LEV418 One who speaks or listens to lashon hara also violates the prohibition of לִפְנֵ֣י עִוֵּ֔ר לֹ֥א תִתֵּ֖ן מִכְשֹׁ֑ל, “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block" (Vayikra 19:14), because the speaker and the listener are each “placing a stumbling block” before the other and causing him to transgress explicit Torah prohibitions. However, there is a difference between the speaker and the listener in this regard. The speaker transgresses this prohibition whether the listeners are many or few. In fact, the more listeners there are, the more transgressions the speaker accumulates, because when he speaks before several individuals he causes each of them to stumble in a prohibition. This is not true of the listener, though, for it is possible that he violates this prohibition only when he is the sole individual listening to the lashon hara or rechilus. If he were to leave, then the speaker would have no one to whom to relate his lashon hara. However, if there are other people listening to the lashon hara at the same time, then perhaps the listener does not transgress this prohibition, but transgresses only the other prohibitions enumerated in this section [for the lashon hara would have been spoken even if he had not been listening]. However, this applies only to a listener who joined the group after the discussion was already underway. But the first listener with whom the speaker was originally conversing definitely violates this prohibition under all circumstances--even though other people came afterward to listen to the derogatory information--because the transgression started with him. In any event, one should take great care not to sit among such groups of people, because in Heaven all the members of the group are recorded as belonging to a wicked assembly, as is stated in the ethical will of Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol, who instructed his son Horkanus: “My son, do not sit among a group of people who speak ill of others, because when their words ascend above, they are recorded in a book, and all the people present are inscribed as members of an assembly of evildoers.”

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LEV421 See [[LEV515]] Leviticus 19:16 talebearer SEFER 283-5

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LEV429 Temptation it does not excuse sinful or criminal actions. Theology as well as secular criminal law is based on the notion that human beings must exercise self-control and restraint even in the face of the most powerful incentives to commit a wrong. Despite the demands for absolute rectitude, it is immoral and malicious to tempt an individual to perpetuate an illegal act. This is true even when the proffered temptation is merely a subterfuge as a means of testing a person's character and integrity. Such is the case when an employer deliberately leaves money unattended, within easy reach of an employee, so that he may find out whether the latter is capable of resisting a temptation to steal. An entrapper is a moral accomplice to the criminal. The ancient rabbis expressed their loathing for entrapment by condemning it as a sign of greater gravity then murder (Bamidbar Rabbah 21:4). The principal source of the prohibition of entrapment is [this verse]. The blind person is not aware of the human intervention which caused his fall. In most instances of entrapment the individual who holds out the blandishments is known to his victim. Yet the attraction of the temptation is such that the victim is blinded to the true intent of the entrapper and the potential danger to his own welfare. The young man who induces his friend to smoke marijuana by describing its blissful rewards is an entrapper. The person who persuades his buddy to join him on a stealing rampage because it is "a good way of making some easy money" is an entrapper. The young lady with a taste for expensive jewelry who is willing to offer her favors as soon as the young man proves his love with lavish gifts is an entrapper. The rabbis' objection to entrapment was extended also to the creation of opportunities for entrapment, even when none was intended. Thus they looked with disfavor upon lending money when the transaction is not done in the presence of witnesses or if no receipt is demanded. A debtor pressured for money might be tempted to deny the loan under such circumstances. An individual who deliberately offers misleading advice for selfish reasons of personal gain was considered guilty of violating the law against entrapment. The recipient of his advice, who has confidence in the sincerity of the adviser, is blinded to the trap laid before him (Sifra, Leviticus 19:14). Provocation, like temptation, may impel an individual to commit a wrong. Both are equally immoral and mischievous.

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LEV427 Hypocrisy intensifies deceit, for the hypocrite pretends to believe one thing while intending to act quite differently. Thus the rabbis warned: "The Holy One, blessed be He, hates a person who says one thing with his mouth and another in his heart" (Pes. 113b). Hypocrites are one of the four kinds of deceivers who may not come into God's presence" (Midrash Psalms 101:7). "There are seven sorts of thieves. The first comprises people who deceive their neighbors by urging them to be their guest when they don't really want them, or those who push a gift when they know the neighbor won't accept it" (Baba Kama 7:8). "The law, 'you must not set a stumbling block before the blind,' [this verse], include the sanction, 'you must not hide a part of your intention in giving someone advice.' You must not say 'sell your field and buy a donkey,' when you are really manipulating things so that you can buy his field" (Sifra Ked. 88). ... People lie for various reasons. Some convince themselves that they should tell only what they think we need to know. Others believe that a sin of omission--giving an incomplete version of the truth--is a lesser vice than a sin of commission--saying and doing whatever they think they can get away with ... Our sages reject such convenient rationalizations. They have always demanded scrupulously high standards, especially of our leaders. Scam artists who pray on the poor, the lonely, and the elderly are particularly reprehensible.

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LEV430 The Bible tells us not to place a stumbling block before the blind [this verse].… Today's strangers are often those who have just moved into a new neighborhood or are making the first visit to our synagogue.… mentoring those who do not "know the ropes" (as if we still had great sailing ships) is a small but significant part of our practice of lovingkindness.

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LEV426 Do not place a stumbling block in front of the innocent. Do not cause harm to a fellow Jew by giving him bad advice. Do just the opposite. Give only good and helpful advice. This prohibition also forbids us to help a fellow Jew to transgress the Torah. [For example, if someone borrows or lends money with interest, he violates the prohibition to lend or borrow with interest. In addition, by simply being a party to such a loan, each party places a “stumbling block” before the other party]. Key concept: So that society prospers and functions as desired, people must give helpful advice to one another.

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LEV425 An interesting aggadah, a moral tale, appears in tractate Bava Kamma [50b; a longer version appears in the Tosefta, Bava Kamma 2:10], of the Babylonian Talmud. It reads: The Rabbis taught: A person should not clear stones from his property to public property. It happened that a person was clearing stones from his property to public property. A pious person met him and said: “Fool! Why are you clearing stones from property that is not yours to property that is yours?” [The owner of the field] mocked him. Sometime later he needed to sell his field, and [after that] he was walking in the same public place and tripped on those same stones. He said: That pious person spoke well when he asked me, “Why are you clearing stones from a place that is not yours to a place that is? This tale raises a few interesting points. First, it might seem counterintuitive that a person's private property is “property that is not yours,” as described by the pious individual's chastising. This is one of the many ways in which the Jewish tradition reminds us that God is the true owner of the earth, and we are its inhabitants and stewards. The man clearing stones is being inconsiderate to his community by littering in the public area. The idea that he is part of that community is clearly shown when he trips over his mess. Thus, when we “clear stones” into the public domain, we are not only harming others, we are also harming ourselves. If we, as individuals, purchase products that are harmful to the environment or support companies that are unnecessarily destructive, we become party to environmental destruction. In this parable, the stones can be read as our abuse of the environment. The man clearing stones is each and every one of us, and is also most corporations. The pious individual represents our collective conscience, reminding us that thoughtless waste and environmental wantonness have been responsible for widespread devastation in our natural ecosystem, causing clear, irreparable effect. It is impossible to ignore the fact that our choices and actions now affect us in more and more noticeable ways--in other words, we have, in a sense, “cluttered” our public domain by actively and passively participating in harming our environment. Placing a Stumbling Block. This story implicitly alludes to the important commandment from the Torah: lifnei iver lo titein mikhshol, “You shall not... place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). The rabbinic tradition has understood this prohibition to refer to a ban on assisting Jews in transgressing mitzvot (“commandments”). For example, a Jewish business owner is prohibited from selling products forbidden to other Jews, such as idols or non-kosher foods. The buyer, who does not know whether or not an item is forbidden (and is thus “blind”), might mistakenly think that, since it is sold by a Jew, it is kosher. Thus, its presence in the store serves as a “stumbling block.” In regard to the environment, and consumer responsibility, I like to employ the principle of lifnei iver in an unconventional sense. We live in a market-driven economy. In very simple terms, what we buy determines what is sold. Many companies produce goods people want that have a negative environmental impact, which may include obvious things, such as air pollution or increased carbon output. However, there are other unseen impacts of consumer decisions. Despite these negative environmental consequences, companies in our society tend to choose making a profit over sustaining the environment. As consumers in a market-driven economy, we have power within that structure and therefore, we have responsibility. If a Jewish store owner provides items forbidden to Jewish individuals, and a Jewish customer unknowingly purchases one of those products, that store owner may be guilty of livnei iver error. When we buy products or support companies that unnecessarily harm the environment, are we not giving these companies an incentive to continue with “business as usual”? Although this is not the traditional application of lifnei iver, by providing profit for a company despite their engagement in irreparable, unnecessary environmental destruction, we become party to a greed-driven system and thus perhaps guilty of placing stumbling blocks in front of others. (By Justin Goldstein)

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LEV428 Separate and distinct from this mitzvah [i.e., the interest-free loan as a positive religious act in Judaism] is the negative mitzvah of not taking interest, which is repeated numerous times in the Bible. In the eyes of the halachic authorities, this repetition of the injunction against taking interest serves to compound the severity of the crime, making the participants liable on a number of different counts. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh v Loveh, chapter 4, halakhot 1-2. Even the use of two different Hebrew terms, neshekh and tarbit, both to mean “interest,” is seen as reflecting the desire of the Torah to make a man liable for two transgressions from making the same single interest-bearing loan. It is interesting to see the Jewish social attitude toward interest expressed in Rashi’s comment on the use of the word neshekh (literally, a “bite”). A snake bite is at first only slightly uncomfortable, but later increases in pain and severity. So, too, interest (neshekh) is at first bearable, but as the debt mounts, the debtors suffering increases. Rashi on Exod. 22:24 From the Torah’s viewpoint, the transgression involved in making interest-bearing loans is not limited to the lender, even though he is obviously the major factor and so bears the brunt of the responsibility. Rather, all parties to the transaction are guilty of violating religious injunctions. The lender is guilty, inter alia, of putting a stumbling block in the path of the blind open (Leviticus 19:14), which the rabbinic authorities always understood as referring to giving prejudiced advice to somebody or providing him with things that are to his spiritual or physical detriment. See Rashi and Sefer HaChinukh, Mitzvah 232; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotzeah u Shmirot Hanefesh, chapter 12, halakhah 14. Agents or other go-betweens in the transaction are considered to be guilty of the same crime. In keeping with Judaism’s symmetry of justice, even the borrower is not left untouched. After all, it is his need or desire for the loan which has implicated the lender in a moral crime. Even the witnesses to the transaction, as well as the guarantors of an interest-bearing loan, are considered to have violated the injunction of “you shall not take interest from him.” Without their participation, it is highly improbable that the transaction would have taken place. It is only fitting, therefore, that they share in the guilt attached to the maker of the interest-bearing loan by the Torah. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Malveh u Loveh, chapter 4, halakhah 2.

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LEV432 At first glance, it would seem that reconciling affirmative action with Jewish tradition might prove difficult, as suggested by the following statement that says the rich and poor should not be treated differently by judges: “You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment; you shall not respect the person of the poor nor favor the person of the mighty, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15). Yet even this clear position was bent to the realities of creating justice. In a well-known Talmudic story about a dispute between brothers, the rules of evidence were changed to put an excessive burden on the rich and powerful brother when witnesses for the weaker brother were fearful of testifying. “Thus we do for all who are powerful,” says the text. (Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 39b). The promise of equality is not sufficient if there are obstacles that make the reality of equality impossible. (By Albert Vorspan and David Saperstein).

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LEV433 See [[EXOD673]] Exodus 22:21 widow SPERO 126

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