Excerpt Browser

This page displays the full text of excerpts.  When viewing a single excerpt, its “Share,” “Switch Article,” and “Comment” functions are accessible.

EXODUS — 21:37 five

EXOD616 A thief is obligated to pay back four times the value of a calf stolen but five times the value of a large animal such as an ox. When the Talmud Bava Kamma 79b asks why the different amounts, Rabbi Yochanan says that Judaism even cares about the dignity of the thief. Since he had to carry the calf on his shoulders (an undignified act) he pays only four times the value, but as the ox could walk under its own power, the thief pays five times the amount.

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 21:37 five

EXOD618 It was taught: R. Yochanan b. Zakkai said: Come and see how great is (concern for) human dignity.[For] an ox, which walks on its feet [and did not need to be carried by the thief, he pays] five-fold; [for] a lamb, which he must carry on his back [he pays(only)] four-fold [having already made a kind of partial payment in the sacrifice of his dignity] (Bava Kamma 79b)

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 21:37 pay

EXOD619 From the following ordinance, we can derive a moral lesson. The Bible evinces compassion, even for a thief. The thief suffers less embarrassment when he steals an ox, as compared to a sheep. He must carry away the sheep in his arms, and the owner's neighbors may well suspect the stranger's motives. But an ox may be led by its halter, and observers naturally suppose it belongs to the man leading it. Therefore, the penalty is less for a sheep because the theft is more obvious, and the thief is more easily spotted. The Bible even feels compassion for the lawbreaker who must suffer the penalty for his transgression.

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 21:37 steals

EXOD620 Everyone knows that ["Do not steal"] is one of the Ten Commandments. What may be less well known is that the rabbis have traditionally held that the "Do not steal" in the Ten Commandments refers to stealing people, that is, kidnapping. They derived this meaning because all the other "Do not's" in the Ten Commandments are capital offenses, and kidnapping as the only form of theft that is a capital offense (B. Sanhedrin 86a). Ordinary theft of property is forbidden on the basis of several other verses in the Torah that explicitly forbid theft of objects such as sheep and cattle [e.g. this verse, Lev 19:11]. More specifically to our interest in business ethics, the Torah is aware of that commerce can provide special temptations to cheat, and so we are warned "You shall not have in your bag different weights, a large and small. You shall not have in your house different measures, a large and small. You shall rather have a perfect and just weight, a perfect and just measure shall you have; that your days maybe lengthened in the land that the Lord your God gives you." (Deut. 25:13-15). These verses from the Torah teach us that it is not acceptable to cheat. If you are selling a pound of olives, you are obligated to deliver a full pound of olives. Obviously, this concept extends to other forms of business cheating and shortcuts. You are obligated to deliver "the full measure" of what the client buys. This is readily understood to include quality as well as quantity: a discussion in the Talmud that shows that when people pay for a specific product--vinegar, medium-quality wine, or select wine--they are entitled to receive what they purchased. (B. Bava Metzia 73a). The concept of "Do not steal" is extended beyond the theft of physical objects to include intangibles. We are forbidden to engage in geneivat da'at -- deception, literally "stealing the mind," creating a false impression, or misleading people. The Talmud explicitly states that such deception is forbidden, and it specifies that one may not deceive "idol-worshipers," which is to say not only Gentiles, who are also ethical monotheist, but anyone at all. (B. Hullin 94b). There are several examples of forbidden deception in the Talmud that we can use to extrapolate to contemporary situations. Some of these examples are: • Letting a guest think you are opening a barrel of wine in his honor, when you plan to open the barrel anyway. This act would deceive the guest to think you thought he was worth a great expense, and it might prompt the guest to think that he must treat you with the same degree of honor the next time you are a guest in his home. • Inviting someone to a meal when you know he will say no. (Does "let's do lunch" sound familiar?) Another contemporary equivalent would be offering to open a very expensive bottle of wine for a guest you are certain will say no. • Giving some meat to a Gentile and allowing him to think it is kosher and therefore more expensive then non-kosher meat when it is not. Even though the Gentile is not required to follow the kosher dietary laws, you may not deceive him in this way, both because he may inadvertently give it to a Jew thinking it is kosher, and because you are misleading him into thinking you are more generous than you are. • Inviting someone to anoint himself with oil when you know the jar is empty.• Offering many gifts to someone if you know he will not accept. Note that exceptions would probably be made for cultures where it was expected both to make the offer and to reject it, since there is no deception in that context. [All these examples are from B. Hullin 94a]. Contemporary applications abound: • Misleading advertising. This is a complex area that requires careful case-by-case consideration. Although it is forbidden to make false claims or to mislead intentionally, it is permitted to make your product look/sound as attractive as possible. There are those who might argue, for example, that advertisements for cars showing sexy women getting out of the cars are misleading because they imply that if the man buys that car, he will attract that kind of woman. I would disagree, because I do not think anyone believes a man's buying the right car will lead to sexy women throwing themselves at him; rather the manufacturers are trying to convey a certain image, to appeal to a particular demographic, and that is not forbidden. • Concealing flaws. For example, if you were selling a used car, it would be forbidden to put an extra heavy weight oil in the car to conceal the fact that the car had an oil leak. • Misleading financial statements. Any actions that would cost potential investors to think the company is financially healthier then it is to encourage them to invest is forbidden. For example, if the client asks a company to invoice them before the end of the year so that it uses up the prior year's budget, even though the goods are not shipped until later in the following year, it would be forbidden to claim all of that revenue without booking a corresponding liability for the goods not yet shipped. Failure to do so would artificially inflate the receiving company's profits, because they will have recorded the revenue but not yet recorded the associated expenses. (By Barry J. Leff, "Jewish Business Ethics")

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 22:1 bloodguilt

EXOD622 If the thief is found breaking into a house at night, the Torah says that if a Jew kills that thief, he or she is blameless. This seems to give legal authority for purchasing a weapon in advance in order to kill an intruder who may break into a home. But why is this so? By what legal authority can the owner of the home become both judge and jury in one fell swoop and kill this thief, without the legal system for determining that this man is a (potential) murderer who maybe stopped with the gun? Rashi, in his commentary on this verse, gives us a clear explanation. Killing this intruder, says Rashi, is not considered murder because the Torah creates a special ruling in this case. This person, intent on murdering the occupants of the house, already has the legal status of a "dead man" (equal to a legally convicted murderer). Thus, it is lawful to kill such a person by any means necessary. But how do we know that this person is indeed a murderer, even in potential? Maybe he came only to steal some objects, but if he were to be challenged by the residents of the home, he would run away? The Talmud responds to this question by explaining that a typical thief knows that most homeowners, if the owners face him, will not simply give up their possessions. Thus, the thief who knows this in advance generally comes armed and is prepared to kill the inhabitants if confronted. Sanhedrin 72a Based on this verse and Talmudic discussion, the Talmud establishes the legality of the principle of self-defense-if someone is coming to kill you, you may kill him first. Yoma 85b In addition, God's command to the Jews to attack the Midianites who attacked the Jewish people in the desert Numbers 25:16–18 is also a basis for the concept of self defense. Midrash Tanchuma, Pinchas 3 (continued at [[EXOD626]] Exodus 22:2 sun AMJV 119)

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 22:1 death

EXOD623 The Talmud introduces a new category of war, however, and claims that Rabbi Judah and the Sages disagreed about that [i.e., whether wars waged by the Kings of the House of David for the purpose of territorial expansion were discretionary, and that the wars waged by Joshua for the conquest of the land of Canaan were required by God]. The category consists of wars “to diminish the heathens so that they shall not March against them.” M. Sotah 8:7 (44b). According to the Talmud, because such wars are not specifically commanded by God in the Bible, Rabbi Judah and the Sages agreed that the biblical exemptions [to military service] apply, but they refer to such preemptive strikes in different terminology because they disagreed on their status and other matters. The Rabbis included such wars in the general category of discretionary wars because they are not specifically mandated by God in Scripture. Rabbi Judah thought that even though that is the case, preemptive strikes of the sort described nevertheless fulfill a commandment because they are necessary for self-defense. In other words, even though the Torah does not specifically require such wars, it indirectly commands that we engage in them as part of the general biblical obligation to defend yourself based on Exodus 22:1, which exonerates a householder who kills a burglar. (Compare B. Sanhedrin 72a and Yoma 85b). Rabbi Judah, therefore, described wars of self-defense as “commanded wars” (milhamot mitzvah) and invented a new term, “obligatory wars” (milhamot hovah), to mark wars that are specifically required by God in the Torah, such as the conquest of Canaan. The practical result of this disagreement, according to the Talmud, is based on a general principle, according to which a person who is engaged in the performance of any commandment is exempt from the fulfillment of other commandments during that period. For Rabbi Judah, since preemptive wars constitute a commanded act, soldiers engaged in them may take advantage of this exemption; for the Rabbis, though, such wars are discretionary, and the soldiers engaged in them are still obliged to fulfill all other commandments. In sum, the conceptual structure of the Mishnah and its talmudic commentary distinguishes two, and perhaps three, types of war: specifically commanded wars, including the wars against the seven Canaanite nations (for example, Numbers 31:7, 15f. and 33:55 and Deuteronomy 7:2, 20:16f) and the wars against Amalek; Exodus 17:14-16 and Deuteronomy 25:17-19). Discretionary wars, including the wars of King David to expand the borders of Israelite territory; and, for Rabbi Judah, indirectly commanded wars, including preemptive wars for purposes of “diminishing the heathen so that they will not March against them [the Israelites].” For the rabbis, the last of these is simply another example of discretionary wars, but for Rabbi Judah they constitute a separate category of “commanded” wars.

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 22:1 tunneling

EXOD624 Jewish teachings on self-defense are based on a ruling in [this verse]. … The Bible scholar Moshe Greenberg notes that "both [ancient] Assyrian and Babylonian law know of offenses against property that entailed the death sentence. In Babylonia, breaking and entering… and theft from another's possession are punished by death. Assyrian law punishes theft committed by a wife against her husband with death. In view of this, the leniency biblical law in dealing with all types of property offenses is astonishing. No property offense is punishable with death" (Moshe Greenberg," Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law," in Judah Goldin, editor, The Jewish Expression, page 27).

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

EXODUS — 22:1 while

EXOD625 Jewish law recognizes not only a right to self-defense, but a positive duty to protect endangered life, elevating the “Good Samaritan” principle (that is, the duty to rescue) to the status of a legal requirement. [See Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:7; Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 73ff; Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:1-2. Rashi and Tosafot, ad.loc. Sanhedrin 73a; and Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotzeah 1:6.] The law also commands that we hinder a perpetrator (rodef; lit. “pursuer”) with force, even lethal force, from committing a crime, where no other means of prevention are available. Limits on Self-Defense. Given the overwhelming sanctity of life, however, the Rabbis recognized the enormous danger of issuing an obligation that overrides the prohibition against force, so they placed stringent limitations on applying the principle of defense: … 2. Force must be a spontaneous reaction to present danger, not a premeditated act of preemption or revenge. One may not kill or injure another to avenge or punish a crime. Punishment is reserved for the criminal justice system--with its careful inquiry into the facts, its procedural safeguards, and its presumption of innocence. One may cause harm in self-defense only in a moment of unavoidable urgency, when life is in immediate danger. [See for example Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Geneiva 9:7-10, Meir ben Baruch (Maharam bar Baruch) cited in Mordekhai, Bava Kamma 196, and Rashi, ad. Loc., Exodus 22:1]

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

RSS
First214215216217218219220221222224226227228229230231232233Last
Back To Top