LEV425 An interesting aggadah, a moral tale, appears in tractate Bava Kamma [50b; a longer version appears in the Tosefta, Bava Kamma 2:10], of the Babylonian Talmud. It reads: The Rabbis taught: A person should not clear stones from his property to public property. It happened that a person was clearing stones from his property to public property. A pious person met him and said: “Fool! Why are you clearing stones from property that is not yours to property that is yours?” [The owner of the field] mocked him. Sometime later he needed to sell his field, and [after that] he was walking in the same public place and tripped on those same stones. He said: That pious person spoke well when he asked me, “Why are you clearing stones from a place that is not yours to a place that is? This tale raises a few interesting points. First, it might seem counterintuitive that a person's private property is “property that is not yours,” as described by the pious individual's chastising. This is one of the many ways in which the Jewish tradition reminds us that God is the true owner of the earth, and we are its inhabitants and stewards. The man clearing stones is being inconsiderate to his community by littering in the public area. The idea that he is part of that community is clearly shown when he trips over his mess. Thus, when we “clear stones” into the public domain, we are not only harming others, we are also harming ourselves. If we, as individuals, purchase products that are harmful to the environment or support companies that are unnecessarily destructive, we become party to environmental destruction. In this parable, the stones can be read as our abuse of the environment. The man clearing stones is each and every one of us, and is also most corporations. The pious individual represents our collective conscience, reminding us that thoughtless waste and environmental wantonness have been responsible for widespread devastation in our natural ecosystem, causing clear, irreparable effect. It is impossible to ignore the fact that our choices and actions now affect us in more and more noticeable ways--in other words, we have, in a sense, “cluttered” our public domain by actively and passively participating in harming our environment. Placing a Stumbling Block. This story implicitly alludes to the important commandment from the Torah: lifnei iver lo titein mikhshol, “You shall not... place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). The rabbinic tradition has understood this prohibition to refer to a ban on assisting Jews in transgressing mitzvot (“commandments”). For example, a Jewish business owner is prohibited from selling products forbidden to other Jews, such as idols or non-kosher foods. The buyer, who does not know whether or not an item is forbidden (and is thus “blind”), might mistakenly think that, since it is sold by a Jew, it is kosher. Thus, its presence in the store serves as a “stumbling block.” In regard to the environment, and consumer responsibility, I like to employ the principle of lifnei iver in an unconventional sense. We live in a market-driven economy. In very simple terms, what we buy determines what is sold. Many companies produce goods people want that have a negative environmental impact, which may include obvious things, such as air pollution or increased carbon output. However, there are other unseen impacts of consumer decisions. Despite these negative environmental consequences, companies in our society tend to choose making a profit over sustaining the environment. As consumers in a market-driven economy, we have power within that structure and therefore, we have responsibility. If a Jewish store owner provides items forbidden to Jewish individuals, and a Jewish customer unknowingly purchases one of those products, that store owner may be guilty of livnei iver error. When we buy products or support companies that unnecessarily harm the environment, are we not giving these companies an incentive to continue with “business as usual”? Although this is not the traditional application of lifnei iver, by providing profit for a company despite their engagement in irreparable, unnecessary environmental destruction, we become party to a greed-driven system and thus perhaps guilty of placing stumbling blocks in front of others. (By Justin Goldstein)

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LEV428 Separate and distinct from this mitzvah [i.e., the interest-free loan as a positive religious act in Judaism] is the negative mitzvah of not taking interest, which is repeated numerous times in the Bible. In the eyes of the halachic authorities, this repetition of the injunction against taking interest serves to compound the severity of the crime, making the participants liable on a number of different counts. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh v Loveh, chapter 4, halakhot 1-2. Even the use of two different Hebrew terms, neshekh and tarbit, both to mean “interest,” is seen as reflecting the desire of the Torah to make a man liable for two transgressions from making the same single interest-bearing loan. It is interesting to see the Jewish social attitude toward interest expressed in Rashi’s comment on the use of the word neshekh (literally, a “bite”). A snake bite is at first only slightly uncomfortable, but later increases in pain and severity. So, too, interest (neshekh) is at first bearable, but as the debt mounts, the debtors suffering increases. Rashi on Exod. 22:24 From the Torah’s viewpoint, the transgression involved in making interest-bearing loans is not limited to the lender, even though he is obviously the major factor and so bears the brunt of the responsibility. Rather, all parties to the transaction are guilty of violating religious injunctions. The lender is guilty, inter alia, of putting a stumbling block in the path of the blind open (Leviticus 19:14), which the rabbinic authorities always understood as referring to giving prejudiced advice to somebody or providing him with things that are to his spiritual or physical detriment. See Rashi and Sefer HaChinukh, Mitzvah 232; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotzeah u Shmirot Hanefesh, chapter 12, halakhah 14. Agents or other go-betweens in the transaction are considered to be guilty of the same crime. In keeping with Judaism’s symmetry of justice, even the borrower is not left untouched. After all, it is his need or desire for the loan which has implicated the lender in a moral crime. Even the witnesses to the transaction, as well as the guarantors of an interest-bearing loan, are considered to have violated the injunction of “you shall not take interest from him.” Without their participation, it is highly improbable that the transaction would have taken place. It is only fitting, therefore, that they share in the guilt attached to the maker of the interest-bearing loan by the Torah. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh u Loveh, chapter 4, halakhah 2.

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LEV432 At first glance, it would seem that reconciling affirmative action with Jewish tradition might prove difficult, as suggested by the following statement that says the rich and poor should not be treated differently by judges: “You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment; you shall not respect the person of the poor nor favor the person of the mighty, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15). Yet even this clear position was bent to the realities of creating justice. In a well-known Talmudic story about a dispute between brothers, the rules of evidence were changed to put an excessive burden on the rich and powerful brother when witnesses for the weaker brother were fearful of testifying. “Thus we do for all who are powerful,” says the text. (Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 39b). The promise of equality is not sufficient if there are obstacles that make the reality of equality impossible. (By Albert Vorspan and David Saperstein).

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LEV433 See [[EXOD673]] Exodus 22:21 widow SPERO 126

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LEV431 "Do not favor the poor nor show deference to the rich" [this verse]. "You shall neither side with mighty to do wrong nor shall you show deference to a poor man in his dispute" (Exodus 23:2-3). The many Jewish laws commanding the compassionate treatment of the poor (see, for example, chapters 12, 13, and 18), are applicable outside, but not inside, the courtroom. In a judicial setting, there must be one standard of justice for poor and rich alike. Thus, a judge should not reason to himself: "Since this man is poor and both I and this rich man are obliged to support him, I shall decide the case in his favor so that he will receive support in a clean [and non-embarrassing] manner" (Sifra on this verse). The Talmud holds up King David as a model of someone who showed both justice and charity. In the courtroom, he judged strictly on the basis of law, acquitting the innocent and condemning the guilty. But after pronouncing a ruling in which he sentenced a poor man to pay damages, he would help the man out of his own pocket, thereby fulfilling the demands of both justice and kindness, justice to the injured party by ensuring him that he received what was due him, and kindness to the poor man by enabling him to pay his debt (Sanhedrin 6b). (This Talmudic teaching is offered in explanation of the biblical verse: [King] David administered justice and kindness to all of his people" (II Samuel 8:15).

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LEV437 Humility will occasion a sense of justice in all things. It will teach a man to be scrupulously honest in all he does and not to take any unfair advantage of the ignorance or trust of another. It will instill in him the determination to loathe any usurious transaction and abhor exploitation in business and all other kinds of fraudulent dealing. Few vices come more under the lash than the abuse of the confidence placed in us by a trusting fellow-man [this verse, Leviticus xxv. 14; Deut. xvi. 19; xxv. 16; Isa. xxxii. 7; Jer. xxii. 15; Zech. vii. 9-10; Hab. ii. 6-11; Prov. xxi. 21; xiv. 34; xxviii. 8; Job xxxi. 7; Ps. xv; Talmud: Sanhed. 25a; Kidd. 56b; Hull. 94a). To be impartial is only the passive side of justice and is not enough. Justice has an active side also; this is to right wrong and to vindicate the cause of the oppressed. Isaiah is fond of describing the justice of God side-by-side with His Holiness (xxvi.9)

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LEV436 Greater is Torah than the cohen's realm and than royalty: for royalty is acquired with thirty attainments, and the cohen's realm with twenty-four, while the Torah is acquired by forty-eight things. And they are: [38] judges him favorably Pirkei Avot, Perek VI, mishnah 6. In its literal meaning, the Hebrew refers to the image of the scales of justice, with its two pans evenly balanced, one on either side. When someone is to be judged for something he has done, we imagine that every possible accusation against him is put on one pan, and every element in his favor on the other pan; then we see which pan goes lower, indicating it is heavier – – and accordingly we declare the person innocent or guilty, good or bad. Now suppose you have seen a neighbor doing something which, from one point of view is a misdeed, but in another respect may be a good act. In the figurative scales of justice that measure the deed, says our text, the scholar of Torah will see that pan bending lower which declares his neighbor innocent and worthy. "For him he makes the pan of merit weigh the more." He gives his fellow, fully and readily, the benefit of the doubt (in keeping with the teaching of R. Joshua b. P'rahyah in the first perek, mishnah 6). In fact, Scripture admonishes, "with righteousness shall you judge your neighbor"--which the Sages understand in this very sense. [this verse, Midrash Sifra ad loc. T.B. Shebu'oth 30a).

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LEV434 .. In line with the biblical law "In justice shall you judge your fellow" [this verse], we should force ourselves to construct one or two positive scenarios that can account for why the person acted as he did. If we recall the person's good deeds and try to put a more positive "spin" on why he has now acted inappropriately, we might choose not to break off a relationship over a relatively insignificant issue.

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LEV435 Gossips also violate [this verse]. Jewish tradition understands this law as requiring us to judge others fairly, and to incline toward the more favorable assessment of their behavior when two views are possible. Yet those who speak lashon hara tend to attribute bad or selfish motives to those they are talking about (for a more comprehensive discussion of judging others fairly, see chapters five and six [of this volume]).

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LEV438 "He will minister judgment to the peoples with equity." Psalm 9:9. Justice, by its very definition, must treat all people with equal impartiality, rich and poor, powerful and humble. The Bible explicitly prohibits favoring the poor or giving preference to the rich [this verse]. Yet equality before the law does not always meet the ends of justice. The loss of a small financial claim will not significantly affect a rich person but it may destroy a man in need. Universality of law precludes the kind of flexibility which allows for wide judicial discretion. This renders the law helpless to prevent occasional miscarriages of justice. To remedy the situation, courts of equity came into existence in medieval England. Equity judges gave liberal interpretations to the letter of the law in order to arrive at equitable decisions. However, even courts of equity were bound by legal principles which did not permit judges to entirely ignore the letter of the law. The layman's interpretation of equity, as it is widely understood in modern times, is not constrained by technicalities, as was the case when equity was part of the national juridical system. In common parlance equity is synonymous with fairness. The determining factor of fairness is ethics, not law. The burden of equity is the responsibility of all individuals in every walk of life. The standard of behavior of equitable people must be measured on the scale of fairness rather than legality. (Continued at [[DEUT584]] Deuteronomy 12:28 good BLOCH 113-4)

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