EXOD549 Some scholars have questioned the validity of the assertion that Jewish morality is indeed universal. Examining the pivotal passage in Leviticus [19:18], "and ye shall love thy neighbor [re'akha] as thyself," they asked, "what does the Bible mean by 'neighbor' and how has the term been understood in Jewish tradition?" (E. Simon, "The Neighbor Whom We Shall Love," in Modern Jewish Ethics, ed. Marvin Fox (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), 29:55.). Analysis of the biblical use of the term turns out to be inconclusive. (Compare Exodus 11:2, 2:13, 12:35, 3:21, with Deuteronomy 19:14). It appears that the term re'ah is sometimes used in contexts that clearly include non-Jews as well as Jews, while in other places the reference appears to be Jews only. More important, however, is the understanding developed in rabbinic tradition. In regard to a number of crucial laws, rabbinic tradition does restrict the meaning of re'ah to Jews only. [And if one man's ox hurt the ox of his neighbor [re'ehu]...Exodus 21:35; And if a man came presumptuously upon his neighbor to slay him with guile...[this verse]; ... neither shall thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor (re'akha) Leviticus 19:36; ...and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself Leviticus 19:18]. Rabbinic interpretation as found in the Talmud and the Midrash Halakhah and in the codes understands these laws as referring only to those who are truly "the neighbors" or "fellows"; I.e., one's fellow Jews. Bava Kamma 37,38; Mekhilta on Exodus 21:14. Does the existence of such restrictions on these moral rules disprove the universality of Jewish morality? To put it even stronger: Doesn't such apparently discriminatory treatment of non-Jews show Jewish morality to be seriously flawed? Before we turn to these specific passages and their rabbinic interpretations, let us examine the Torah for other expressions regarding behavior toward non-Jews. We find, for example: "thou shall not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother; thou shalt not abhor a Mizri [Egyptian], because thou wast a stranger in his land." (Deuteronomy 23:8). In regard to the runaway slave the Torah teaches: (Deuteronomy 23:16-17; see Rashi). Jewish tradition understood this to apply even to a Canaanite slave who has fled from his Jewish master and seeks refuge with Jews in the land of Israel. In outlining the relationship between employer and employee the Torah states: [Deuteronomy 23:8]. The rabbis interpreted "stranger" here to mean ger toshav, the resident alien who has not converted to Judaism but has rejected idolatry. Maimonides, basing himself on the Talmud, rules that it is forbidden to steal from an idolator as well as from a Jew (Rambam, Hilkhot Gezelah 1:1). And Samuel teaches in the Talmud that it is forbidden to deceive any human being (genevat da'at -- where no monetary loss is involved), even an idolator. (Chullin 94). To support the physical needs of non-Jews in Israel was seen by the Torah as a Jewish obligation: (Leviticus 25:35; See Rashi). The right of the non-Jew in Israel, even of the idolator, to purchase and own a Jewish slave is clearly reflected in the rabbinic interpretation of Leviticus 25:47 (See Rashi on Leviticus 26:1 and Kiddushin 20; also Bava Metzia 71). It remained, however, for the rabbis to make explicit the teachings embodied in the Torah's concept of man and to declare that the law of love applied to the non-Jew as well. [Avot 1:12; The word beriyot denotes the entire human family and in some contexts includes the animal kingdom as well; Avot 2:16, 4:1; Berakhot 17a]. ... Since the Torah in Genesis had already established that all men were created in God's image, and therefore that all men are moral agents and entitled to be treated as ends in themselves, it would follow that any moral rule applies to all human beings, Jews and non-Jews alike. The question that arises, therefore, is why the Torah in several of its commandments of a moral character uses ambiguous terminology (such as re'ah), leading the rabbis in their interpretation to restrict the application to Jews. Since we assume the unitary character of the Torah, self-contradiction prevents us from accepting any explanation suggesting an intrinsic disability in the non-Jew. We must therefore look for considerations growing out of the requirements of the general welfare or moral factors arising from the special circumstances of the particular law. We must remind ourselves that whatever else the Torah is, it must be viewed first and foremost as a practical constitution for a particular society of living men and women at a given point in time and place. In a word, the Pentateuch must be seen within a specific historical context. The Jewish generation that received the Torah found themselves surrounded by barbaric idolaters who lacked the basic structures of law and morality. Indeed, the Siniatic covenant, which creates a special faith-community and whose blueprint is the Torah law, was necessitated by a serious regression on the part of humanity. Reflected in the Torah, therefore, are special obligations that one has to one's own countrymen and co-religionists even as one has special obligations to members of one's own family. Given a specific historical situation to which the Mosaic code addressed itself, priority had to be given to developing cooperating, loving relationships among Jews themselves, and to overcome tribal and other parochial differences before the law of love could be realistically advocated for the non-Jew. Furthermore, given the usual state of politics and relations with the nation on one's borders, advocacy of the law of love to all men would have inevitably included the avowed enemies of one's people. But justice as well as prudence requires that one not jeopardize the security and welfare of one's family and neighbors by embracing the enemies of one's people. Love, like any other moral principle, is not absolute and is context dependent. ... Any just moral system is predicated on a measure of reciprocity which is a realistic expectation if all individuals within the group accept the system as normative or under equal obligation to comply. But if the Torah were, for example, to command Jews to lend money without interest to non-Jews as well as Jews and to cancel in the Sabbatical years all debts to non-Jews as well as Jews (Deuteronomy 23:21, 15:3) without any means of securing reciprocal treatment from non-Jews, a manifestly unjust situation would have been created. The high moral standard, therefore, was best restricted, at least initially, to the faith-community of Israel, to which the Torah was directed. Let us return now to a consideration of the specific laws mentioned above which are restricted to one's re'ah. Maimonides, following the lead of the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, explores the Mishnah's restrictive interpretation of Exodus 21:35 by pointing to the asocial behavior of the Canaanites of old. The extra payment that the Canaanite is obliged to make in the case of his ox doing damage is to be understood as a punitive measure to impress upon him the need to better restrain his animals (Rambam, Hilkhot Nizikei Mamon 8:5). However, as was already noted by the commentators in the Talmud, the implication here is that a non-Jew who observes the basic humanitarian Noahide laws had to be treated the same as the Jew. Shitah Mekubbetzet on Bava Kamma 38. This received its fullest expression much later when Rabbi Menachem ha-Meiri, in the late 13th century, ruled that "nations who are disciplined by the ways of religion (such as contemporary Christians) are not to be considered idolaters and are to be considered 'your brother.'" See discussion in J. Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), p. 116. (Continued at [[GEN723]] Genesis 9:6 whoever SPERO 130-31).
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