LEV450 If you see a man saying or doing something for which he may be judged either favorably or unfavorably--if he is a God-fearing man, you are obliged to judge him favorably in keeping with the truth, even if the indications are much more for an unfavorable than for a favorable judgment. And if he is in the middle range, generally keeping himself from sin, but sometimes stumbling into it, you should put aside the doubt and judge him favorably. Our Rabbis of blessed memory have said [Shabbos 127b]: "One who judges others on the scale of merit will be judged by the Almighty on the scale of merit." And this is a positive commandment of the Torah, as it is written [this verse]: "In righteousness shall you judge your neighbor." And if the indications are for an unfavorable judgment, let the matter be doubtful in your eyes and do not judge him unfavorably. If most of the man's actions and words, however, are evil, and you know that there is no fear of the Exalted One in his heart, then an unfavorable judgment is to be placed upon his deeds and words.

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LEV454 Above, we cited from the poskim that the Torah forbids one to believe derogatory information that people say about others. The same halakhah applies when one knows that the information he heard is true, but it could be interpreted in two possible ways, and the speaker interpreted the information in a negative light, which led him to disparage the subject. In such a situation, it is clearly a mitzvah for the listener to judge this subject favorably (which is a decisive halachah in the Gemara in Shevuos [30a], and a positive Torah commandment according to many poskim and refrain from accepting the speaker’s derogatory interpretation. If the listener violates this commandment by failing to give the subject the benefit of the doubt, and he concurs with the speakers disparaging words, then not only has he transgressed the commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Vayikra 19:15), but he is also considered to have believed lashon hara, since his failure to judge the subject favorably automatically resulted in his acceptance of the disparaging words.

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LEV455 At times, one who speaks or believes lashon hara also transgresses the positive commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ׃, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Vayikra 19:15). For instance, if one sees his friend do or say something that can either be interpreted in a favorable light and given the benefit of the doubt, or be interpreted negatively, then this Torah commandment obligates him to judge the other person favorably, even if that person is just an average Jew. (However, if the person is G-d-fearing, then one is required to give him the benefit of the doubt even if it seems more likely that he acted improperly.) One who interprets another person's words or actions unfavorably and then disparages him on that basis has transgressed this commandment, as has the listener who believed this unfavorable interpretation.

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LEV456 If the person who sinned is considered an average Jew who is usually careful to avoid transgressing and stumbles only occasionally, then the halachah is as follows. If it is possible that the person sinned unintentionally, or was not aware that this act was forbidden, or thought that it was a mere stringency or a good practice that pious individuals are careful about, and even if one saw him repeatedly violate the prohibition, one should definitely give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that he sinned because of one of the aforementioned reasons. Therefore, it is forbidden to tell others what happened to, lest the other person will be disgraced in their eyes. Furthermore, even the person who witnessed the transgression should not look down upon the other person. It is forbidden for him to hate the other person because of what he saw, for he is required to judge him favorably. According to many poskim, this is included in the positive Torah commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Vayikra 19:15). However, if one sees a person violate a well- known prohibition-- such as immorality, or eating forbidden foods, or any other similar prohibition--in which case it would seem that the person who sinned was aware of the prohibition and intentionally violated it, then halachah is as follows. If that person is otherwise considered an average Jew, who is usually careful about sinning and was seen transgressing this prohibition only once, in private, then it is forbidden to tell others about his transgression even if he is not present. One who reveals the incident to others commits a serious offense, for perhaps the person has already mended his wrongful ways and regrets his misdeed. In that case, Hashem has already forgiven him, since he has fulfilled the primary requirement of teshuvah, which is heart-felt regret. If someone publicizes that person's sin, then the person will be disgraced in the eyes of the listeners even though he already regretted his misdeed and was forgiven for it. Therefore, the evildoer who speaks about this person's misdeed is himself guilty of a grave sin .... One should rebuke the person privately for defying Hashem by committing this offense, and caution him to avoid those things that brought him to sin, so that he will not repeat the sin in the future. When he rebukes the other person, he should make sure to speak softly so as not to embarrass him, as it says:הֹוכֵ֤חַ תֹּוכִ֙יחַ֙ אֶת־עֲמִיתֶ֔ךָ וְלֹא־תִשָּׂ֥א עָלָ֖יו חֵֽטְא׃, “You shall surely rebuke your fellow, but do not bear a sin because of him [by shaming him] (Vayikra 19:17).

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LEV457 See [[NUM380]] Numbers 32:22 clean SEFER 247-51

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LEV458 [This verse]. [T]o what [type of] "judgment" does the beginning of the verse refer to? (I.e.,., the Torah does not have any unnecessary words; thus the beginning of the verse must be referring to some type of injustice not mentioned afterward.) Our sages, z"l, said (Sifra 19:5-6) that this is a reference to [being honest in] measure, weight, and volume. This teaches us that one who measures is referred to as a judge; if he is dishonest when measuring it is as if he has carried out an injustice in judgment, and he is called iniquitous, repugnant, anathema, and loathsome. Furthermore, he causes the emergence of five phenomena, just as one who performs an injustice in judgment does: he defiles the land, desecrate Hashem's Name, drives away the Divine presence, causes the people to be downed by the sword, and leads to their being exiled from their land. (Continued at [[LEV803]] Leviticus 19:35 injustice GATES 267).

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LEV459 If you observe someone who either says something or performs a particular deed, and his words or actions can be judged in either a negative or positive way -- if he is a God-fearing individual, you must judge him favorably, by way of the truth (I.e., even though the circumstantial evidence points toward guilt, since he is God-fearing, in truth he is probably innocent), even if the facts are closer and lean more toward his guilt. If he is within the norm, people who [on the whole] are careful not to sin, and yet sometimes falter, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and judge him favorably (Here Rabbeinu Yonah does not add, "by way of the truth."), as our Sages, z"l, said (Shabbos 127b), "Whoever judges his fellow man favorably, will [himself] be judged favorably by the Omnipresent." This is a positive commandment of the Torah, as the pasuk says [this verse], "You shall judge your fellowman justly." If the facts lean toward his guilt, you must treat it as you would any uncertainty – – do not tip the scales against him. But if the majority of his deeds are [geared] towards evil, or if you have checked that within his heart there is no fear of God, then [you must allow] his words and deeds [to] tip the scales against him, as the pasuk says (Mishlei 21;12), "A righteous person understands the house of the wicked; he construes the wicked towards evil." We have already explained this (Rabbeinu Yonah elaborates upon this verse in his commentaries to Mishlei (21:12) and Avos (1:6).

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LEV461 It is a negative commandment not to have pity on a poor man in a court trial as Scripture says, neither show you favor a poor man in his cause (Sh'moth 23:3); and it says further, you shall not respect the person of the poor [this verse]. [This means] that the judge should not say, "He is an indigent man, and we have a duty to sustain him. I will declare him right in the court case, so that he will be sustained with ease."

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LEV460 Do not say: He is a poor man, and since I and the rich man are obliged to sustain him, I shall vindicate him in judgment so that he can support himself honorably. To this end it is written: "You shall not lift up the face of the poor" (Torath Cohanim)

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LEV462 ... moral rules, unlike moral principles, require exceptions. John Stuart Mill stated it most concisely: “It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable.” Smith and Sosa, Mill’s Utilitarianism, Wadsworth, 1969, p. 165. In his book, Generalization in Ethics, Marcus G. Singer clarifies the distinction between principles and rules. Rules, as we have seen, allow exceptions. They state what is usually right or wrong, but there are occasions when it is not only justified, but imperative to break a moral rule. In A.I. Meldon, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy, University of Washington, 1958, p. 165. In some situations, a parent should steal milk for his starving child. Moral principles, on the other hand, allow no exceptions. They are also deeper than and the source of moral rules. Thus, we often speak of the principle underlying a certain rule which determines its scope and justifies exceptions to it. Ibid, 160. Moral principles are not only more fundamental than rules; they are also more general and comprehensive. It follows that principles are necessarily more abstract than rules. Ibid. 169. Given these conditions, it is clear that moral principles will not be nearly as numerous as moral rules. What are some moral principles? Kant's categorical imperative is such a principle: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959, p. 39. In other words, when faced with an ethical choice, we must ask the question, “What if everyone in a similar situation were to do that?” The categorical imperative, thus, warns the individual not to make an exception of himself and not to set himself above the moral law. There are exceptional situations, but no person is an exception. The Torah, the five books of Moses, speaks strongly on this point. None is above the law. Not the powerful and not the King. Leviticus 19:15, Deuteronomy 17:14-20. Even the poor, for whom the Torah has immense compassion, are not to be favored at the expense of justice. Exodus 23:3, Leviticus 19:15. This truth also implies that no principle, no nation, and no religion is above the moral law.

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