DEUT1382 Scholars have noted that two different approaches, each virtually the opposite of the other, seem to have been employed by the midrash halakhah, the rabbinic method of exegesis, in interpreting the biblical laws (J.M. Guttmann, Bechinat Kiyyum ha-Mitzvot (Jerusalem: Makor, 1978), pp. 19-23). Sometimes what seems to be operating is a policy of contraction, limiting the law in question to the exact conditions specifically mentioned in the text and considering the slightest deviation from these conditions as sufficient to render the law inapplicable. On other occasions, the exegesis seems to be following a policy of expansion, extrapolating the law to similar situations and thereby broadening the area of its applicability beyond the specific terms of the biblical formulation. The observation has been made that the expansion approach seems to be used overwhelmingly in regards to laws grounded in the principle of kindness, justice, and peace, which we have suggested can be considered the essence of the Torah. Therefore, if one can assume that one has insight into the guiding principle behind the law, one can proceed to widen the scope of the law with confidence that one is still within the area intended. This roughly coincides with a group of laws dealing with matters bain adam le-chavero, "between man and his fellow man." Some examples of the method of expansion culled from this area follow. Concerning a "higher servant" who is "poor and needy" we are told, "in the same day thou shalt shall give him his hire." Yet in spite of the explicit reference to his being "poor and needy," the rabbis interpreted this to apply to any hired servant, be he rich or poor (Deuteronomy 24:15, Bava Metzia 111b). On the passage "Thou shall not take the widow's raiment to pledge," the interpretation was, "whether she is rich or poor" (Deuteronomy 24:17, Bava Metzia 115a). The prohibition "Thou shall not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn" was understood to apply even when the ox was muzzled from before (Deuteronomy 25:4, Bava Metzia 90b). The injunction "No man shall take the mill or the upper millstone to pledge" was interpreted to apply to any object necessary to produce food (Deuteronomy 24:6, Bava Metzia 115a). The method of contraction, however, was utilized, it would seem, in regard to the ritual laws called chukkim or gezerot ha-katuv, whose rationale was not clear, or to laws that carried with them certain stated punishments. In regard to the former, the approach of the rabbis was to confine the law to the precise conditions mentioned in the text. Not understanding the underlying principles, the rabbis had little choice. Thus, the passage "You shall offer no strange incense thereon" whose intent is quite clear, was understood to mean that the individual person could not contribute any incense (Exodus 30:9, Menachot 3b). However, concerning the oil of anointment, the Torah said, "Upon the flesh of men it shall not be poured." The rabbis restricted this to "flesh of men," excluding animals, vessels, and the dead from the prohibition (Exodus 30:32, Keritot 6b). In regard to the redemption of the first-born, "All the first-born of thy sons [banekha] thou shalt redeem" was strictly interpreted as meaning sons but not daughters, although sometimes the word banim was understood to mean "children." (Exodus 34:20, Kiddushin 29a). Similarly, the biblical prohibition of combining meat and milk was interpreted as applying only derekh bishul, "if arrived at through cooking," in accordance with the wording of the passage: "Thou shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk." (Exodus 23:19, Sanhedrin 4b) (Continued at [[NUM411]] Numbers 35:25 deliver SPERO 53).
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