EXOD864 How Can Public Servants Police Industries and Then Join Them? When public servants such as regulators leave their jobs, they often go to work for the same companies they used to supervise. This "revolving door" can create severe conflicts of interest as the public servant has an interest in impressing and accommodating his future potential employer. Q: Should public employees go to work for the very same businesses they policed while in government service? A: Before we analyze this problem, we should acknowledge that there are many advantages to this "revolving door" between the public and private sectors. COMMUNICATION When there is turnover between the public and private sectors, the communication and understanding among them is increased. It is hard to regulate industry effectively if you do not have inside knowledge of how it really works. Conversely, when business people have a deeper understanding of the regulatory process, they can conform to requirements more effectively. Excessive parochialism in each sector leads to suspicion and competition between them. EDUCATION Each sector absorbs some of the organizational culture of the other. Business organizations focused on the boughttom line tended to have more accountability and discipline within public agencies. Public agencies are more affected by political considerations and attuned to the public interest. INCENTIVE It's not always easy to attract talented people to public service. Recruiting is easier when workers feel that the public sector is not a dead end but, on the contrary, can open doors for them in other fields. A measure of turnover in the governing class is an important characteristic of a functioning democracy. This advantage was known in antiquity. The Mishnah speaks of one member of each family being taken into the king's service for a period of time, and Rashi explains that it was customary to take civil servants in rotation from the various families in the kingdom [Bava Batra 144b]. However, we must acknowledge the problem of conflict of interest. It is difficult to police people effectively if at the same time you are trying to find favor in their eyes as a potential employee. A regulator exercises judgment on behalf of the public. In some ways his responsibilities are similar to that the judge. He certainly must avoid the appearance of being beholden to those he regulates. The Torah states, "Do not take bribes, for bribery blinds the sighted and distorts the words of the righteous" [this verse]. Even a righteous person who intends to judge with integrity will find his judgment distorted by a bribe. Rabbi Yechiel Michal Esptein writes in his Arukh ha-Shulhan [Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 9:1] "One cannot say that the prohibition is directed against taking bribes to distort judgment, for this is already explicitly forbidden in several places.… Rather, it certainly means that taking bribes is forbidden even to vindicate the party in the right and to condemn the offender.… And it is not only a judge who is forgetting to take bribes, but anyone appointed to or occupied with a communal responsibility." Just as brides can distort judgment, so can the expectation of future benefits, and judges and public officials are equally forbidden to take gifts from litigants after a case has already been judged [Glosses of Rosh on Sanhedrin 27b; Pilpula Charitfta commentary]. For this reason our sages warned that judges need to take special care to avoid being obsequious to the powerful [Sotah 41b and Rashi's commentary]. How can we enjoy the benefits of cooperation and openness without having our regulators beholden to powerful interests? One way is education-cultivating a public sector with a culture of independence. Another way is to prevent concentrations of power and knowledge. When a single individual exercises too much judgment and controls access to too much information, the temptation and ability to depart from norms is great. Rather, we should adopt the norms of teamwork and transparency in regulation. The Jewish tradition is to have a panel of judges, rather than a single judge, in order to balance out any excesses or distortions of judgment; as the Mishnah warns, "Only One can judge alone" [Avot 4:8]. One common solution is to have a "cooling-off" period between roles as regulator and regulated. A reasonable period greatly reduces the appearance and reality of a "quid pro quo." This norm is found in Jewish law regarding the laws of usury. While it is forbidden to pay usury even after the loan is repaid, a gift which is given sometime after the loan repayment and doesn't appear connected it is permissible. By the same token, a firm can hire a former regulator after a reasonable interval, on the condition that no mention is made of any benefits rendered the employer while the new hire was in the public service [See Shulhan Arukh Torah Deah 160:6 and Shach commentary. The Pilpula Charifta commentary just cited (on the Rosh Sanhedrin 27b) draws a general parallel between delayed interest and delayed bribes.]. Conflicts of interest can never be avoided entirely, and efforts to completely prevent such conflicts create a problem of excess polarization in public life. But these conflicts are ethical problem, and need to be kept under control through appropriate ethical values and norms of conduct that include patience, teamwork, and transparency.