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EXODUS — 22:26 covering

EXOD725 (Continued from [[LEV1062]] Leviticus 25:36 interest OXFORD 46). In the Tanakh, loans at interest are viewed as exploitation of the indigent, since commonly the agrarian poor would be the recipients. This situation is obvious in the prohibition of taking a garment or cloak as pledge because "It is his only clothing, the sole covering for his skin" [this verse]. Further, the purpose of generosity to one's fellow Israelites is to maintain social and economic stability and prevent the emergence of an underclass encumbered by debt. The Bible mentions instances when these rules were neglected with unfortunate consequences, such as in Jerusalem during the time of Nehemiah when Judean children were distrained for their parents' debt (Neh 5; see also 2 Kings 4:1). This reason would not apply to loans for the nokhri, or foreigner, who perhaps was visiting the country for purposes of commerce and investment; there is no moral requirement to offer interest-free loans to him for such purposes. (Jeffrey Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, 218 quoting the nineteenth-century Italian commentator Shemuel Dovid Luzzato). (By Elaine Adler Goodfriend, “Ethical Theory and Practice in the Hebrew Bible)

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EXODUS — 22:26 hear

EXOD727 By attributing love and hate to the sense of hearing, [Solomon] Ibn Gabirol (c. 1022-1058) teaches in effect that love means hearing the Other and hatred means not to hear him or her. Similarly, he cites God's words, "I will hear for I am merciful" [this verse]. (Ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of Moral Qualities, Arabic text and English translation by Stephen S. Wise (New York: Columbia University Press, 1902), intro., pp. 29-51 (Arabic, 59b-73b). The merciful individual hears the Other, the cruel one does not. Ibn Gabirol observes that the Bible connects the love for God with hearing: "Hear, O Israel ... Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" (Deut 6:4). (Ibid, Arabic, 65b). (By Warren Zev Harvey, “Ethical Theories among Medieval Jewish Philosophers”)

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EXODUS — 23:7 falsehood

EXOD845 One of the most basic features of the business world today is the contract. Whenever two companies enter into a business relationship, a contract defines the terms of the deal and generally specifies what happens if something goes wrong. Contracts are common with consumers as well; one of the most common forms of contract nowadays governs the purchase of software. The manufacturers generally state that by opening a package or clicking "purchase," the buyer is in essence entering into a contract with the seller and is agreeing to abide by the terms of the sale and the restrictions on making copies. The acceptability and authority of such "shrink-wrap" contracts are complex issues in both American and Jewish law. The Jewish approach to contracting is similar to the approach highlighted above regarding offices transactions: "play fair." Two basic rules in the Jewish approach to contracts are: (1) deception is forbidden; and (2) you have to have a "meeting of the minds." • Mi'dvar sheker tirhak -- "Stay far from a false matter" [this verse]. The Rabbis of the Talmud, in tractate Shevu'ot (oaths), explicitly apply this rule of the Torah to settling a variety of disputes. For example, they say this: • How do we know that if three persons have a claim of a hundred zuzim one should not be the litigant, and the other two, the witnesses, in order that they may extract the hundred zuzim and divide it? Because it is said: "From a false matter keep far." (B. Shevu'ot 31a) • The rabbis also acknowledge, however, that in normal daily life there may be some exceptions. So, for example, when Shammai opposes calling an ugly woman a "beautiful bride," in keeping with "Keep far from a false matter," his colleague, Hillel, retorts that she is surely beautiful in the eyes of the groom, so is it is no sin to praise her to the groom. • Mekah ta'ut--an erroneous transaction. If two parties make an agreement but it turns out that one of the basic assumptions was wrong, the deal is null and void. The Talmud gives an example of a person who thought he had some excess money, contracted with his partners to use that money to pay their tax bill, but later found out that he did not actually have any excess money. The Rabbis called this a flawed transaction and cancelled the contract. (B. Gittin 14a) (By Barry J. Leff, "Jewish Business Ethics")

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EXODUS — 23:12 rest

EXOD886 Dr. Bernard Rollin, a secular Jew who spent twelve years in yeshivah (Orthodox religious school) [and "father of veterinary medical ethics"] has argued throughout his career of more than thirty yeas that the major problems of farmed animal welfare today are the result of a failure to update our ethics to take into account our contemporary situation. In today's factory farms unnecessary animal suffering is at least as likely to occur on the farm as it is during slaughter, and responding to this new situation is arguably the most important aim of contemporary animal ethics, including Jewish animal ethics. Ninety-eight percent of the interactions that U.S. citizens have with animals are with those raised for food, and ninety-nine percent of these animals are raised on factory farms. Nonetheless, no movement of Judaism in the United States or Israel has attempted to develop policy on the systematic suffering inflicted upon animals on factory farms during their lives. This situation is likely to change in the near future, and already a committee of the Rabbinic Assembly, the organization of Conservative rabbis, is at work on just such a document as part of its Magen Tzedek program to certify foods as meeting ethical as well as ritual standards. An important resource in formulating a response is the broad legal principle expressed by the rabbis of the Talmud as a command not to cause tza'ar--literally "suffering" and understood to mean the suffering that does not advance some legitimate human good--to ba'alei hayyim-- to "living beings." The Rishonim (leading rabbinic authorities of the eleventh to sixteenth century) associate a variety of laws with this principle. Frequently cited examples include the prohibition against plowing with two animals of unequal strength (paradigmatically an ox and donkey), which causes the weaker animals to suffer (Deut. 22:10), and the already mentioned prohibition on muzzling an ox as it laborers (Deut 25:4)--rabbinically expanded to include all animals. Arguably the most prominent such law, found in both versions of the Decalogue, dictates that animals too are to be included in Sabbath rest [Exodus 20:10, Deut. 5:14]. All of these laws are expanded by rabbinic traditions, creating a massive body of legal material regarding Jewish and human responsibilities to animals. Thus, for example, the participation of animals in the rest of the Sabbath has led both ancient and contemporary rabbis to be lenient in permitting activities that are otherwise prohibited on Shabbat if they function to relieve animal pain (tza'ar ba'alei hayyim). And Rashi, commenting on [this verse], interprets the command to include not simply freedom from labor, but a positive state of contentment, and he thus rules that animals normally must have access to pasture on the Sabbath. Such laws demonstrate a concern for animal lives that takes into account diverse forms of harm such as that caused by the behavior of other animals, by emotional factors, or by constant exertion without respite. While forged largely in relation to laboring animals, the basic thrust of these laws--concern for the physical, social, and emotional lives of animals--would today be most applicable to the systematic forms of abuse inflicted upon find animals being raised for meat, milk, and eggs. (By Aaron S. Gross, "Jewish Animal Ethics")

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