DEUT185 The Torah repeats the Ten Commandments in the book of Deuteronomy. In the book of Exodus, the tenth commandment reads, "You shall not covet your neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his donkey, nor anything that is your neighbor's" (Exodus 20:14). The Hebrew verb prohibiting coveting is "Lo Tachmod." In Deuteronomy, however, a second verb is added with other slight changes: "You shall not desire your neighbor's wife, nor shall you covet your neighbor's house, his field, or his manservant, or his maidservant, his ox, or his donkey, or anything that is your neighbor's" [this verse]. The additional verb, "do not desire" ("Lo Titave"), is the subject of debate among the commentaries. Some Jewish law authorities see both verbs as identical and make no distinction between the laws in Exodus and in Deuteronomy (Semag, Mitzvah 158). Rashi agrees with this interpretation (Rashi commentary to this verse). However, the vast majority and normative Jewish approach is to divide this probation into two distinct categories (Zohar 3:261). One prohibition, merely desiring your neighbor's object, is prohibited under Lo Titave, without requiring any action to take place. Coveting, on the other hand, requires a distinct action to be taken in order to be guilty of the sin. But how could a Jew be guilty of a sin from a mere emotion, which may be beyond his control? Maimonides indeed points out that merely desiring the object is not enough to be guilty of "do not desire" ("Lo Titave"). A person must actually plot and scheme how he will obtain the object (without doing any action) to be guilty of this prohibition (Maimonides, Hilchot Gezaila 1:10). Thus, while the sin does not involve any actual action, it does require much more than a mere base emotion. The Code of Jewish Law, Shulchan Aruch, agrees with Maimonides. One can sin without an action, but to be guilty a person must do more than simply desire. He must also use his brain to devise a means to buy or obtain the object (Shulchan Aruch, Chosen Mishpat 359:10-11). The second prohibition of coveting is more clear-cut. The Midrash states that in order to be guilty of sin, a person must act upon his desire to obtain his neighbor's wife, his house, or any object belonging to him (Midrash, Mechilta, HaChodesh 8). What action renders one guilty of coveting? Tur seems to say that merely talking about obtaining the object is enough to make a person guilty (Tur, Choshen Mishpat 371). Maimonides believes that a person must take a concrete action to obtain the object, by approaching the neighbor and repeatedly annoying him or her to give or sell it when the neighbor is reluctant to do so. If the neighbor actually does give it or sell it, only then is the person guilty of the sin of coveting. Shulchan Aruch reflects the view of Maimonides, which has become normative Jewish law: until the neighbor (reluctantly) gives or sells the object after badgering, a person is not guilty of "thou shalt not covet" (Shulchan Aruch, Chosen Mishpat 359:10) Rabbi Eliezer Papo, a later commentary (1785-1825), sums up the two prohibitions simply: "Anyone who desires and then attempts to obtain his neighbor's object as a gift or by purchasing it, violates 'Thou shalt not covet.' And even if he does not attempt to buy it, but merely thinks about ways to get the object into his position, he has violated the prohibition of 'Thou shalt not desire.'" Pele Yo'etz on "Chemdah."