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EXODUS — 22:24 lend

EXOD711 Rabbi Yosef taught, “If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, do not act as a creditor toward them” (Exodus 22:24). In the case of a Jew and a non-Jew, the Jew takes precedence; a poor person and a wealthy person, the poor person takes precedence; a poor person of your own city and a poor person of another city, the poor person of your city takes precedence. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzi’a 71a

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LEVITICUS — 19:14 stumbling-block

LEV425 An interesting aggadah, a moral tale, appears in tractate Bava Kamma [50b; a longer version appears in the Tosefta, Bava Kamma 2:10], of the Babylonian Talmud. It reads: The Rabbis taught: A person should not clear stones from his property to public property. It happened that a person was clearing stones from his property to public property. A pious person met him and said: “Fool! Why are you clearing stones from property that is not yours to property that is yours?” [The owner of the field] mocked him. Sometime later he needed to sell his field, and [after that] he was walking in the same public place and tripped on those same stones. He said: That pious person spoke well when he asked me, “Why are you clearing stones from a place that is not yours to a place that is? This tale raises a few interesting points. First, it might seem counterintuitive that a person's private property is “property that is not yours,” as described by the pious individual's chastising. This is one of the many ways in which the Jewish tradition reminds us that God is the true owner of the earth, and we are its inhabitants and stewards. The man clearing stones is being inconsiderate to his community by littering in the public area. The idea that he is part of that community is clearly shown when he trips over his mess. Thus, when we “clear stones” into the public domain, we are not only harming others, we are also harming ourselves. If we, as individuals, purchase products that are harmful to the environment or support companies that are unnecessarily destructive, we become party to environmental destruction. In this parable, the stones can be read as our abuse of the environment. The man clearing stones is each and every one of us, and is also most corporations. The pious individual represents our collective conscience, reminding us that thoughtless waste and environmental wantonness have been responsible for widespread devastation in our natural ecosystem, causing clear, irreparable effect. It is impossible to ignore the fact that our choices and actions now affect us in more and more noticeable ways--in other words, we have, in a sense, “cluttered” our public domain by actively and passively participating in harming our environment. Placing a Stumbling Block. This story implicitly alludes to the important commandment from the Torah: lifnei iver lo titein mikhshol, “You shall not... place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). The rabbinic tradition has understood this prohibition to refer to a ban on assisting Jews in transgressing mitzvot (“commandments”). For example, a Jewish business owner is prohibited from selling products forbidden to other Jews, such as idols or non-kosher foods. The buyer, who does not know whether or not an item is forbidden (and is thus “blind”), might mistakenly think that, since it is sold by a Jew, it is kosher. Thus, its presence in the store serves as a “stumbling block.” In regard to the environment, and consumer responsibility, I like to employ the principle of lifnei iver in an unconventional sense. We live in a market-driven economy. In very simple terms, what we buy determines what is sold. Many companies produce goods people want that have a negative environmental impact, which may include obvious things, such as air pollution or increased carbon output. However, there are other unseen impacts of consumer decisions. Despite these negative environmental consequences, companies in our society tend to choose making a profit over sustaining the environment. As consumers in a market-driven economy, we have power within that structure and therefore, we have responsibility. If a Jewish store owner provides items forbidden to Jewish individuals, and a Jewish customer unknowingly purchases one of those products, that store owner may be guilty of livnei iver error. When we buy products or support companies that unnecessarily harm the environment, are we not giving these companies an incentive to continue with “business as usual”? Although this is not the traditional application of lifnei iver, by providing profit for a company despite their engagement in irreparable, unnecessary environmental destruction, we become party to a greed-driven system and thus perhaps guilty of placing stumbling blocks in front of others. (By Justin Goldstein)

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LEVITICUS — 19:15 deference

LEV432 At first glance, it would seem that reconciling affirmative action with Jewish tradition might prove difficult, as suggested by the following statement that says the rich and poor should not be treated differently by judges: “You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment; you shall not respect the person of the poor nor favor the person of the mighty, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15). Yet even this clear position was bent to the realities of creating justice. In a well-known Talmudic story about a dispute between brothers, the rules of evidence were changed to put an excessive burden on the rich and powerful brother when witnesses for the weaker brother were fearful of testifying. “Thus we do for all who are powerful,” says the text. (Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 39b). The promise of equality is not sufficient if there are obstacles that make the reality of equality impossible. (By Albert Vorspan and David Saperstein).

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LEVITICUS — 19:18 vengeance

LEV721 Part of what we generally mean by justice is retribution... Granted that the Mishnah later made it virtually impossible to carry out the death penalty (M. Makkot 1:10) and that it transformed these modes of retribution into compensation (M. Baba Kamma 8:1), still the standard of justice is lex talionis, the law of fitting the punishment to the crime in an attempt to achieve an exact balance of one for the other. That, in the view of both the Torah and the Rabbis, is justice. So how is justice different from vengeance such that the former is praised and a latter condemned? Several things mark the difference. First, justice is meted out by communal authorities—courts and/or kings in the ancient world--while the vengeance banned in Leviticus 19 [i.e., 19:18-AJL] is that of individuals against each other. The presumption is that the court or king will be neutral and fair in deciding whether punishment is warranted and, if so, what it should be. Judges, therefore, according to Mishnaic law (M. Sanhedrin 3:4), may not be related to each other or to the accused or litigants... Second, justice requires that people be treated fairly--that is, that everyone be subject to the same rules. Those taking revenge, by contrast, decide by themselves what they think is appropriate to do to get even with a particular person or people from whom they are wreaking vengeance. Finally, the agents and motives of justice and vengeance differ radically. Justice is meted out by neutral government authorities. Judges may be upset that they must inflict punishment on particular offenders, but if they are unrelated to them, as they should be, the judge’s motivation will not be to harm particular people but rather to uphold the law so that society can live in peace. In contrast, vengeance is inflicted by victims of their families or friends. Vengeance is therefore much more personal. As such, it can eat up the person who bears a grudge and seeks vengeance, sometimes to the point of making gaining revenge the focus of their lives. (By Elliot N. Dorff)

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LEVITICUS — 25:35 support

LEV1043 There are eight gradations in giving charity, each higher than the other. The highest of these, which has no superior, is one who helps a fellow Jew who became poor and offers him a gift, or a loan, or enters into a business partnership with him, or finds him a job, in order to strengthen his economic situation before he needs to ask [for help]. Concerning this, Scripture says, “You shall support him... so that he may live with you” (Leviticus 25:35), that is, help him before he falls and needs. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 10:6-14

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LEVITICUS — 25:36 you

LEV1071 The Torah commands that the needy of his household come first, then the poor of his city, and they, in turn, have priority over the poor of another city... Rabbi Saadia (882-942) wrote that a person is required to put his own sustenance first, and is not duty bound to give charity to others until after providing for his own. The Torah says, “And your brother shall live with you,” (Leviticus 25:36), a verse that clearly establishes that your life comes first and only then the other person’s [following the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzi’a 62a]. Jacob ben Asher (13th-14th century, Spain), Arba Turim, Yoreh De’ah, Chapter 251.

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