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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV528 Q: I was just asked to give a reference for a former employee. I want to give the prospective employer as much information as possible, but I don't wish to bad mouth my former hire. A: … A degree of frankness in referrals is ethically appropriate, because accurate information is of immeasurable aid to the prospective employer. An inappropriate hire is frustrating for employer and employee alike. There may even be a third victim: another, more suitable applicant who was not hired and remains out of a job. Yet there is a significant danger that the information you provide may be improper, or may be improperly used. The ethical responsibility to avoid slander is a primary concern. The Torah emphasizes the need to balance our ethical obligations to the recipient and to the subject of negative information by mentioning the two considerations in a single verse: "Do not go about as a talebearer among your people, and do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow man; I am the Lord." [this verse]. The first half of the verse warns us against slander, but the continuation of the verse tells us not to stand idly when we have the ability to come to the aid of our fellow man. The final expression, "I am the Lord," reassures us that we have the God given ability to fulfill both obligations in a responsible way. ... What is forbidden is gratuitous slander, but if we have appropriate intentions and exercise due prudence, disclosure is proper and may be an obligation. ... We must first of all be careful not to arbitrarily spread damaging information, even when it is true; subject to this restriction, we should reveal information when it will help protect someone else from harm.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV529 Q: If I know that a job applicant has a criminal record, should I inform the proprietor? A: The case of a former criminal can be examined in two ways. From one standpoint, he is the same as anyone else – he deserves protection from slander, but at the same time others deserve protection from any damage he may be likely to cause. From another perspective, there is a public interest involved in this unique case.… The discussion here cannot touch upon the grave and complex considerations that apply if the applicant's past creates a concern that he may be dangerous to others. Here we will examine the concern that the applicant may be dishonest and cause a monetary loss. As we have written many times, Jewish tradition deems revealing someone's defects or shortcomings to be a grave transgression. Even casual or innocent gossip is strictly condemned. However, in some cases our dismay at speaking up has to give away before our responsibility to protect others from harm. The Torah emphasizes the reciprocal connection between these two duties by combining them in a single verse: "Do not go about as a talebearer among your people; do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor." [This verse]. The first half of the verse forbids gratuitous slander or gossip, while the second half requires us to take active steps to protect our fellow from harm. Sefer ha-Hinnukh explains: "If we hear someone saying something negative about his fellow, we should not tell the other: 'So-and-so said such-and-such about you.'" But then he adds "unless our intention is to prevent damage and to calm a dispute." Since only gratuitous slander is forbidden, it is permissible to inform if we fulfill a number of conditions, as explained in the classic Hafetz Hayyim by Rabbi Yisrael Meir ha-Kohen. (See especially sections 1:10 and 11:10). They are arranged below in a mnemonic ABC format: Accuracy. It is forbidden to exaggerate or embellish. Benefit. Revealing the information must be the only way to obtain some constructive benefit. Certainty. We must be sure the information is reliable. Desire. The teller's intention must be constructive, not vindictive. Equity. The revelation must not cause undeserved damage to the subject. It is not equitable to protect one person at the expense of another.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV530 Q: May firms monitor worker emails? A: There is no doubt that it is proper and even vital to keep an eye on workers to make sure that they are doing their job. The Talmud suggests ironically that someone who inherits a lot of money and wants to lose it quickly should hire workers and fail to supervise them. Bava Metzia 29b It also assures us that someone who personally surveys his affairs each day, including the behavior of workers, is guaranteed to benefit. Chullin 105a However, intrusive monitoring can violate a worker's privacy. The fact that someone is at work doesn't make his or her every move the concern of the employer. Employers have an ethical responsibility to monitor in a responsible way. This responsibility has two aspects, the "what" and the "how": 1. Not to have an excessive amount of monitoring; 2. Not to use the information gleaned from monitoring in an in equitable or otherwise improper way. We can get some idea of where to draw the line from a fascinating insight of the renowned seventeen century legal authority, Rabbi Yaakov Hagiz. Noting that gossip is strictly forbidden in Jewish law, according to the verse, "Don't go about as a talebearer" [this verse], Rabbi Hagiz concludes that just as it is forbidden to disclose private information to others by gossiping, so it is forbidden to reveal such information to ourselves by prying. "It is forbidden to pursue and seek the private affairs of one's fellow, for what is the difference between gossiping to others or to oneself?" Responsa Halakhot Ketanot 1:276. We can complete the picture by presenting the basic ethical principle regarding gossip or slander: Only information that is essential to preventing substantive damage may be disclosed to the vulnerable party and only if the information will be used in a responsible way.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV531 Tale-bearing, or gossip, refers to telling stories about others that are true (at least in the speaker's mind) and not necessarily negative or degrading to the subject (M.T. Laws of Ethics 7:2). The Jerusalem Talmud interprets the verse's rakhil with reference to rokhel, a peddler: one should not be like a rokhel who bears the burden of one person's words and carries them to another (J. Peah 1:1, 16a). Maimonides (M.T. Laws of Ethics 7:1:2) employs strong language in writing of gossip, pointing out that it is a "great sin" which can cause the "killing of souls" and can "destroy the world." He specifically calls attention to the case of Doeg the Edomite (1 Sam 22:9–19). Doeg informed King Saul that Ahimelech, a priest in Nob, had assisted the then-fugitive David. This information was true (per 1 Sam 21:2–10) and was not prima facie negative about either Ahimelech or David; yet this information enraged Saul, who ordered Doeg to kill all the priests in Nob. Thus, according to Maimonides, the prohibition of gossip is appropriately placed alongside the command "Do not stand idly by your brother's blood" [this verse]. Another issue with the gossipmonger is that she may reveal what should be kept private. M. Sanhedrin 3:7 quotes [this verse] and Proverbs 11:13 ("A base fellow [rakhil] gives away secrets, but a trustworthy soul keeps a confidence")... (By Alyssa M. Gray, "Jewish Ethics of Speech")

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV513 "You shall not go about as a talebearer among your people" This is the prohibition dealing specifically with loshon hora and r'chilus. Loshon hora is the term used for a derogatory or damaging statement. R'chilus is the term used for a report that someone has spoken or acted against the listener. Both are prohibited even when true. Just as a peddler (rochil) goes from house to house selling his wares, so too, a habitual gossip goes from person to person picking up and leaving behind tidbits of derogatory information about others (see Rashi).

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV539 We are sometimes obligated to relate derogatory information. Rabbi Chayim of Volozhin said that the Torah wrote the two prohibitions together to teach us a lesson. When it is necessary to relate derogatory information to save someone from harm we must do so. Withholding such information is a violation of the prohibition against standing idly by the blood of your fellow man (See Chofetz Chayim, R'chilus 9b:6; The Ohr Hachayim and Malbim also discuss this idea.). Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv comments that from here we see how much effort it takes to do exactly what is proper. Since speaking loshon hara is an extremely great transgression, a person might be inclined to avoid it by resolving, "I'll always remain silent and I won't talk at all." But this is not permissible. There are times when one is actually obligated--not merely allowed--to relate derogatory information. (Chochmah Umussar, vol. 1, p. 332). Some people are normally careless in regard to speaking loshon hora. Yet they avoid relating information of practical importance, such as information in connection with a shidduch or a business partnership. In such matters, failure to relate the necessary information could cause serious harm and damage. For this reason, it is of the utmost importance to know the laws of loshon hora very well. A person must know when he is obligated to be silent and conversely, when he is obligated to divulge information. (Zeh Hashulchan, notes of sefer Chofetz Chayim).

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV538 We are forbidden to speak against others. This is the prohibition dealing specifically with loshon hara and r'chilus. Loshon hara is the term used for a derogatory or damaging statement about someone. R'chilus is the term used for a report that someone has spoken or acted against the listener. For example, you tell Reuven that Shimon said he is lazy. [Transcriber's note: Author provides extensive discussion of laws with many illustrative examples].

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV515 A person buys something in a store, and finalizes the sale in accordance with halachah. Afterward, he shows the item to his friend, to find out whether the item is really worth the price that he paid for it. In response, the friend not only fails to compliment him on his purchase, he also disparages it by telling him that the seller really cheated him. The friend is not particularly meticulous with his assessment at that point, and speaks without determining the item’s precise current market value. This is a mistake, because prices often fluctuate within a short period of time. Furthermore, the friend does not calculate how much the buyer was overcharged, in order to determine whether the price constitutes overcharging according to halachah. Nor does he bother to find out when the deceitful transaction took place, in order to determine whether the window of time for showing the item to a different merchant or to a relative has already passed. If that amount of time did elapse, then there would be no point in notifying the buyer of the matter, for this information would only cause the buyer to develop intense hatred toward the seller. Under such circumstances, were he to inform the buyer of the deception, he would be considered a full-fledged rechilus speaker, who passes negative information from one person to the next. In many cases, the person who tells the buyer about the problem is motivated by his own hatred toward the seller, and it later becomes clear that the item really was worth the amount of buyer paid for it. Often, informing the buyer that he was overcharged causes the seller a financial loss, for the speaker convinces the buyer by saying, “Go return the item and throw it back at him. If you are embarrassed to do it yourself, then send the item back to him with someone else. And if the seller refuses to take it back from you, then don't pay him the money that you owe him for this item or for other merchandise you've bought from him in the past.” (At times, these actions contravene halachah, and therefore constitute outright theft.) When the buyer brings the item back to the seller, and the seller does not want to take it back--for he claims that the buyer is causing him a loss that is halachically unjustified--the two begin to quarrel and berate each other. Take note of how many wrongdoings this rechilus speaker committed. He violated the prohibition of לֹא־תֵלֵ֤ךְ רָכִיל֙ בְּעַמֶּ֔יךָ, “Do not go as a talebearer among your nation” (Vayikra 19:16) (if he was not meticulous to fulfill the conditions we listed above). He violated the prohibition of לִפְנֵ֣י עִוֵּ֔ר לֹ֥א תִתֵּ֖ן מִכְשֹׁ֑ל, “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block” (Vayikra 19:14), by advising his friend to return the item in contravention of halachah, or by causing him to harm the seller in other ways. He also caused his friend to enter a dispute, in violation of the prohibition of לֹ֤א תֹונוּ֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶת־עֲמִיתֹ֔, “Do not distress a member of your nation” (Vayikra 25:17), as well as several other prohibitions that are transgressed in the course of a dispute, Hashem should only save us. Therefore, it is highly advisable to refrain from involving oneself in matters like these unless one thoroughly contemplates all that we have discussed. Then, Hashem will help him, so that his actions will not lead to any adverse results.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV518 However, if one surmises that nothing constructive will result from informing other people what was done, then it is forbidden to tell them. For example, if the people to whom one wants to report the offense are themselves wrongdoers, who have committed similar offenses against others at times and do not consider such behavior sinful at all, then one should refrain from sharing any such information with them. Aside from the fact that nothing constructive will result from his report, it could also lead to a disastrous outcome, for the listeners may approach the one who stole, cheated, or humiliated and tell him what was said about him, and thus violate the negative commandment of לֹא־תֵלֵ֤ךְ רָכִיל֙ בְּעַמֶּ֔יךָ, “Do not go as a talebearer among your nation” (Leviticus 19:16). Such incidents frequently result in terrible disputes as well. In particular, if there is a possibility that reporting the information could lead to malshinus (informing), Heaven forbid, then even if all of the conditions above are fulfilled, it is forbidden to relate any of the information.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 talebearer

LEV522 It is forbidden to speak negatively about another person even if what one says is entirely true. The term that Chazal used to refer to such speech is “lashon hara.” (If one mixes some falsehood into his words, then he enters the category of motzi shem ra, a slanderer, and his transgression is far worse.) Someone who speaks lashon hara violates the negative commandment of לֹא־תֵלֵ֤ךְ רָכִיל֙ בְּעַמֶּ֔יךָ “Do not go as a talebearer among your nation (Vayikra 19:16), for lashon hara is also considered “talebearing.”

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