NUM416 Homicide is never less than serious in Jewish law. But there is a fundamental difference between murder--deliberate killing--and manslaughter, accidental death. To kill someone who is not guilty of murder as an act of revenge, someone who is responsible for the accidental death, is not justice but further bloodshed; this must be prevented--hence the need for safe havens where people at risk could be protected. The prevention of unjust violence is fundamental to the Torah. God's covenant with Noah and humankind after the Flood identifies murder as the ultimate crime: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man" (Genesis 9:6). Blood wrongly shed cries to Heaven itself. God said to Cain after he murdered Abel, "Your brother's blood is crying to Me from the ground" (Genesis 4:10). Here in Numbers we hear a similar sentiment: "You shall not pollute the land in which you live, for blood pollutes the land, and the blood can have no expiation for blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it" (Numbers 35:33). The verb H-N-F, which appears twice in this verse and nowhere else in the Mosaic books, means to pollute, to soil, to dirty, to defile. There is something fundamentally blemished about a world in which murder goes unpunished. Human life is sacred. Even justified acts of bloodshed, as in the case of war, communicate impurity. A priest who has shed blood does not bless the people (Berakhot 32b; Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Tefilla 15:3). David is told that he may not build the Temple "because you shed much blood" (I. Chr. 22:8). Death defiles. ... However, not all acts of killing are murder. Some are bishgaga, that is, unintentional, accidental, or inadvertent. These are the acts that lead to exile in the cities of refuge. Yet there is an ambiguity about this law. Was exile to the cities of refuge considered a way of protecting the accidental killer, or was it itself a form of punishment--not the death sentence that would have applied to one guilty of murder, but punishment nonetheless? Recall that exile is a biblical form of punishment. Adam and Eve, after their sin, were exiled from Eden. Cain, after killing Abel, was told he would be "a restless wanderer on the face of the earth" (Genesis 4:12). ... In truth both elements are present. On the one hand the Torah says, "The assembly must protect the one accused of murder from the redeemer of blood and send the accused back to the city of refuge to which he fled" (Numbers 35:25). Here the emphasis is on protection. But on the other hand, we read that if the exiled person "ever goes outside the limits of the city of refuge to which he fled and the redeemer of blood finds him outside the city, the redeemer of blood may kill the accused without being guilty of murder" (Numbers 35:26–27). Here an element of guilt is presumed; otherwise, why would the blood-redeemer be innocent of murder? (See Amnon Bazak, Cities of Refuge and Cities of Flight," in Torah MiEtzion, Devarim (Jerusalem, Maggid, 2012), 229-236.) … The desire for revenge is basic. It exists in all societies. It leads to cycles of retaliation… that have no natural end. Wars of the clans were capable of destroying all societies. The Torah, understanding that the desire for revenge is natural, tames it by translating it into something else altogether. It recognizes the pain, the loss, and the moral indignation of the victim's family. That is the meaning of the phrase goel hadam, the blood-redeemer, the figure who represents that instinct for revenge.… Yet the Torah inserts one vital element between the killer and the victim's family: the principle of justice. There must be no direct act of revenge. The killer must be protected until his case has been heard in a court of law. If found guilty, he must pay the price. If found innocent, he must be given refuge. This single act turns revenge into retribution. This makes all the difference. People often find it difficult to distinguish between retribution and revenge, yet they are completely different concepts. Revenge is an I-Thou relationship. You killed a member of my family so I will kill you. It is intrinsically personal. Retribution, by contrast, is impersonal. ... Indeed the best definition of the society the Torah seeks to create is nomocracy: the rule of laws, not men. Retribution is the principled rejection of revenge. It says that we are not free to take the law into our own hands. Passion may not override the due process of the law, for that is a sure route to anarchy and bloodshed.