EXOD781 The text (Exodus 23:1-2) is concerned with perversions of justice, and the second verse is particularly obscure. The sages elsewhere interpret it in terms of legal procedures for acquittal and conviction, concerned for questions about the size of the majority. But the verse warns us not to FOLLOW THE MANY, particularly in an evil matter, and not to assume that the many are correct in a dispute. Indeed, the matter seems to have to do with pandering either to the majority, or to the poor. Justice must be fair to all. While the tradition of focusing on how to determine the proper majority is valuable, Jeremiah’s use here [Baba Metsia 59b] must utterly recontextualize the verse. For him, the verse proves that majority rules, ignoring the beginning of the clause, which is a prohibition. The sages depend on the sense of a majority precisely because they do not insist on consensus. The matter has to be resolved in a way that tolerates dissent. In this particular case, Jeremiah argues that Eliezer must abide by the majority. But the very practice of interpretation coheres with this interpretation. The text, inscribed at Sinai, is made to justify an interpretive practice by that same practice: not what it seems to say in its context, but by a recontextualization it becomes the authority for dissenting interpretation and majority rule. If the text were not given to people, if it were still in heaven, then one could not read this text this way, nor could one use it to justify the authority of the community of interpreters against the Heavenly Voice.

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EXOD783 The very first reference to the concept of following a majority opinion in deciding a Jewish law comes from the Torah. This refers to a majority of judges who decide the guilt or innocence of an accused criminal. But the very fact that a minority can speak up and try to convince the majority it has the correct view, shows that Judaism tolerates minority opinions, even in cases that they do not rule that way. This was further demonstrated by how the highest Jewish Court, the Sanhedrin, deliberated capital crimes and other issues that affected the entire Jewish nation. The physical setup of the Sanhedrin was that of a semicircle, which is imitated today by the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. The Talmud states that the younger and less experienced members of the deliberative body would sit on the sides, while the more prominent members sat towards the middle. But when they begin deliberations, the first members who spoke were those that sat on the sides, the newest members, who gave their opinions first. This was the intentional order, so that the less experienced judges would not be influenced or intimidated by the opinion of the veterans. Sanhedrin 32b, 36a Thus, we see that Judaism not only tolerated different views, but actually encouraged and wanted different viewpoints on each subject that was judged.

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EXOD782 See [[DEUT848]] Deuteronomy 16:20 justice DORFFDRAG 114-5

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EXOD784 "You shall not follow a multitude to do evil." If you join a group to speak or hear loshon hora, you violate this prohibition (See Shaarey T'shuvah 3:50).

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EXOD786 See [[LEV462]] Leviticus 19:15 rich HIRSH 34-5 ft. 7

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EXOD785 However, a real understanding of the relationship between Halakhah and morality must begin with an awareness of what must be seen as a basic conflict between their fundamental principles. The Halakhah in its aspect of law and in regulating regulations between man and man is based upon the concept of justice and equality. It therefore stresses the notion of "What is mine is mine, and what is thine is thine." In its social aspects, it emphasizes negative rules or prohibitions because it assumes that individuals come endowed with life and possessions and rights. It therefore strives to prevent the proper order of society from being disturbed and the rights of individuals from being violated (This is perhaps why the moral rules in the Decalogue are primarily negative). The point of conflict with the broader concept of morality can be understood in the disparity between "Thou shalt not favor a poor man in judgment" and "Make right the poor and the indigent" [this verse, Psalms 62, Chullin 134]. In considering a judgment between two individuals, the Halakhah requires that we ignore the fact that one is poor and the other rich and make every effort to decide the case with objectivity and in accordance with the general rules governing possessions or damages or rights or responsibilities. But what of our obligation to help the needy, to have compassion up on the poor, and to unselfishly give of ourselves and our fortunes in our love for others? The answer is that you may indeed voluntarily relinquish what is your own. In judgment, however, the judge may not be charitable with the money of others. The case must be decided on its merits (Ketubbot 84). The basic disparity between din (morality and its aspect of judgment) and morality as benevolence is reflected in an important Mishnah: "There are four attitudes among men: he who says, 'mine is mine and thine is thine,' is a median [middle-of-the-road] attitude, but others say it is the attitude of Sodom. He who says, 'mine is thine and thine is thine' is a Hasid…" (Avot 5:13).

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EXOD787 Do not favor the poor in matters of justice. Do not show favoritism to the weak or impoverished who stand before you in litigation. Rather, follow only the dictates of strait justice. In matters of justice one cannot show favoritism.

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EXOD790 The prophetic pleas for justice, integrity, mercy and benevolence were embodied into the legal codes of the Torah. Here they were translated into concrete laws to govern the affairs of men. Animated by faith, the law was so formulated as to serve the ends of morality and was to be so administered as to have justice done to all. To ensure the rights of poor and rich, of home-born and strangers alike represents the duty of the judges, rulers and Kings. God Himself is the guarantor of justice. "Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; you shall hear the small and the great alike; you shall not be afraid of the face of any man; for the judgment is God's" [Deut. 1:17]. Most striking are these laws in the Code of the Covenant: [this and previous verses] Geiger calls attention to the uniqueness of the last law. The rich man must receive no advantage because he is rich, nor should the poor man have preferential treatment because he is poor. "Sympathy and pity are emotions that have their proper place in use, but even those noble feelings must be silent before justice." [Judaism and Its History, p. 37] The full significance of this law is brought out by its sequel: "Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of the poor in his cause" (verse six). It is more important that he get justice than that he be favored. Inequity in any form is iniquity. The Code of Holiness state similarly: "Thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor favor the person of the mighty; but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor" (Lev. 19:15).

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EXOD788 R. Shimon b. Lakish said: (Psalms 82:3): "Grace the afflicted and the poor" -- What is the intent of "Grace"? If in a judgment, is it not written: "And a poor man do not favor in his quarrel"? The intent must be, then: "Be gracious with what is yours [in case of doubt as to whether it is yours or theirs] and give it to them (Chullin 134a).

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EXOD789 See [[DEUT628]] Deuteronomy 13:9 pity TZADIK 143-5

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