EXOD544 The basic halakhic principle governing abortion practices is recorded in the Mishnah, Oholot 7:6, in the declaration that when "hard travail" of labor endangers the life of the mother an embryotomy may be performed and the embryo extracted member by member. This ruling is cited as definitive by Rambam, Hilkhot Roze'ah 1:9, and Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:2. The halakhic reasoning underlying this provision is incorporated in the text of the Mishnah and succinctly couched in the explanatory phrase "for her [mother's] life has priority over its [the fetus'] life." In the concluding clause of the Mishnah, a distinction is sharply drawn between the status of the fetus and that of a newly born infant. The Mishnah stipulates that from the moment at which birth, as halakhically defined [Yoreh De'ah 194:10], is considered to have occurred, no interference with natural processes is permitted, since "one life is not to be set aside for the sake of another life." It may readily be inferred from this statement that destruction of the fetus is prohibited in situations not involving a threat to the life of the pregnant mother. Incorporation of the justificatory statement "for her life takes precedence over its life" within the text of the Mishnah indicates that in the absence of this consideration abortion is not sanctioned. Tosafot (Sanhedrin 59a; Hullin 33a) states explicitly that feticide, although entailing no statutory punishment, is nevertheless forbidden. Elsewhere we find that according to rabbinic exegesis (Mekhilta, this verse; Sanhedrin 84a) the killing of an unborn child is not considered to be a capital crime --an implication derived from the verse "He that smiteth a man so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death" [this verse]. Tosafot, on the basis of the Mishnah, apparently reasons that although feticide does not occasion capital punishment, the fetus is nevertheless sufficiently human to render its destruction a moral offense.