LEV336 The Torah clearly prohibits lying in several places: "You must not carry false rumors" (Exod 23:1); "Keep far from a false charge" (Exod 23:7); and "You shall not deal deceitfully or falsely with one another" [this verse]. While eschewing lies is necessary for the maintenance of trust among people, thus making human society possible, the Rabbis recognized that not every untruth is an evil to be avoided, not every truth necessary to reveal. According to a story on B. Sanhedrin 97a, Rava at first despaired of finding truth in the world. He then learned of another rabbi who never told lies and who had settled in a town called "Kushta" ("truth"). No one in Kushta ever told lies or died prematurely. The Kushtan rabbi married and had two sons. One day a neighbor called for his wife, who was washing her hair. The rabbi thought it inappropriate to mention that fact, and so (falsely) stated that his wife was not present. His two sons died, and when the townspeople investigated this unheard-of tragedy and learned how it had come about, they asked him to leave Kushta. The story's point is that absolute truth cannot abide an untruth told even for a virtuous purpose, and human life itself cannot be sustained within the realm of absolute truth. This latter rabbinic insight appears in a number of places in the Talmud and post-talmudic literature where the point is not necessarily that physical human life is endangered by absolute truth, but that absolute truth may endanger human relations, emotions, and psyches. For example, Genesis Rabbah 48:18 points out that while the matriarch Sarah had included her husband's advanced age along with her own as the reason she could not conceive (Gen 18:12), God reported her statement to Abraham as mentioning only her own age (Gen 18:13). The midrash points out that the Torah altered her statement in order to keep peace between them. B. Yevamot 65b also refers to Joseph's brothers' reference to the deceased father's non-existent request that Joseph forgive them (Gen 50:15-17), as well as to Samuel's misleading Saul as to the real purpose of his coming to see him (I Sam 16:2) -- which was to inform him of God's rejection. In the first and third of these biblical examples, it is God Himself Who utters or suggests the untruth. Referring to Genesis 50:15–17, Rabbi Il'a states that it is permitted to alter a statement for the sake of peace, but Rabbi Nathan relies on I Samuel 16:2 in asserting that it is a mitzvah to do so. The passage on B. Yevamot 65b closes with reference to God shading of the truth in Genesis 18:13, thus tipping the scale in Rabbi Nathan's favor. (By Alyssa M. Gray, "Jewish Ethics of Speech")

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LEV342 See [[EXOD620]] Exodus 21:37 steals OXFORD 372

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LEV355 Abduction is stealing a human being. Because the Torah elsewhere prohibits stealing goods [this verse] the Rabbis, who assume that there is nothing superfluous in God's teachings in the Torah, interpreted the prohibition against stealing in the Ten Commandments [Exodus 20:13, Deuteronomy 5:17] as a ban against kidnapping. [Mekhilta. Mishpatim, 5.] Couched between the two commandments against murder and adultery, both capital offenses, kidnapping too was held to be a capital offense. [Exodus 21:16] (By Laurie L. Levenson, "Judaism and CriminalJustice"

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LEV373 In addition to the literal meaning of the verse, referring to physically blind people, the Rabbis of the Talmud interpret "blind" metaphorically: they take it to mean anyone who is unaware of something, who does not see something, who has a "blind spot." With this principle, the Jewish tradition raises our responsibilities towards others to quite a high-level: we are not allowed to do things that would cause someone else to sin, that would cause someone else to do something wrong. We are commanded not to give bad advice. ... Contemporary ways this principle may be applied include these: ● There are many situations where being in violation of the prohibition on deception (see above) will also result in placing a stumbling block before the blind, such as creating misleading financial statements, or misleading advertising, where the actions could cause someone to be "blind" to the actual financial health of the company or the worthiness of a product and to harm himself as a result. ● A salesperson recommending an item because he gets a bigger commission on it, not because it would be best for the client, violates this norm. It is not forbidden for a manufacturer to encourage the sale of certain of their products over others. What is forbidden, where the line gets crossed, is when the best needs of the client are ignored in the process. ● Offering a bribe or a kickback is also banned by this rule. An employee is supposed to be working in the best interest of his employer, not to line his own pockets. If you offer someone a bribe, you are causing him or her to stumble because he will no longer be acting in the best interests of his or her employer. (By Barry J. Leff, "Jewish Business Ethics")

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LEV502 As for the meaning of the word moral or ethical, it has often been quite distorted. For instance, when asked to define an ethical person, one's response will often be "a person who does not hurt anyone else." This definition, however, is far from the Jewish one. A person whose good conduct consists only of not hurting anyone is not a criminal, but is not necessarily an ethical person. To be an ethical person as Judaism understands it is to be a person who actively pursues the good in life. To cite a few examples: It is not adequate to simply refrain from hurting other people. One must get involved when one sees a wrong being committed. The Torah says, "Do not stand by on the blood of your neighbor" [this verse]. Similarly, it is not enough to merely refrain from doing unjust things. To be a good and ethical person, one must actively seek out and try to correct a wrong done by another: "Justice, justice, shall you pursue" [Deuteronomy 16:20], and "you shall burn the evil from out of your midst" [Deuteronomy 17:7]. In short, being and behaving in an ethical way means to act and respond positively to anything that is wrong in the world. As Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin once succinctly put it: "The entire Bible may be understood as a positive response to the question which Cain posed after murdering his brother Abel: 'Am I my brother's keeper?'"

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LEV508 See [[LEV1119]] Leviticus 26:16 wreak OXFORD 313-4

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LEV503 During recent decades military forces were deployed in some cases of humanitarian intervention that involved combat. Usually such wars cannot be portrayed as wars of self-defense. Are they justifiable? Although there is no official Jewish view of such interventions, a starting point can be offered. It is the biblical precept "you shall not… stand against the blood of your neighbor" [this verse]. That verse is usually interpreted as pertaining to proper interactions between individuals--that, for example, one must seek to rescue a person who is drowning or accosted by highway robbers (B. Sanhedrin 73a)--but it can and should serve as grounds for a conception of proper humanitarian intervention in telling us that we as a society may, and maybe even should, engage in such wars if there is no alternative to protecting innocent lives. (By Asa Kasher, "Jewish Ethics and War")

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LEV530 Q: May firms monitor worker emails? A: There is no doubt that it is proper and even vital to keep an eye on workers to make sure that they are doing their job. The Talmud suggests ironically that someone who inherits a lot of money and wants to lose it quickly should hire workers and fail to supervise them. Bava Metzia 29b It also assures us that someone who personally surveys his affairs each day, including the behavior of workers, is guaranteed to benefit. Chullin 105a However, intrusive monitoring can violate a worker's privacy. The fact that someone is at work doesn't make his or her every move the concern of the employer. Employers have an ethical responsibility to monitor in a responsible way. This responsibility has two aspects, the "what" and the "how": 1. Not to have an excessive amount of monitoring; 2. Not to use the information gleaned from monitoring in an in equitable or otherwise improper way. We can get some idea of where to draw the line from a fascinating insight of the renowned seventeen century legal authority, Rabbi Yaakov Hagiz. Noting that gossip is strictly forbidden in Jewish law, according to the verse, "Don't go about as a talebearer" [this verse], Rabbi Hagiz concludes that just as it is forbidden to disclose private information to others by gossiping, so it is forbidden to reveal such information to ourselves by prying. "It is forbidden to pursue and seek the private affairs of one's fellow, for what is the difference between gossiping to others or to oneself?" Responsa Halakhot Ketanot 1:276. We can complete the picture by presenting the basic ethical principle regarding gossip or slander: Only information that is essential to preventing substantive damage may be disclosed to the vulnerable party and only if the information will be used in a responsible way.

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LEV611 The first category [of flatterers] is [one] who recognizes or sees or knows that his fellowman's hand is [tainted] with iniquity and that he embraces deceit (Yirmeyahu 8:5), or that he sins through lashon hara or verbal abuse – – but smooth-talks him with an evil tongue and says, 'You have committed no wrong." Not only has the flatterer committed the transgression of withholding reproof, as [this verse] says ... but he further sins by saying, "You have not sinned, as the pasuk says (Yirmeyahu 23:14), "They have strengthened the hands of evildoers." This is a serious transgression (Iyov 31:28) in the hand of the foolish flatterer; for he is not a zealous for the truth, but abets falsehood, declaring evil to be good and making light into darkness. He also places a pitfall before the sinner from two vantage points: firstly -- [as a result of this] the sinner does not regret his evil; secondly -- he repeats his foolishness the next day since the wicked flatterer has praised him and his heart's desire (Tehillim 10:3; I.e., has praised him for doing whatever he wants). Besides this, he will bear punishment for the harm he caused to the person whom the sinner wronged, by justifying the one who sinned against him; and aside from that, he will be punished for [his] false words, as the pesukim says, "You will destroy speakers of deceit" (Tehillim 5:7), and "One who justifies an evildoer and who condemns a righteous person -- both are an abomination of Hashem" (Mishlei 17:15). This applies even more so if the iniquity of his fellowman is public knowledge; for when the flatterer says to him before others, "You are pure, without iniquity," he has desecrated and demeaned both the law and justice. (Continued at [[DEUT15]] Deuteronomy 1:17 afraid GATES 375).

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LEV698 The Tanakh's [Hebrew Bible] term for ethics, yir'at Elohim, "fear of God/gods," points to the blurred boundaries in ancient Israel between ethics and religion. A paramount element in the proper worship of Israel's God is action in the social realm to relieve the oppression of the poor and powerless and to prevent corruption of the judicial process. Further, many of God's commands are intended to deter the Israelite from acting toward his fellow with vengeance and malice. Indeed, the centrality of ethics is indicated by the placement of the command to "love one's neighbor as oneself" at the midpoint of the Torah [this verse]. (By Elaine Adler Goodfriend, “Ethical Theory and Practice in the Hebrew Bible)

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