LEV711 [How is: "Do not take revenge, and do not bear a grudge" to be understood? It is comparable to a knife slipping while one is slicing meat and cutting his hand. Will he thereupon cut his other hand? This is precisely the same] (Yerushalmi Nedarim 9:4)

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LEV715 The Torah, indeed, draws the implication of the teaching that all men are created in the image of God. False and irrelevant distinctions must not be introduced to disqualify human beings from their right to justice. For if man is made in the image God, if he is the creation God, then every human being is included and the entire significance of the one man is extended to embrace every man. Said Rabbi Akiva, "Beloved is man, for he was created in the image [of God]." (Avot 3:18). Every man is fellow man to every other man, or is "thy brother." The fatherhood of the one God implies the brotherhood of all men, which generates the concept of universal morality. It has been suggested that the well-known passage in Leviticus, usually translated "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, I am the Lord," [this verse] should be interpreted, "Love thy neighbor; he is as thou [kamokah]," and in that "as thou" lies the full meaning of the commandment. The identification of justice with God projects God's infinity and absoluteness onto the concept of justice, removing it from the category of subjective reality and relativity. (See Psalms 89:5; 97:2, Genesis 18:19 and Jeremiah 23:5). (Continued at [[EXOD673]] Exodus 22:21 widow SPERO 126)

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LEV720 Occasionally, by refraining from doing a favor, one transgresses the negative commandment of "You shall not take vengeance." For instance, he had previously asked a favor of someone, either a loan of money or the like, and the other person had failed to help him. Now that other person comes to him for a favor and he gains his revenge, repaying that person by refusing to help. In this case, by refraining from doing a favor, the person transgresses the commandment [this verse], "You shall not take vengeance." If, through his hatred of that person, he spreads the report in the city that the other person is not reliable, thereby discouraging others from granting the loan that person requires, he transgresses all the more. In addition to violating the two prohibitions against taking revenge and bearing a grudge, he transgresses the commandment forbidding slander (leshon hara'), since here he attacks the person's very life.… Furthermore, even if he had helped that other person, but rebuked him by saying: "I am not like you; you did not help me," he violates the prohibition [this verse]: "You shall bear no grudge," since he has shown here that he still harbors the hate in his heart. He should erase his ill–feeling and lend with a perfect heart, reflecting that all the affairs of this world are vain and worthless, not important enough to arouse the desire for revenge and grudges. [Continued at [[LEV473]] Leviticus 19:16 idly AHAVCH 28].

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LEV723 The Torah clearly prohibits revenge as a biblical mitzvah in [this] verse immediately following the prohibition to hate in one's heart. The Talmud (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 30a) explains why a Jew may not take revenge against another Jew. The hand of a person would never take revenge against the other hand that cut it, since all belong to the same body and the concept of revenge against one's own body is nonsensical. So, too, each Jew belongs to one body of the Jewish people, where revenge against different parts of the same body would be nonsensical.

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LEV717 But why is it that in regard to all other traits and actions, Jews should imitate the behavior of God, and only in the case of revenge does God operate alone, not wanting His actions to be emulated? Perhaps it is precisely because revenge is such an intense and volatile feeling that God forbade it completely from the realm of man's actions. Human beings would not know how to use this feeling properly and repay a wrong in the proper proportion. Just as Cain murdered Abel as revenge for a sacrifice favored by God, which was certainly an "overreaction," perhaps no person can properly control rage and feeling the need for revenge, and therefore cannot administer it properly against another human being who is deserving of punishment. That is why it is left only to God to take revenge and avenge a sin properly, in a way that is exact compensation for a wrong committed. Chizkuni implies as much when he says that only God can assuage the feeling of revenge within man. [Chizkuni commentary on this verse].

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LEV719 In explaining the prohibition against taking revenge in the Torah, Chizkuni writes that the feeling of seething rage completely overtakes a human being [Chizkuni commentary on this verse].

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LEV718 Do not take vengeance against your fellow Jew. Each of us must realize that whatever happens to him is only because Hashem decrees it. Therefore, if someone causes us pain or suffering of any sort, he must realize that he is not the root cause. Rather, the root cause is our sins, and Hashem decreed that the pain or suffering befall us. If this fact is clear to us, we will not take vengeance on those who harm us or cause us suffering. In addition, a great benefit derives to us from this mitzvah, for it quells hatred before it has a chance to grow, so it prevents outbreaks of strife and quarrelling. When people do not take vengeance and do their best to live in peace with one another, Hashem will bless them and grant them peace.

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LEV721 Part of what we generally mean by justice is retribution... Granted that the Mishnah later made it virtually impossible to carry out the death penalty (M. Makkot 1:10) and that it transformed these modes of retribution into compensation (M. Baba Kamma 8:1), still the standard of justice is lex talionis, the law of fitting the punishment to the crime in an attempt to achieve an exact balance of one for the other. That, in the view of both the Torah and the Rabbis, is justice. So how is justice different from vengeance such that the former is praised and a latter condemned? Several things mark the difference. First, justice is meted out by communal authorities—courts and/or kings in the ancient world--while the vengeance banned in Leviticus 19 [i.e., 19:18-AJL] is that of individuals against each other. The presumption is that the court or king will be neutral and fair in deciding whether punishment is warranted and, if so, what it should be. Judges, therefore, according to Mishnaic law (M. Sanhedrin 3:4), may not be related to each other or to the accused or litigants... Second, justice requires that people be treated fairly--that is, that everyone be subject to the same rules. Those taking revenge, by contrast, decide by themselves what they think is appropriate to do to get even with a particular person or people from whom they are wreaking vengeance. Finally, the agents and motives of justice and vengeance differ radically. Justice is meted out by neutral government authorities. Judges may be upset that they must inflict punishment on particular offenders, but if they are unrelated to them, as they should be, the judge’s motivation will not be to harm particular people but rather to uphold the law so that society can live in peace. In contrast, vengeance is inflicted by victims of their families or friends. Vengeance is therefore much more personal. As such, it can eat up the person who bears a grudge and seeks vengeance, sometimes to the point of making gaining revenge the focus of their lives. (By Elliot N. Dorff)

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LEV722 See [[LEV554]] Leviticus 19:17 hate PATH 72

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LEV716 "You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of your people." If you are angry at someone because he refused to grant you some favor and in revenge you speak loshon hora about him, you have violated these two prohibitions, in addition to having spoken loshon hora. For recalling that person's refusal to render you assistance, you are guilty of bearing a grudge. For slandering him, you are guilty of taking vengeance. You are obligated to forget the entire incident. To illustrate the extent of these two prohibitions, a certain scholar related the following anecdote: Lost and wandering in the desert, Gavrial finally spotted a man leading a herd of camels. Half–crazed from thirst, Gavrial crawled up to the man and begged for water. The camel owner refused and left Gavrial to the elements. Gavrial miraculously managed to get back to civilization and in a short time became very wealthy. One day, Gavrial's secretary announced that a camel dealer was interested in obtaining a loan from him for the purpose of enlarging his stock. When the man entered Gavrial's office, Gavrial immediately recognized the face. It was the person who had refused to aid him in his hour of need. Gavrial is obligated to grant the loan without recalling the desert incident. This is a true and difficult test Gavrial's strength of character, but it is required of him by these two mitzvos.

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