can the common be turned into an agricultural area or, by being built upon, become part of the city. No one generation has the right to dispose of its natural resources simply as it sees fit, without handing over to future generations the same possibilities it inherited from the past.

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LEV1035 See [[EXOD693]] Exodus 22:24 interest TAMARI 170

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DEUT110 A clear distinction must be made between those injuries that are caused by defective equipment or some act of negligence on the part of the employer or are the result of his assets or interests and those in which the employer is blameless. In the former type of case, the worker, like any other injured party, is entitled to the fivefold damages awarded by the halakhah. (These damages embrace loss of income, loss of limb, medical expenses, pain incurred, and the shame resulting from the injury.) Our concern here is solely with the employer's responsibility to share in the social and medical costs incurred in the course of his employment of others but for which he is not directly or indirectly responsible. Our question is to what extent is the worker-employer relationship, extended by the halakhah, as distinct from custom or specific contract, to include such costs. The general halachic principle seems to be that work, just like any other human activity, has its normal element of risk, which has been considered and accepted by the worker upon his acceptance of employment. In other words, the employer does not have any automatic obligations to shoulder the social costs arising out of such risk. This may be seen from the Talmudic discussion concerning a worker who was injured in a tree during the harvesting of dates and olives. The rabbis in that discussion held that the worker, in his desire to earn the wages offered, knowingly took upon himself this risk. [Talmud Bavli, Baba Metzia 112a, as explained by Rashi.] A responsum written in 13th century Spain, rejecting a similar claim for damages, explained that the worker accepted the job despite his knowledge that incidents like this were to be expected in this type of work. [T’shuvot HaRashba 20 (attributed to the Ramban). Also reproduced in the Bet Yosef, Choshen Mishpat, section 188.] Many avenues of employment, however, present elements of risk far in excess of normal, everyday activities. Workers, like all people, are by halachic sources forbidden to place themselves in danger, in accordance with the biblical dictum “And thou shalt surely guard yourselves very much” (Deuteronomy 4:15). Understanding that it is not possible to lead risk free lives, the sages accepted a concept of “normal acceptable risk,” beyond which people were not allowed to place themselves in jeopardy. In our own day [book published 1987-AJL], such industries as coal mining, with its association with black lung disease, or the asbestos or nuclear industries may present an abnormal risk. A labor contract exposing workers to such risk would seem to be contrary to the obligation to guard one's body against harm and therefore not acceptable, even if the workers agreed to it.

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DEUT111 One is not permitted to do damage to one's own body and is required to look after it, since it is a gift from God. Therefore one has the responsibility to refrain from bad habits or from placing himself in danger for the sake of sport or thrills or pleasure, in accordance with the biblical injunction “You shall surely guard your lives very carefully” (Deuteronomy 4:15). On such grounds, for example, cigarette smoking has been forbidden by some present-day halachic authorities. [Assia 35, Jerusalem, pp. 10-15.] Even those who question this ruling hold that it is forbidden in public places, since it damages others. [Iggrot Moshe, Yoreh De’ah, part 2, section 49; part 7; Choshen Mishpat, part 2, section 18. 31] Judaism’s treatment of damage caused by one individual to another does not rest only on the necessity for monetary compensation and for the removal of the cause of damage, irrespective of whether it is to another’s (or one’s own) body or to his property. Great lengths were taken, both in the moralistic literature and in the legal codes, to inculcate in the Jew a duty to prevent damage, even when such damage was not caused either by him or by his property. The halakhic sources stressed that it is a man's duty to prevent his neighbor from suffering loss or from undergoing pain or physical suffering. This is in contrast to many modern societies, wherein people are taught to mind their own business and so to refrain from interfering when others are being caused financial damage or bodily harm. The collective responsibility of Jews for one another, which has been stressed throughout this chapter, makes such an attitude impossible.

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DEUT112 This precept ["Guard your lives exceedingly carefully;" Deut. 4:15] is understood by the rabbis to apply to a wide variety of dangerous habits and behaviors involving eating, drinking, occupation, etc. Some authorities, such as Rabbi Waldenberg, a present-day [1987] halachic source of responsa on medical questions, see in it an injunction against smoking, in view of its proven relationship to cancer.

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DEUT189 An example of the obligation to provide a pension for public sector workers in their old age or in those cases where they are totally disabled is to be found in the minute books of the community council of Poznan. Written in Eastern Europe, they contain the following decision, from the year of 1636: “Seeing as how our teacher, our master, Rabbi Shimon Zusshinder, has sat faithfully in judgment here in our community for many years, and now, due to failing eyesight and age, is no longer able to fulfill this task, it is fitting that the community should see that he is provided for in an honorable fashion.” Pinkas Kehilat Poznan, Regulation 189. The basis for such a decision is, again, to be found in the biblical injunction “And thou shalt do that which is righteous and good” (Deuteronomy 5:18); it is an act of kindness rather than a legal obligation.

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DEUT240 And you shall Love the Lord your God … with all your might – that is, with all your material possessions. Rashi on Deuteronomy 6:5

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