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DEUTERONOMY — 19:14 landmarks

DEUT948 Another principle related to theft is hasagat g'vul, or "moving boundaries." Hasagat g'vul provides an excellent illustration of how a concept has evolved over time: from a simple rule in the Torah not to steal land by moving a boundary marker, the tradition has evolved into a prohibition against unfair competition, and then this is further extended to protect intellectual property. Hasagat g'vul literally means "moving a boundary," and the concept is rooted in a prohibition found in the Torah. "You shall not remove your neighbor's landmark." [This verse] In other words, do not steal his land by moving the landmarks used to delineate the boundaries of his field. The Talmud extends this concept to tradespeople in competition. In the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 21b, we find the following teaching: "If a resident of a cul-de-sac set up a mill to grind grain for others, and then a fellow resident of the cul-de-sac comes and sets up a mill in the same street, the law is that the first one can stop the second one, for he can say to him, 'You are cutting off my livelihood!'" The same discussion in the Talmud brings another example--namely, that fisherman have to respect each other's fishing areas, even though the fish themselves are ownerless: "Fishing nets must be kept away from [the hiding place of] a fish [that has been spotted by another fisherman] the full length of the fish's swim." The Rabbis did, however, recognize that competition can be a good thing, bringing lower prices, and that other people--competitors--are entitled to make a living as well. The Talmud provides several examples of limits to the ability to argue "you are interfering with my livelihood." This is one of them: Certain basket-sellers brought baskets to Babylon [to sell]. The townspeople came and stopped them [because they did not want the competition], so they [the basket sellers] appeal to Ravina. He said, "They have come from outside [the town], and they may sell to the people from outside [the town]. This restriction, however, applies only to the market day, but not to other days; and even on the market day only for selling in the market, but not for going around the houses." B. Bava Batra 22a. We can see in this example that the Rabbis were concerned about balancing the livelihood of the local basket-sellers against the desire of the townspeople for competition and the ability of the itinerant basket-sellers also to make a living. In the last few hundred years, the principle of hasagat g'vul, not to move boundaries, has even been extended as a rationale for the protection of intellectual property. The Rabbis see it as a natural extension: since the Talmud, for example, expressed a concern about protecting the livelihood of a fisherman who had invested effort in a particular fish run, it follows that we should also protect the livelihood of someone who has invested effort in creating something new, such as a book, a song, or an invention. Respecting boundaries is a fundamental principle that applies to many of our business relationships. Some of the ways this principle finds expression and contemporary business situations are these: One must honor confidentiality agreements between an employer and employee, or between companies. One must have respect for the intellectual property rights of others. Anti-competitive behavior--for example, using predatory pricing to drive competitors out of the market so you can raise your prices afterward--is prohibited. The balance the Rabbis tried to strike and extending the concept of hasagat g'vul to unfair competition is exactly what anti-trust laws try to accomplish--to permit competition but to put limits on competition to avoid situations that are patently unfair. (By Barry J. Leff, "Jewish Business Ethics")

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DEUTERONOMY — 20:11 forced

DEUT992 The most conspicuous presentation of a Jewish biblical conception of a religious duty to restrain warfare is a cluster of commandments in Deuteronomy 20, the fifth book of the Pentateuch, the Torah, which Jews regard as the fundamental and most sacred part of the Bible. The activities to be governed by these commandments are: waging a war, exempting some combatants from participating in it, offering the enemy peaceful surrender, treating captives and booty, and conducting a siege. Additional Deuteronomy 21 verses govern the case of a combatant desiring to have a captive beautiful woman as a wife. The ethics of warfare embodied in these norms rests on a fundamental religious strategy that permeates the whole body of Jewish commandments: Jews may be involved in every human sphere of activity, whether individual or collective, except for idol worship, but their activity within each sphere is significantly restrained. Thus, for example, setting a siege around a town is permitted, being an ordinary, non-idolatrous act of warfare, but the siege ought not to involve cutting down fruit trees. Any moral evaluation of this ethics of warfare should consist of two parts: a moral evaluation of the imposed constraint, and a moral evaluation of what is permitted. The first evaluation involves the following consideration: If (a) the cause of war is good and (b) a constraint imposed on warfare activities does not eliminate the ability to gain victory, then (c) the imposed constraint presumably helps alleviate the calamities of war and therefore (d) is morally worthy. It seems that the Deuteronomy 20 "you shall not" constraints are all morally commendable. The second evaluation focuses on the constrained dimension of the sphere of activity in order to determine whether it permits activities that are morally unjustifiable. The results of this evaluation of the norms of Deuteronomy 20 are mixed. On the one hand, the exemption of certain men, such as one who has betrothed a wife and has not taken her," delineates the corps of combatants in a just and effective way. On the other hand, the association of proclaiming peace with the requirement "that all people that are found therein shall serve you at forced labor" [this verse] is indeed morally unjustifiable. Other commandments are even worse, for example, the norm that when a town will make no peace, "you shall put all its males to the sword" (v. 13). (Continued at [[DEUT996]] Deuteronomy 20:13 sword OXFORD 488-9). (By Aaron S. Gross, "Jewish Animal Ethics")

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DEUTERONOMY — 20:13 sword

DEUT996 (Continued from [[DEUT992]] Deuteronomy 20:11 forced OXFORD 488-9). Because Deuteronomy 20-21 is an element of the Jewish Holy Writ, a question arises as to what lessons should be drawn, within the Jewish religious tradition, from the ethical norms of these chapters. A plausible answer would involve a clarification of the above-mentioned fundamental Jewish religious strategy: Except for idolatry, Jews may be involved in every human sphere of activity, as it is practiced under the circumstances, but the activity within each sphere is significantly restrained. This is why the Bible includes, for instance, norms of slavery and norms of marriage and divorce that prescribe unequal treatment of persons according to their gender. The same applies to warfare practices. The moral evaluation of the constrained activities permitted by Jewish biblical ethics is actually a moral evaluation of warfare practices of the time. Accordingly, current Jewish warfare ethics should rest on a modern conception of warfare, one that embodies some variant of the Just War doctrine, and imposes constraints on its application. Unlike Deuteronomy 20-21, it will involve, for example, a principle of distinction between combatants and others and be as morally justifiable as Just War norms. This is one example of a much larger phenomenon--namely, that what constitutes the Jewish tradition, and Jewish ethics in particular, is not the Bible alone, but rather is based on how rabbis and lay Jews have interpreted and applied the Bible and subsequent traditions over the centuries. This includes not only how Jews have developed their tradition internally, but also what they have learned from others and made part of the Jewish tradition--in this case, Just War theory. (By Asa Kasher, "Jewish Ethics and War")

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DEUTERONOMY — 20:19 trees

DEUT1019 What seems in the Torah a specialized and therefore rather minor edict about behavior toward the earth becomes a much broader one in rabbinic Judaism. The Torah says, [this and following verse]. The rabbis of the Talmud concluded that if we must not destroy enemy fruit trees even in wartime, then all the more must we take care not to waste them, or any life-forms, or even human-made objects, in time of peace: Bal tashkit! ("Do not destroy!") At the same time, having broadened the command so much, they also made clear that it was wasteful use, not all use, that they were prohibiting, that indeed God sees it as a sin not to take advantage of the joys God provided in the world God created. (B. Bava Kamma 91b. For the prohibition itself, see also B. Shabbat 67b, 129a, 140b; B. Kiddushin 32a; and B. Hullin 7b). (By Arthur Waskow, "Jewish Environmental Ethics: Intertwining Adam with Adamah")

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