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LEVITICUS — 19:14 stumbling block

LEV417 One should also be aware of an important principle regarding issues of lashon hara. If one is interested in entering a relationship with someone else--such as by hiring him as a worker, becoming his business partner, making a shidduch with him, or the like--and even if he has not yet heard anything negative about the other person, he is still permitted to research and investigate by asking others about the person's character and dealings. Although it is possible that the people he asks will tell him derogatory information about the other person, it is nevertheless permitted to make these inquiries, since his sole intent is for his own benefit, in order to spare himself damage and avoid any quarrels, disputes or chillul Hashem, Heaven forbid. It seems to me, however, that the one inquiring is required to inform the person he is asking that he is interested in entering a shidduch or starting some other relationship with the subject of his inquiries. By doing so, he will avoid even the slightest transgression with his inquiries, since his intent is only for his own benefit and not in order to disparage the person, as we explained. (Nevertheless, he should take care not to decisively believe anything negative that the person tells him about the subject, because that would be a violation of the prohibition of believing lashon hara. Rather, he should consider the possibility that the information is true, in order to protect himself.) By informing the person of the reason for his inquiries, he also avoids transgressing the prohibition of וְלִפְנֵ֣י עִוֵּ֔ר לֹ֥א תִתֵּ֖ן מִכְשֹׁ֑ל, “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block” (Vayikra 19:14), for even if the person exposes the negative aspects of the subject's character, he is not violating any prohibition, since he is aware of the constructive nature of the discussion. His intent in sharing the information is not to disparage the subject; rather, he is speaking the truth in order to help the one who was consulting with him on this matter--which is halachically permitted, as we explained elsewhere. However, the person who was asked for information should be very careful not to exaggerate and say more than he actually knows. There are other conditions that must be fulfilled in such a case; refer to section 9 of Hilchos Rechilus, where we discuss these halachos.

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LEVITICUS — 19:14 stumbling block

LEV418 One who speaks or listens to lashon hara also violates the prohibition of לִפְנֵ֣י עִוֵּ֔ר לֹ֥א תִתֵּ֖ן מִכְשֹׁ֑ל, “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block" (Vayikra 19:14), because the speaker and the listener are each “placing a stumbling block” before the other and causing him to transgress explicit Torah prohibitions. However, there is a difference between the speaker and the listener in this regard. The speaker transgresses this prohibition whether the listeners are many or few. In fact, the more listeners there are, the more transgressions the speaker accumulates, because when he speaks before several individuals he causes each of them to stumble in a prohibition. This is not true of the listener, though, for it is possible that he violates this prohibition only when he is the sole individual listening to the lashon hara or rechilus. If he were to leave, then the speaker would have no one to whom to relate his lashon hara. However, if there are other people listening to the lashon hara at the same time, then perhaps the listener does not transgress this prohibition, but transgresses only the other prohibitions enumerated in this section [for the lashon hara would have been spoken even if he had not been listening]. However, this applies only to a listener who joined the group after the discussion was already underway. But the first listener with whom the speaker was originally conversing definitely violates this prohibition under all circumstances--even though other people came afterward to listen to the derogatory information--because the transgression started with him. In any event, one should take great care not to sit among such groups of people, because in Heaven all the members of the group are recorded as belonging to a wicked assembly, as is stated in the ethical will of Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol, who instructed his son Horkanus: “My son, do not sit among a group of people who speak ill of others, because when their words ascend above, they are recorded in a book, and all the people present are inscribed as members of an assembly of evildoers.”

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LEVITICUS — 19:15 favorably

LEV443 If one sees another person say or do something--whether in the area of bein adam l’Makom (matters between man and Hashem) or in the area of bein adam l’chaveiro--interpersonal relationships--and his actions can be judged favorably and given the benefit of the doubt, then the halachah depends on how virtuous the person is. If he is G-d-fearing, then one is required to give him the benefit of the doubt even if it seems more likely that he acted improperly. If he is an average person who generally refrains from sin but does stumble on occasion, then if the possibility that he acted properly is equal to the possibility that he acted inappropriately, one is required to judge him favorably. Indeed, Chazal say, “If one judges his fellow favorably, Hashem will judge him favorably.” This obligation is included in Hashem's commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Leviticus 19:15). Even if the possibility that the other person acted improperly seems to outweigh the possibility that his action was justified, it is correct to consider the matter inconclusive, rather than assume that the other person acted improperly. In a case in which it seems likely that the person's actions were indeed justified, if one judges him unfavorably-- which is certainly forbidden by halachah--and consequently proceeds to disparage him, not only does he violate the commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ, “Judge your fellow favorably,” he also transgresses the prohibition of speaking lashon hara. Even when the chances that the person acted improperly outweigh the chances that he acted properly-- in which case there would not be as much of a halachic prohibition to judge him unfavorably-- all that would mean is that the observer may assume for himself that the other person acted inappropriately. However, he may not hurry to go disparage that person before others on the basis of this assumption, unless all of the conditions delineated in sections 4, 5, and 10 are fulfilled. For even if the other person did act improperly, in many cases it would still be forbidden to disparage him, as one who studies those sections will discover.

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LEVITICUS — 19:15 judge

LEV454 Above, we cited from the poskim that the Torah forbids one to believe derogatory information that people say about others. The same halakhah applies when one knows that the information he heard is true, but it could be interpreted in two possible ways, and the speaker interpreted the information in a negative light, which led him to disparage the subject. In such a situation, it is clearly a mitzvah for the listener to judge this subject favorably (which is a decisive halachah in the Gemara in Shevuos [30a], and a positive Torah commandment according to many poskim and refrain from accepting the speaker’s derogatory interpretation. If the listener violates this commandment by failing to give the subject the benefit of the doubt, and he concurs with the speakers disparaging words, then not only has he transgressed the commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Vayikra 19:15), but he is also considered to have believed lashon hara, since his failure to judge the subject favorably automatically resulted in his acceptance of the disparaging words.

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LEVITICUS — 19:15 judge

LEV455 At times, one who speaks or believes lashon hara also transgresses the positive commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ׃, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Vayikra 19:15). For instance, if one sees his friend do or say something that can either be interpreted in a favorable light and given the benefit of the doubt, or be interpreted negatively, then this Torah commandment obligates him to judge the other person favorably, even if that person is just an average Jew. (However, if the person is G-d-fearing, then one is required to give him the benefit of the doubt even if it seems more likely that he acted improperly.) One who interprets another person's words or actions unfavorably and then disparages him on that basis has transgressed this commandment, as has the listener who believed this unfavorable interpretation.

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LEVITICUS — 19:15 judge

LEV456 If the person who sinned is considered an average Jew who is usually careful to avoid transgressing and stumbles only occasionally, then the halachah is as follows. If it is possible that the person sinned unintentionally, or was not aware that this act was forbidden, or thought that it was a mere stringency or a good practice that pious individuals are careful about, and even if one saw him repeatedly violate the prohibition, one should definitely give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that he sinned because of one of the aforementioned reasons. Therefore, it is forbidden to tell others what happened to, lest the other person will be disgraced in their eyes. Furthermore, even the person who witnessed the transgression should not look down upon the other person. It is forbidden for him to hate the other person because of what he saw, for he is required to judge him favorably. According to many poskim, this is included in the positive Torah commandment of בְּצֶ֖דֶק תִּשְׁפֹּ֥ט עֲמִיתֶֽךָ, “Judge your fellow favorably” (Vayikra 19:15). However, if one sees a person violate a well- known prohibition-- such as immorality, or eating forbidden foods, or any other similar prohibition--in which case it would seem that the person who sinned was aware of the prohibition and intentionally violated it, then halachah is as follows. If that person is otherwise considered an average Jew, who is usually careful about sinning and was seen transgressing this prohibition only once, in private, then it is forbidden to tell others about his transgression even if he is not present. One who reveals the incident to others commits a serious offense, for perhaps the person has already mended his wrongful ways and regrets his misdeed. In that case, Hashem has already forgiven him, since he has fulfilled the primary requirement of teshuvah, which is heart-felt regret. If someone publicizes that person's sin, then the person will be disgraced in the eyes of the listeners even though he already regretted his misdeed and was forgiven for it. Therefore, the evildoer who speaks about this person's misdeed is himself guilty of a grave sin .... One should rebuke the person privately for defying Hashem by committing this offense, and caution him to avoid those things that brought him to sin, so that he will not repeat the sin in the future. When he rebukes the other person, he should make sure to speak softly so as not to embarrass him, as it says:הֹוכֵ֤חַ תֹּוכִ֙יחַ֙ אֶת־עֲמִיתֶ֔ךָ וְלֹא־תִשָּׂ֥א עָלָ֖יו חֵֽטְא׃, “You shall surely rebuke your fellow, but do not bear a sin because of him [by shaming him] (Vayikra 19:17).

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 go

LEV466 The holy Torah [] instructed: לֹא־תֵלֵ֤ךְ רָכִיל֙ בְּעַמֶּ֔יךָ, “Do not go as a talebearer among your nation.” (Leviticus 19:16). The Shelach explains that the pasuk uses the word “go” in order to teach us that the act of going [in order to speak negatively] is forbidden in its own right, aside from the actual prohibition of speaking rechilus.

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LEVITICUS — 19:16 idly-by

LEV491 Hashem loves His nation, the Jewish people, and wants the best for them, so much so that He refers to them as His “children,” “portion,” and “inheritance,” as well as by many other affectionate titles that indicate the extent of His love for them, as the pasuk says: אָהַ֤בְתִּי אֶתְכֶם֙ אָמַ֣ר יְהוָ֔ה, "I love you, said Hashem"... (Malachi 1:2). Because of this great love, He distanced the Jewish people from all bad practices, and especially from lashon hara and rechilus, which cause people to argue and quarrel. At times, lashon hara and rechilus can even lead to bloodshed, as the Rambam writes in Hilchos Dei’os (7:1): “Even though this prohibition does not incur lashes, it is a grave sin, and causes the murder of many Jews. Therefore, the prohibition of lashon hara is juxtaposed with: לֹ֥א תַעֲמֹ֖ד עַל־דַּ֣ם רֵעֶ֑ךָ, “Do not stand by idly while your friend's blood is spilled" (Vayikra 19:16). Go and learn from what happened with Doeg the Adomi”—whose rechilus caused the massacre of Nov, the city of kohanim. [1 Samuel 21-22--AJL]. These deplorable practices [of lashon hara and rechilus] have caused many other terrible calamities. As we know, the sin of the Serpent was primarily one of lashon hara, for the Serpent spoke lashon hara about Hashem by telling Chavah that “Hashem ate from this tree and then created the world.” He used this claim to seduce Chavah, as Chazal say (Shabbos 146a), “The Serpent came unto Chavah and contaminated her.” We see, then, that his lashon hara led to immorality. The Serpent's actions also brought death into the world; we see, then, that his lashon hara led to bloodshed. In addition, the Serpent’s lashon hara caused Adam Harishon and Chavah to violate the will of Hashem. Consequently, one who speaks lashon hara is adopting the trait of the Serpent, which destroys the world. (Continued at [[GEN1437]] Genesis 37:2 reports SEFER 30-1).

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