DEUT920 In the Torah, there were many "experts" who claimed that they could cure disease and sickness using ways and methods that did not involve standard medical practices. What all of these practices had in common was that these individuals believed they possessed a power to heal that came from some place other than God. Therefore, all these "alternative therapies" (as outlined in the Torah), which are based on a belief in other powers such as idols, are forbidden. Although we no longer have the same deep desire to worship idols today, Judaism still believes that anytime some other power than God is claimed to be involved, that practice is forbidden. Thus, healing by using witchcraft is forbidden in the Torah, as is the healing of a wizard, relying on omens, astrology, (stick) divination, mediums, or illusions to provide a cure (Exodus 25:17, Leviticus 20:27, Deuteronomy 18:9-12).

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DEUT930 See [[NUM390]] Numbers 33:35 Etzion-geber AMJV 342-3

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DEUT931 The Code of Jewish Law, authored by Rabbi Yosef Caro, states that it is forbidden for a Jew to try to determine the future by using astrology or lots (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 179:1). Rabbi Caro, in a different book of his, explains that the origin of this Jewish law is from the Midrash (Beit Yosef commentary on Tur, Yoreh De'ah 179). Apparently, Rabbi Caro equates using a lottery to determine future events not only with astrology, but also with witchcraft and other forbidden Jewish practices (See chapter [in AMJV], "Alternative Medicine"). The verse mentioned as proof is, "You shall be complete with the Lord your God" [this verse]. This indicates, according to Rashi, that one should rely only on God, and not try to determine any future events by any means. Rather, one must accept what God doles out for him or her. Shulchan Aruch was averse to using lots in any situation relating to determining the future, equating this process with astrology. (However, he allowed lots regarding giving Shabbat food to children and dividing the deceased parents' land among their heirs, as noted above.) Therefore, based on this line of thinking, many later Rabbis banned the concept and the practical application of drawing lots to determine future events. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, a leading Rabbinic leader of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, forbade using lots in our times (Responsa Yabia Omer, section 6, Choshen Mishpat 4).

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DEUT936 The Torah does acknowledge and empathizes with the anger and feelings of revenge by the aggrieved relatives. First, if the accidental killer ever leaves the city of refuge (illegally, before the death of the Kohen Gadol), then the relatives are allowed to kill him with impunity [this verse]. In addition, after the person has been judged to be an accidental killer and is on his way to the city of refuge, the Talmud understands the great anger of the relatives and is afraid that the relatives may try to kill that accidental killer on his way to the city of refuge. Therefore, the court appoints two Torah scholars to accompany the accidental killer to the city, in case they meet up with the relatives of the victim. As they attempt to calm down the relatives seeking revenge, the Torah scholars attempt to convince them not to act illegally and kill that person then and there (Makkot 10b). When the Kohen Gadol dies after many years and the entire people mourn his death, it is hoped that this public mourning and the effect of time will overcome the relative's desire for revenge. Maimonides explains all of these laws in detail, which demonstrate Judaism's great sensitivity towards the feelings of one who seeks revenge (Maimonides, Hilchot Rotze'ach 5:7-11).

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DEUT947 According to most decisors of Jewish law, intellectual property is considered actual property. Thus, all the laws prohibiting stealing also apply to taking copyrighted material without permission from or payment to the owner. … There are a few Rabbis who believed that an idea cannot be owned, and thus copying intellectual property or books is not stealing per se. Nevertheless, they forbade the practice of copying for different reasons in Jewish law. ... The first reason given is that if a secular law prohibits copying, then Jewish law must follow secular law (in areas that do not conflict with Jewish law). This principle is discussed many times in the sources and it is brought down as Jewish law in numerous places by Shulchan Aruch (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 55:11, Choshen Mishpat 369:6; Rema, Yoreh De'ah 165:1, Choshen Mishpat 207:115, 236:9). ... The second reason is the prohibition of encroaching on someone else's business, which is forbidden in Judaism, ([this] Torah verse). Chatam Sofer specifically says that anyone who will cause others to lose money as a result of copyright infringement and copying anything owned by someone else is guilty of this sin (Responsa of Chatam Sofer, Section 5, Choshen Mishpat 79). (It is estimated that the recording and film industries lose billions of dollars a year because people download songs and films for free instead of paying for them.) The third reason is what is called in legal terms "accepted practice law." Whenever there is a legitimate agreement among the people of the city or any particular industry, this is regarded as binding in Jewish law (Rema, Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 37:22). Since copyright infringement is agreed upon by most law-enforcing countries, this agreement, even if not official law, is binding in Jewish law.

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DEUT954 A Jewish court can only rule and act upon the valid report of two legitimate witnesses [this verse], a situation that is almost impossible in cases of sexual abuse of children. And the testimony of a child is not admitted at all in a Jewish court. What then it is the right thing to do according to Judaism at the stage of innuendo, suspicion, and/or accusation without actual proof? The Rabbis had enough savvy to understand how and when to act even without adequate witnesses and to differentiate between accusations and substantiations, between circumstantial evidence and proof. The Talmud asks how King David could have acted upon the Lashon Harah (slanderous speech) of Tziba? It answers that he saw other things besides Tziba's words that convinced him of the facts, and he did not act on the words alone (Shabbat 56a). Thus, we see that sometimes, besides actual witnesses, evidence can be intuitive and common sense can be employed to act upon it, thereby ameliorating the need to rely solely upon accusations. Sometimes even an allegation is enough to justify punishment under certain circumstances (i.e., if other circumstantial evidence helps determine the facts in the case). Therefore, in particular circumstances and in the absence of valid witnesses, the Talmud states that it is permitted to give a person the punishment of flogging merely based on a rumor of evildoing (Kiddushin 81a).

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DEUT966 See [[DEUT610]] Deuteronomy 13:6 death AMJV 354

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DEUT986 See [[DEUT40]] Deuteronomy 2:26 offer AMJV 63-4

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DEUT1066 See [[DEUT610]] Deuteronomy 13:6 death AMJV 354

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DEUT1074 See [[DEUT1080]] Deuteronomy 21:23 overnight AMEMEI 92

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