DEUT1314 "so as to satisfy," and not gluttonously (Bava Metzia 87b)

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DEUT1315 Workers handling produce shall not take more than they eat. See [[DEUT1308]] Deuteronomy 23:25 eat CHINUCH 367-8. Although such behavior on the part of laborers is actually theft and the Torah already forbids theft, the Torah adds this precept because workers might rationalize and think that such behavior is not sinful. They might imagine that since the employer sees a bountiful harvest, he will not be particular if his workers take of it even in substantial amounts. Therefore, out of His great kindness, Hashem adds a specific prohibition to his Torah, to save workers from stealing.

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DEUT1316 This tells me only of a vineyard. Whence do I derive [the same halachah] for all [similar] instances? It is derived from "vineyard," viz.: Just as a vineyard is characterize3d by being a growth of the soil, and at its fruition the laborer eats of it, so, the laborer may eat of all growths of the soil at their fruition (Bava Metzia 87b)

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DEUT1317 This teaches us that he may not cut it with a hand-sickle [for then the owner would sustain a greater loss] (Sifrei)

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DEUT1318 It is positive commandment that an owner should allow the laborer to eat of what he is working at, when it is something that grows from the ground since Scripture says, When you come in to your fellow's vineyard, then you may eat, etc. [this verse]; and it says, When you come into your fellow's standing grain, you may pluck the ears, etc. [this verse]; and by the Oral Tradition it was learned that Scripture speaks here of a laborer. He may eat produce that either was plucked or is attached, whose work has not been completed yet, and by this act [of his labor] the work is completed [to make it bear the obligations of tithes or of hallah]. This means, then, not before the completion of the work nor after the completion of the work, but only during the completion of the work. And for the purpose of returning a loss [lost working time] to the owner, the Sages taught (Talmud, Bava M'tzi'a 91b) that the workers should eat while walking from one furrow to another, and while returning from the winepress [even though they are not actually working then], so that they should not stop their work and sit down to eat, but should rather eat during the labor while they are walking, and us not be idle from their work. If someone is guarding produce attached to the soil, he is not to eat [of it] at all, since a watchman is not like one doing actual labor. If a person is guarding reaped produce, he may eat [of it] not by the law of the Torah, but by the norms of the land.

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DEUT1319 See [[LEV836]] Leviticus 20:10 death OXFORD 479

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DEUT1320 The Torah provides for divorce (this and following three verses), and so from our earliest texts the Jewish tradition has not consider divorce a sin. On the contrary, at times divorce is appropriate and possibly even a Jewish and moral good. That would certainly be true when the marital bond includes abuse or when it causes severe harm to the self-esteem of one or both spouses; but it might even be true when a couple simply cannot get along, despite counseling and other modes of trying to repair the relationship. On the other hand, though, the Talmud teaches that the Temple altar itself sheds tears upon the termination of a marriage (B. Gittin 90b), suggesting that divorce is a source of immense sadness to all involved, not only to the couple and the family but even to the community and the world. Divorce is sometimes the right thing to do, sometimes a tragedy, and often both.

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DEUT1323 The Jewish tradition understands marriage to operate on three independent, but interlocking, planes: the contractual, the social, and the sacred. That is, marriage is not exclusively a matter of a contract between the two people or families, and it is not simply a social structure governed by the rules of society or a sacred event with solely religious meaning; it is all three at once. Moreover, each element affects the functioning of the others. The Covenantal Element of Jewish Marriage. Jewish marriage is, first, a covenant between the parties. Like a contract, a covenant is an agreement between two parties in which each gets something and gives something (lawyers call what each party gets “consideration”). Unlike a contract, though, a covenant is not designed to accomplish a specific task, after which it terminates; rather, those entering a covenant intend to create a long-term relationship. As a result, the terms of a covenant are generally less well spelled out than those of a contract, because it is harder to anticipate what might happen in a long-term relationship then it is taking on a particular task. Thus, a covenant of marriage in all cultures and legal systems is typically much shorter and much less specific than, for example, a contract to rent an apartment. Even though a covenant differs in important ways from a contract, it shares one important aspect that affects marriage--namely, the parties can create the covenant or dissolve it at will. Both the man and the woman must agree to be married for the marriage to be valid. As the Rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud understood the Torah (specifically, Deuteronomy 24:1-3), a man must initiate a divorce but can simply throw the writ of divorce within six feet (four cubits) of the woman to deliver it and effect the divorce. After the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom toward the end of the tenth century, however, the woman as well as the man must agree to a divorce to make it valid. (S.A. Even Hae’zer 66:3 gloss, 119:6 gloss. Maimonides (twelfth century) still accepts the validity of a divorce against her will: M.T. Laws of Divorce 1:2). Even in the time of Torah, as far as we can tell, and certainly by the time of the later Mishnah and Talmud, if both members of a couple agree to a divorce, they need not supply a justification for dissolving their marriage to judges or other officials; The covenantal nature of marriage enables them to create and dissolve their marriage at will. “The School of Shammai says, “A man may not divorce his wife unless he has found something improper in her, as it is said, ‘because he finds something obnoxious about her’” (Deuteronomy 24:1). But the School of Hillel says, “Even if she spoiled a dish for him, as it is said, ‘because he finds something obnoxious about her.’ Rabbi Akiva says, “Even if he found another more beautiful than she is, as it is said, ‘She fails to please him’”. Mishnah, Gittin 9:10. As late as 1970, all American states except Nevada required that a divorcing couple justify their divorce as a response to adultery, insanity, imprisonment, or some other communally accepted reason for the couple to separate. In contrast, the covenantal nature of Jewish marriage had enabled couples to divorce simply for “irreconcilable differences” almost two thousand years earlier.

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DEUT1322 The high ideal of married life inculcated by Judaism, added to the experience that an irksome marriage could be ended if absolute necessity arose, raised the lofty standard of Jewish marriage to a very high-level. Though the ethical principles of Judaism are against dissolution, life reveals circumstances, the influences of which sometimes so undermined the basis of marriage as to make any modus vivendi almost impossible. In such cases, it was contended that divorce was the external dissolution of a relation which had already inwardly been destroyed. From the Codes, it would appear that our divorce laws did not press heavily to the disadvantage of woman. Despite the facility with which a union could be dissolved (as would appear from a hurried glance at the sources), the evidence does not suggest that this facility was abused. In the figurative words of one teacher, the alter weeps when a man divorces his first wife (Gittin 90). The Jew, despite the utterances of his detractors, could not divorce his wife upon any slight pretext or whim. He had to find some serious flaw in her [this and following verse]. What this uncleanness was is the theme of a much Talmudic debate. He could not banish her from his home just by mere word of mouth and in an unceremonious, preemptory manner, but after a long and dreary formality which ended in the placing in her possession of a Get. This process was made odious and laborious for two reasons: one, to prevent an undue haste to divorce occasioned by an outburst of anger; two, to afford an opportunity to either party, even at the twelfth hour or during the actual writing of the Bill of Divorcement, to become reconciled.

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DEUT1321 "Lashon hara for a purpose" is permitted when someone is doing something very wrong, and there is reason to believe that publicizing this fact will pressure the person to change his behavior. For example, Jewish law, basing itself on [this verse], invests the right to initiate divorce in the hands of the husband; therefore it is the man who must grant his wife a get, a Jewish divorce. If a man refuses to do so, the woman remains an agunah, "a chained woman," and is forbidden to all other men [since the Tenth Century, Jewish law has ruled that a woman must accept the get willingly. If she refuses to do so, then the husband is likewise forbidden to marry another.] In instances in which a man refuses to give a get, and a rabbinical court has made clear it that he should do so, it is permitted to publicize this fact, and to exert a variety of pressures on the man, including publicizing his behavior in newspapers (particularly Jewish newspapers), picketing his residence and/or place of business, and walking out of a synagogue service in which he is accorded any honor (such as being called to the Torah for an aliyah). Even in such a case, however, we should abide by the rules of lashon hara and reveal only that information which the public needs to know about the case (thus, it does not seem right to reveal embarrassing information about the person that is extraneous to the issue of the divorce).

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