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EXODUS — 23:7 far

EXOD856 Said the school of Hillel to the school of Shammai: If someone makes a peculiar acquisition in the market, should one praise or deprecate it? Surely one should praise it. Based on this the sages taught: One should always try to be pleasant with people" (Ket. 17a). So too "If sexual relations with your wife make you late to the synagogue and people ask why you were delayed, ascribe it to something else" (Bava Batra 23b). The twentieth-century rav, Eliyahu Dessler, concurred: "Sometimes it may be wrong to 'tell the truth' about our neighbor... and sometimes it may be necessary to change details, when the plain truth would injure" (Mikhtav MeEliyahu). When Francie's late mother-in-law suspected that she had a life-threatening illness, she trusted her family to lie to her rather than scare her with the doctor's grim prognosis. Not telling her the medical "truth" about her condition was not totally honest, yet it supported a worry-free atmosphere that assuredly extended her life. There are other times when you must respect a loved one's final wishes and not betray a trust, though every fiber of your being wants you to do so. Francie's mother, the only person in her immediate family to survive the Holocaust, wanted to be cremated as they had been. She also asked that her ashes be scattered, so that no cemetery headstone would mark her earthly remains. She trusted her husband and daughters to carry out these difficult tasks, even though this would hurt them and was contrary to traditional Jewish law. Fulfilling that trust more than twenty years ago was perhaps the hardest task Francie ever faced.

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EXODUS — 23:7 far

EXOD855 Although it is usually forbidden to lie, at times it is permissible to tell an untruth. The following are some examples: 1) It is permitted to tell an untruth to make peace between two people who are having a dispute, or to save someone from harm. For example, you may tell someone that a person with whom he has quarreled now regrets his behavior, even if it is not true. (Yevomos 65b; Rambam, Hilchos Gzaila Veavaida 14:13). However, you are permitted to tell an untruth to promote peace only in situations when you have no other options (Emes Knaih, p. 46). Moreover, your words should be as close to the truth as possible. (See Rashi on Braishis 27:19). 2) If you were a guest at someone’s house and the host was very hospitable, you should not tell an unscrupulous person about the hospitality extended, since he might take advantage of the host. (Hilchos Gzaila Veavaida 14:13). 3) When someone asks you for information that would constitute r’chilus (needlessly telling someone that another person said or did something against him) if you answer truthfully, you should tell a lie rather than relate that information. For example, Reuven asks you what Shimon said about him. Shimon had said something derogatory. If you tell Reuven the complete truth, you will be guilty of relating r’chilus. What should you do? If you can avoid telling an outright lie, you must do so. Very often by simply leaving out a few details your narrative will be free from r’chilus. If this is not possible, you are permitted to lie for the sake of peace. (Chofetz Chayim, Laws of R’chilus 1:8); Guard Your Tongue, pp. 137-8). 4) You are permitted to tell an untruth out of humility. For example, if someone asks you how well you know a certain tractate of the Talmud, even if you know it well, you are permitted to say that you do not. (Rashi to Bava Metzia 23b). 5) You are permitted to deceive someone who is trying to deceive you in order to save yourself from being cheated (Megilah 13b). However, you may not deceive someone as a revenge for a past wrong which has been perpetrated against you. (Orach Maisharim: Shulchan Aruch L’midos 28:2 and footnote 5). For example, if you suspect someone to be a thief and he asks you for information in order to find out when you will not be home, you are permitted to lie and say that you or someone else will be home, even though it is not true. However, if someone cheated you in a certain business deal, you are not allowed to cheat him on another occasion. 6) When someone purchases an item, you are permitted to praise what he bought even though the article does not deserve the praise. Similarly, you are permitted to praise a bride, even though she does not deserve that praise. (Ksubos 17a). 7) It is permitted to lie to save one’s life. (See Nedorim 22a). 8) A teacher is permitted to say an incorrect statement to his students in order to check their alertness and to see if they remember what they have learned. (Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:6). 9) It is not considered lying when a person makes a statement that everyone understands to be an exaggeration. (For example, “I’ve told you a thousand times.”) (Orach Maishorim 9:11). 10) It is not considered lying to call someone who is not related to you, “My son,” or “My brother,” as a means of showing endearment. (Orach Maishorim 9:10).

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EXODUS — 23:7 kill

EXOD857 Do not decide court cases on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Courts are not allowed to sentence anyone to death unless there are two eyewitnesses, both of whom testify in court that the defendant did as charged. If witnesses say only that it is probable or it seems to them that he did the forbidden act, their words are not considered testimony. Similarly, if two witnesses speak against somebody, one saying that he saw him desecrate Shabbos and the other saying that he saw him worship an idol, their words provide no basis for a trial against this person. It is not considered testimony. It is unthinkable to put someone to death on the basis of circumstantial evidence and opinion, even if the facts seem to leave no doubt as to his guilt. If the Torah allowed courts to administer the death penalty on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence, it would lead to the execution of other defendants on the basis of weaker circumstantial evidence, until God forbid, someone could be put to death for an act that he never did. Therefore, Hashem leaves no room for such a possibility. He forbids courts to judge on the basis of any circumstantial evidence.

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EXODUS — 23:7 lie

EXOD858 We are forbidden to lie. When someone lies, he violates a Torah prohibition (Chofetz Chayim, Positive commandment 13). The Talmud (Sanhedrin 92a) expresses the severity of lying by equating it with idolatry. The Sages (Sotah 42a) list liars among those who will not behold the Divine Presence in the world to come, as it is written, "He that spreads falsehood shall not be established before My eyes" (T'hilim 101:7). Since there are certain situations when it is permissible to distort the truth, as will be listed below, questions might arise about the permissibility to say something that is not true in specific instances. [The author lists twenty-two basic laws of this prohibition and ten instances in which it is permissible to tell an untruth].

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EXODUS — 23:8 bribe

EXOD865 It is a negative commandment for a judge to accept no bribe as Scripture says, And you shall take no bribe [this verse] – – even to render a true judgment. He is duty-bound to return it. And even a bribe of words [flattery] is forbidden. Whoever gives it violates the prohibition, nor shall you put a stumbling-block before the blind (Ya-Yikra 19:14). As for payment for being idled, since it is evident that he is interrupted from his work while he is occupied with a judgment, it is permissible for him to take [a fee] from both litigants equally.

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EXODUS — 23:8 bribe

EXOD861 "You must not take a bribe" [this verse] -- even to entitle the innocent party and to obligate the guilty party. [This injunction applies] even if the two litigants together agree to pay him [for judging]. This is what our Sages, z"l, said (Kesubos 105a): "The legal decisions of one who takes a fee for adjudicating are void." However, it is permissible to compensate him the losses caused as a result of the disruption of his work, provided that the loss is clear, a fixed amount, and known to the public, and that one of the contestants does not reimburse his loss more than the other.

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EXODUS — 23:8 bribe

EXOD862 Can I Accept Gifts from Indigent Clients? Two of the most fundamental principles of ethics are equity and consent: people should be treated equally and fairly, and they should not be coerced. These principles can be violated in flagrant ways, as when a bribe is given to attain special treatment or when deception or pressure are used to evade true consent. But Jewish tradition sensitizes us to more subtle ways in which these principles can be compromised. These are exemplified by the problem that arises when a grateful but impoverished client gives a gift to a helpful public servant. Q: Clients at our social services agency often show their gratitude by giving presents to the social workers. Is it proper to accept? A: The fact that clients are eager to show their gratitude is a wonderful statement about the agency. It shows that people are doing their jobs with ability and dedication, and after all, the work ethic is the starting place for workplace ethics. However these gifts entail two ethical issues that require discussion: equity and expense. THE IMPORTANCE OF EQUITY A very serious problem is that gifts can create favoritism. Our tradition tells us that it is almost impossible to maintain objectivity after one accepts a gift. When the Torah prohibits judges from accepting bribes, it does not say that it is wrong to deliberately pervert justice. That is self-evident. Instead the Torah tells us, "For bribery blinds the sighted, and distorts the words of the righteous" [this verse]. Even a wise and righteous person, who fully intends to remain objective despite the gift, will find that his judgment is distorted. The Talmud educates us to be very sensitive to this consideration. It tells us of important judges who disqualified themselves from judging cases in response to even tiny favors received from one side in the case--favors we might consider routine courtesies. In one case a litigant extended a steadying hand to the judge on a wobbly bridge; in another the petitioner drove a bird away from the judge's head [Ketubbot 105b]. A social worker has to create a working relationship with a client, and exercise a degree of advocacy. He or she can't maintain the same level of detachment that is expected of a judge. But the fundamental psychological insight behind the prohibition of bribes applies in every field. Therefore any gift policy must ensure that all clients are treated equally. Even if we could prevent gifts from creating inequity, we still need to cope with the appearance of favoritism. Some clients will see others giving gifts and will think that they won't get adequate attention unless they do the same. This is a very unfair burden on the agency's impoverished clients. The need for the appearance of equity is graphically illustrated by a story from the Talmud: One of the greatest sages, known by his title Rav, was approached by litigant who was sure that Rav would remember and favor him. In fact, Rav barely recognized the man; yet he disqualified himself as a judge in the case because the litigant's behavior conveyed the impression that the two of them were on friendly terms. And even the replacement judge, Rav Kahana, warned the litigant to stop cultivating the impression of being favored by Rav [Sanhedrin 7b-8a]. DURESS The second possible problem is that accepting gifts make people feel pressured to give them. The problem can be present even the case of an ordinary, friendly gift where the question of equity does not arise. For example, in a social situation, we do not mind that a gift may create a feeling of gratitude and commitment; on the contrary, this feeling is one of the lovely things about gifts. But even in this case there was a problem in accepting a present that is beyond the giver's means. Maimonides writes, "Accepting hospitality from someone who does not have enough for himself verges on stealing. Yet the recipient thinks that he is done nothing wrong, saying, 'did not take only what he offered me?'" [Maimonides, Teshuvah 4:4]. Maimonides awakens us to an important insight: seeming consent can be affected by different kinds of hidden duress. Although the urge to be hospitable is laudable, we should not take excessive advantage of it. We find the same insight regarding charity. Jewish law tells us that charity collectors need to be careful not to put pressure on people to give beyond on their means [Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 248:7]. WHEN GIVING IS GETTING The considerations we have just discussed dictate any gift policy should ensure that gifts do not affect the judgment of the social workers and do not put a financial burden on clients. Does this mean that gifts should be forbidden altogether? Not necessarily. There is an additional ethical consideration we should keep in mind: the value of expressing gratitude. Sometimes accepting is the greatest form of giving. A blanket prohibition on gifts could prevent the clients from expressing their feelings. This definitely presents a problem. Jewish tradition teaches us that giving is a basic human need. This is most clearly demonstrated by the stipulation in Jewish law that charity recipients, who are entitled to support for their needs, should be given enough so that they are themselves able to give charity from the donations they receive [Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 248:1]. One good solution is to adopt a strict policy of not accepting any gifts worth more than some nominal value. Two or three dollars is enough to buy an attractive greeting card or an inexpensive novelty trophy, allowing the clients the satisfaction of expressing their gratitude. But this amount is not so large that it would create an impression of inequity or constitute a real hardship even for a poor person.

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