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DEUTERONOMY — 21:21 stone

DEUT1067 After all is said and done, though, the use of corporal punishment, even within permissible parameters, is questionable. The same Book of Proverbs that advocated the use of physical force in raising children (23:13-14) also says, "Educate a child according to his own way." (Proverb 22:6). The Talmud understands this to mean that parents should make age-appropriate demands so as not to put their children into a situation in which corporal punishment would be called for. In other words, parents have a duty to set reasonable standards for their children so they avoid even being tempted to use physical forms of discipline. As the Talmud says, parents must not make it difficult for their children to fulfill the commandment of honoring them. (B. Kiddushin 30a and see Rashi there). Even in the worst of cases – the kind of described by Deuteronomy -- the Talmud could not accept anything like the death penalty. The Rabbis therefore legislated evidentiary procedures that made it impossible ever to attain a capital conviction in such a case. Once having created these barriers, they themselves said, "A wayward and defiant son [subject to execution according to Deuteronomy 21:18–21] never was and never will be." (B. Sanhedrin 71a). If the Rabbis insisted that even courts not go to the limit available to them under biblical law in physically punishing children, parents should certainly limit the physical punishment they inflict – – or, even better, refrain from it altogether. After all, if the parents' duty is to teach the child proper behavior, they should not, in the process of doing so, do to the child exactly what they do not want the child to do to others. Educationally and pragmatically, then, as well as Jewishly, the best policy is not to use physical punishment at all.

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DEUTERONOMY — 21:22 bury

DEUT1069 Burying the dead, besides being a mitzvah of the Torah, as it says [this verse], also belongs in the category gemiluth chesed. It is an even higher form, a chesed shel emeth, since no reciprocity can be expected here. Taking out the dead for burial, carrying the bier, joining the funeral procession, delivering the eulogy, and everything else done for the dead, involve gemiluth chesed. The topics are explained in the Torah portions of Chayei Sarah and Vayechi. Now see how important this is. Chazal have ruled (Mo'ed Katan 27b): "If someone in the city dies, all are forbidden to carry on their occupations." Now, if the deceased had relatives, the main duty of attending to his burial would devolve on them. Nevertheless the entire city is duty-bound to participate in the funeral. Hence all were forbidden to carry-on with their work. They were thereby endeavor to prepare whatever was necessary for the burial. (If the community has organized groups, each assigned a particular day for discharging these obligations, then those not on duty are free to continue with their occupations. Where the members of the Chevra Kaddisha have not been assigned specific days, but the entire society attends to the deceased, then they must all refrain from the regular occupations until their task has been completed and the coffin transferred to the pallbearers.) Even if the deceased had studied neither Tanach nor Mishnah, the rule applies: all work is prohibited. Torah study alone is not interrupted, as long as the funeral procession has not started, even if the deceased had studied Tanach and Mishnah. Once the coffin is taken out for burial, however, Torah study is stopped for one who was learned, even if the funeral is large, unless the number participating exceeds 600,000. Taking away the Torah (when a Talmid Chacham dies, his Torah departs) requires the same attendance as the giving of the Torah, which occurred in the presence of 600,000 men. Even the outstanding Torah scholar of the generation is not exempt from this obligation.

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DEUTERONOMY — 21:23 affront

DEUT1071 Kevod ha-Beriyot: Human Dignity in Halakhah. The most fundamental assumption of Jewish ethics is that there is something intrinsically and ineradicably sacred about the human person, the human body and spirit as such. … Human dignity is arguably the foundational and most aspirational ideal of Jewish law. The injunction to avoid humiliating or contemptuous behavior takes legal precedence over all other Rabbinic rulings. [See Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 19b; Shabbat 81a-b, 94b; Eruvin 41b; Megillah 3b; Bava Kamma 79b; Menahot 37b, 38a. The parallel text in the Jerusalem Talmud (JT) presents the opinion of R. Zeira that even Torah commandments are temporarily overridden when they conflict with human dignity (JT Kil. 9:1).] The Rabbis thus designate human dignity as the litmus test for their sacred law, a seeming recognition that were the law to participate in dishonoring the human person, it would betray its own raison d'etre. What are some of the practical implications of this lofty principle?... 1. We are not to debase the human body. For many authorities, the idea that the human body is the corporeal representation of divinity gives rise to legal prohibitions against tattooing and multiple piercings, not only outright abuse and degradation of the body. The law prohibits dishonoring even the dead body of a criminal convicted of a capital crime. (Deuteronomy 21:23, Rashi ad. loc.). (By Melissa Weintraub)

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