Excerpt Browser

This page displays the full text of excerpts.  When viewing a single excerpt, its “Share,” “Switch Article,” and “Comment” functions are accessible.

GENESIS — 32:8 anxiety

GEN1361 … there are a number of rabbinic teachings which deal with considerations of conscience for the individual facing a situation of war. Significant is the fact that in these life-and-death confrontations, limitations, and scruples are explicitly affirmed as appropriate. This is so in both individual and collective confrontations. 1. “It has been taught by Rabbi Jonathan ben Saul: If one was pursuing his fellow to slay him, and the pursued could have saved himself by maiming a limb of the pursuer, but instead killed his pursuer, the pursued is subject to execution on that account.” Talmud Sanhedrin 74a.   2.   Especially revealing are the classical rabbinic comments on the anticipation of war between Jacob and Esau, deriving from [This verse]:   “’Then Jacob was greatly afraid and was distressed.’ R. Judah b. R. Ilai said: Are not fear and distress identical? The meaning, however, is that ‘he was afraid’ lest he should be slain, ‘and was distressed’ lest he should slay. For Jacob thought: If he prevails against me, will he not slay me; while if I am stronger than he, will I not slay him? That is the meaning of ‘he was afraid’—lest he should be slain; ‘and was distressed’ – lest he should slay.” Genesis Rabbah 76:2.  Another rabbinic comment ascribes to Jacob the following sentiment: “If he overpowers me, that is bad, and if I overpower him, that is bad!”   Lekach Tov, cited in Torah Shlemah (ed. M. Kasher), Vol. 6, page 1266, footnote 49. (By Everett E. Gendler, "War and the Jewish Tradition") KELLNER 203

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

GENESIS — 38:9 waste

GEN1476 If the unborn child is not considered a nefesh, why should its destruction not be allowed under all circumstances? Why is only a threat to the mother’s life or health an acceptable reason for therapeutic abortion? One answer is given by Rabbi Ya’ir Bacharach who, contrary to the Mishnah in tractate Arachin 1:4, states that one waits for a condemned pregnant woman to give birth because a potential human being can arise from each drop of human seed (sperm). Interference with this pregnancy would constitute expulsion of semen for naught, an act akin the coitus interruptus as practiced by Er and Onan [this verse] and strictly prohibited by Jewish law. This reason and prohibited therapeutic abortion upon demand is also subscribed to by others.  Responsa Ateret Chachamin, Ehven Ha’ezer no. 1; Responsa She’elat Yaavetz, Vol. 1. No 43 by Rabbi Jacob Emden.  A second reason for not allowing abortion without a specific indication is that the unborn fetus, although not a person, does have some status. This is evident from the laws regarding ritual impurity and offerings that a woman who aborts after 40 days of conception must adhere to. These requirements are similar to those prescribed following the live birth of a child. Thus the fetus may be considered as a “partial person.” Responsa Tzonfat Paneach, Vol. 1, no. 49   A third reason for prohibiting abortion on demand is that one is not permitted to wound oneself Bava Kamma 91b; Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Chovel U’mazik, Chapter 5, Par. 1 and thus a woman undergoing vaginal abortion by manipulative means is considered as intentionally wounding herself. At least two Rabbinic authorities adhere to this viewpoint. Responsa Marahit, Vol. 1. No. 99 by Rabbi Joseph Trani; M.Y.H. See ref. 59   A fourth reason for prohibiting abortion without maternal danger is asserted by at least one Rabbi Responsa Beth Shlomoh, Choshen Mishpat no. 132 who states that the operative intervention entails danger. One is prohibited by Jewish law from placing oneself in danger based upon Deuteronomy 4:15: “Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves…” Another reason for prohibiting therapeutic abortion in cases where no threat to the mother exists is stated by the present Chief Rabbi of Israel, Isser Yehuda Unterman.  He states that one may desecrate the Sabbath to save a life or preserve the health of an fetus in order that the child may observe many Sabbaths later. Ramban on Niddah 44b  As a result, destroying the fetus, although not legally murder, is nevertheless forbidden because of an appurtenance to murder.   Rabbi Bacharach, who permits   abortion prior to 40 days of pregnancy because the fetus has no status at all but is considered mere fluid, is taken to task by Rabbi Unterman who states that even prior to 40 days there is an appurtenance to murder. Another argument of Rabbi Unterman is that a fetus, even less than 40 days after conception, is considered a potential (literally: questionable) human being which, by nature alone, without interference, will become an actual human being. Thus a potential person (sofek nefesh) has enough status to prohibit its own destruction. A final argument to Rabbi Unterman comes from the interpretation of R. Ishmael for the Scriptural verse Genesis 9:6: “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God   did He make man.”   This can be translated“ whoso sheddeth the blood of man in man, his blood shall be shed…”. The “man in man” in interpreted to mean a fetus. Sanhedrin 57b This Noachidic prohibition of killing a fetus applies also to Israelites even though the Jewish legal consequences might differ.   A final reason for prohibiting abortion on demand in Jewish law is suggested by the present Chief Emmanuel Jakobovits  Jakobovits, I. “Jewish Views on Abortion,” in Abortion and the Law, edited by D. T. Smith pp 124-143 and Belgian Rabbi Moshe Yonah Zweig, among others. They point to the Mishnah in Tractate Oholoth 7:6 which permits abortion prior to birth of the child only when the mother’s life is in danger. The implication is that when the mother’s life is not at stake, it would be prohibited to kill the unborn fetus. (By Fred Rosner, "The Jewish Attitude Toward Abortion") KELLNER 262-3

SHOW FULL EXCERPT

RSS
12
Back To Top