EXOD536 The Talmud states that any sexual behavior is permitted to a married couple. In Exodus 21:10, we find the concept of onah, according to which a husband is obligated to fulfill his wife's sexual desires. Her sexual rights in the context of marriage are clearly established. (It is interesting to note that the Talmud presumes that a man will assert his sexual rights, but a woman might not). From this point of view, as long as they engage in sex in a private setting and neither is forcing the other to do anything, nothing on either person’s list should be out of bounds. For me personally, there are two notable exceptions: degrading language and engaging in a menage-a-trois. If we accept that each human being is created in the image of God, degrading language is unacceptable under every circumstance, for married or unmarried couples alike. [If the couple is “acting out” degrading language as part of a mutually agreed upon role-play or fantasy, however, that is a different story.) Additionally, if we accept that monogamy and fidelity are the cornerstones of marriage in our broader Torah tradition, then a menage-a-trois falls outside the bounds of monogamy. Consenting adults can do what they want, but this particular behavior is outside the bounds of marriage as it is currently Jewishly understood. If we accept the principles of an integrated brain, together with the values of Torah as guides for our sexual interactions, then our sexual decision-making should reflect them both. We can consider the purpose of sexual interaction before engaging in it, fully experienced it while we engage in it, and savor the experience afterward. This creates a full, complete, and satisfying sexual interaction regardless of the particular behaviors that we choose to engage in. (By Ron Levine)

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EXOD537 A husband's obligations to his wife are listed in the Pentateuch: "Her food, her raiments, and her conjugal rights, he shall not diminish" [this verse]. "Food" is the comprehensive term for board and lodging. The standard of living which a husband must provide depends upon his income. It is unethical to demand of a wife that she be content with a living standard below that which is maintained by the average person within her husband's income bracket. It is equally unethical for a husband with a potential for a higher income to deny it to his wife on the ground that he prefers greater leisure than most people of his age enjoy. On the other hand, it is unethical of a wife to demand a higher standard of living which is beyond her husband's ability to attain. Men who are married to wealthy women may tend to slack in their efforts to make an adequate living. The rabbis were generally critical of husbands who prefer to depend on their wives' income (Pesachim 50b). They issued a dire warning to him who secretly entertains hopes of inheriting his wife's estate. "In the end she will bury him" (Avot deRabbi Natan 3:3). Many modern families have two breadwinners. Women seek employment to increase the family income or out of a preference for the stimulation and challenge of a job. A wife's gainful work is perfectly proper, provided it does not preclude the primary function of bringing children into the world or deprive young children of a parent's company and supervision.

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EXOD538 It was taught: R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: "her flesh, her clothing"-in accordance with her "flesh," give her clothing. Do not give the clothing of a young girl to an old woman, or that of an old woman to a young girl. "Her clothing and her time"-In accordance with her time [in this instance, the time of year], give her a clothing. Do not give her new [heavy] clothing in the summertime or worn [light] clothing in the wintertime (Kethuvoth 48a)

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EXOD539 Sex … is not exclusively for procreation; it is also for the mutual bonding of the couple, emotionally as well as physically. The Rabbis derived this notion from [this verse], according to which a man owes his wife "her food, clothing, and her conjugal rights." [M. Ketubbot 5:6]. As they usually do with regard to any commandment, they then define exactly how this commandment may be fulfilled by determining how often a man must offer to engage in sexual relations with his wife. They maintained that it depends on the degree to which his job enables him to be home at night, and that consequently a man may not change his job to one that will bring him home at night less often without his wife's permission. Conversely, men also have rights to sex in marriage, but, remarkably, the Talmud already prohibits marital rape [B. Eruvin 100b; Leviticus Rabbah 9:6; Numbers Rabbah 13:2; M.T. Laws of Ethics 5:4; M.T. Laws of Marriage 14;15; M.T. Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 21:11; S.A. Orah Hayim 240:10; S.A. Even Ha-Ezer 25:2, gloss], which was not prohibited in any American state until 1975 and not in all American states until 1993. If his wife repeatedly refused to engage in conjugal relations, then, the Mishnah's remedy was that he could diminish what he owed her in divorce by a certain amount each week until he could divorce her without paying her anything and marry someone else [M. Ketubbot 5:7], for he too has a right to sexual satisfaction in marriage. This recognition of the role of sex in a couple's physical satisfaction and emotional bonding, together with their respect for medicine, has made Jews quite willing to use medical and psychological interventions to overcome sexual dysfunctions, and to use artificial reproductive techniques to overcome infertility. (By Elliot N. Dorff)

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EXOD540 (Continued from [[GEN1172]] Genesis 24:14 her BLOCH 213-4). The fine character of the wife must be matched by the equally fine character of her husband if the couple is to create the wholesome home environment essential to the upbringing of children. Yet the early Judaic literature on the subject appears to give greater emphasis to the moral stature of the wife. Eliezer informed Rebecca's family of Isaac's great wealth (Genesis 24:36) but did not touch on the question of Isaac's character. The lyrical description of an admirable wife by the author of Proverbs, "A woman a virtual who can find?" (Proverbs 31:10) [aka "Eshet Hayil" -- AJL], has no parallel passage along the lines of "A man a virtual who can fine?" Warnings against the influence of immoral wives (Ecclesiastes 7:26, Proverbs 9:13) are not coupled with similar censures of the damaging influence of roguish husbands. Hagiographical admonitions to young men are mostly centered on their obligations to honor their parents. On the other hand, admonitions to young women mainly relate to their roles as wives and their obligations to their husbands. Any conclusion that the stress on a wife's qualifications and duties is an indication of the prejudicial attitudes of a male-oriented society is fallacious. On the contrary, the Pentateuch lists a husband's obligations to his wife [this verse] but has no similar text mandating a wife's duties to her husband. Indeed, according to rabbinical rules, a wife who has the means to hire servants is exempt from performing domestic duties. Surely such a liberal law reflects no anti-feminist prejudice. Similarly, the fact that father and mother were placed on an equal level in the Decalogue with regard to filial obligations of parental honor dispels any notion of sexual discrimination. The biblical emphasis on the woman's qualifications for marriage was primarily due to her vital position as the first teacher in the life of her young children and her ability to influence their ethical perceptions at a most formative age. The Book of Proverbs distinguishes between the role of the father and the role of the mother in the raising of children. The father disciplines but the mother instructs (Proverbs 1:8).

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EXOD541 In addition to murder, the death penalty is listed [in Torah] for striking one's parents, kidnapping, bestiality, violating Shabbat, idol worship, adultery, homosexual behavior, and cursing God. (This verse, 21:15-17, 31:14, Leviticus 20:2, 10, 13, 24:16). All the sins are heinous from a Jewish perspective, and the seriousness of their punishment attests to that. However it would be foolish to form the Jewish view of capital punishment based on these verses alone. Why is this so? According to Jewish tradition, the corpus of Oral Law was given along with the Written Torah at the very same time, in order to render the bare bones legal system of Torah verses into a working Jewish society of law for every day living. Therefore, if we examine the details of capital punishment along with the details of its oral laws, we will discover that it was almost impossible to actually punish a perpetrator for any of these crimes or sins with the death penalty.

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EXOD542 Judaism's effort to individualize justice applies not only to punishment, but to defining crimes in the first place. The clearest example maybe the laws of homicide. The shedding of blood is the subject of the first admonition of a criminal nature in the Bible: "Whoever sheds the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed; for in His image did God make men." (Genesis 9:6. The term is first used in Genesis 4:8). Murder is prohibited by the Ten Commandments (Exod 20:13; Deut 5:17), and is marked as a capital offense in [this verse]. However, long before secular systems sought to differentiate among offenders, Jewish law had already done so. Not all homicides are treated the same. Distinctions are made according to the crucial element of the defendant's intent. In Judaism, the death penalty is prescribed for murder only if it is willful [this verse, Exod 21:14; Leviticus 24:17, 21]. The Torah articulates a distinction between premeditated murder and accidental killings. Today we might speak of the difference between deliberate killings (murder) and accidental killings (manslaughter or negligent homicide). Both are deserving of punishment, but they are not deserving of the same punishment. The Torah provides for Cities of Refuge, to which an offender could flee if he accidentally kills another human being. (Exod 21:13; Numbers 35:30-34; Deut 19:1-13). In those cities, the accidental killer would be safe from the avengers, at least pending an assessment of whether he had killed intentionally. The unintentional killer would then have to reside there until the current High Priest died, at which point he could leave the city and be legally protected from avengers for the rest of his life. (By Laurie L. Levenson, "Judaism and CriminalJustice"

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EXOD543 Abortion in the Bible. The legislation of the Bible makes only one reference to our subject, and this is by implication: [Exodus 21:22-23]. A. The Jewish Interpretation. -- This crucial passage, by one of the most curious twists of literary fortunes, marks the parting of the ways between the Jewish and Christian rulings on abortion. According to the Jewish interpretation, if "no harm follow" the "hurt" to the woman resulting in the loss of her fruit refers to the survival of the woman following her miscarriage; in that case there is no capital guilt involved, and the attacker is merely liable to pay compensation for the loss of her fruit. "But if any harm follow," i.e., if the woman is fatally injured, then the man responsible for her death has to "give life for life"; in that event the capital charge of murder exempts him from any monetary liability for the aborted fruit. [Mekhilta and Rashi. For a translation of these sources, see 3 Lauterbach, Mekhilta 66-67 (1935); Rosenbaum & Silbermann, Pentateuch with Rashi's Commentary, 112-13 (1930)]. This interpretation is also borne out by the rabbinical exegesis of the verse defining the law of murder: "He that smites a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death ..." [this verse] which the rabbis construed to mean "a man, but not a fetus." [Mekhilta and Rashi. For a translation of these sources, see 3 Lauterbach, Mekhilta 32-33; Rosenbaum & Silbermann, Pentateuch with Rashi's Commentary, 110-10a] These passages clearly indicate that the killing of an unborn child is not considered as murder punishable by death in Jewish law. B. The Christian Interpretation. -- The Christian tradition disputing this view goes back to a mistranslation in the Septuagint. There, the Hebrew for "no harm follow" was replaced by the Greek for "[her child be born] imperfectly formed." [The mistranslation, also followed in the Samaritan and Karaite versions, is evidently based on reading zurah or surah (meaning "form") for ason (meaning "harm" or "accident"). See Kaufmann, Gedenkschrift 186 (1900)]. This interpretation, distinguishing between an unformed and a formed fetus and branding the killing of the latter as murder, was accepted by Tertullian, who was ignorant of Hebrew, and by later church fathers. The distinction was subsequently embodied in canon law as well as in Justinian Law. [See Westermarck, Christianity and Morals 243 (1939)]. This position was further reinforced by the belief that the "animation" (entry of the soul) of a fetus occurred on the fortieth or eightieth day after conception for males and females respectively, an idea first expressed by Aristotle [Aristotle, De Anim. Hist. vii. 3; see 1 Catholic Encyclopedia 46-48 (1907)], and by the doctrine, firmly enunciated by St. Augustine and other early Christian authorities, that the unborn child was included among those condemned to eternal perdition if he died unbaptized. [See 1 Ploss & Bartels, Woman 483 (1935); 2 Catholic Encyclopedia 26-67 (1907)] Some even regarded the death or murder of an unborn child as a greater calamity than that of a baptized person [See 2 Lecky, History of European Morals 23-24 (3d ed. 1891)]. Eventually the distinction between animate and inanimate fetuses was lost; and since 1588, the Catholic Church has considered as murder the killing of any human fruit from the moment of conception.[See 1 Ploss & Bartels, op. cit, at 484; Bonnar; The Catholic Doctor 78 (1948)]. This position is maintained to the present-day [See, e.g., Catholic Hospital Association of the United States and Canada, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals 4 (1949)]. It assumes that potential life, even in the earliest stages of justation, enjoys the same value as any existing adult life. Hence, the Catholic Church never tolerates any direct abortion, even when, by allowing the pregnancy to continue, both mother and child will perish [See Bonnar, op. cit, at 84]; for "better two deaths than one murder." [Tiberghien, "Principles et Conscience Morale," Cahiers Laennac, Oct. 1946, p. 13].

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EXOD544 The basic halakhic principle governing abortion practices is recorded in the Mishnah, Oholot 7:6, in the declaration that when "hard travail" of labor endangers the life of the mother an embryotomy may be performed and the embryo extracted member by member. This ruling is cited as definitive by Rambam, Hilkhot Roze'ah 1:9, and Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:2. The halakhic reasoning underlying this provision is incorporated in the text of the Mishnah and succinctly couched in the explanatory phrase "for her [mother's] life has priority over its [the fetus'] life." In the concluding clause of the Mishnah, a distinction is sharply drawn between the status of the fetus and that of a newly born infant. The Mishnah stipulates that from the moment at which birth, as halakhically defined [Yoreh De'ah 194:10], is considered to have occurred, no interference with natural processes is permitted, since "one life is not to be set aside for the sake of another life." It may readily be inferred from this statement that destruction of the fetus is prohibited in situations not involving a threat to the life of the pregnant mother. Incorporation of the justificatory statement "for her life takes precedence over its life" within the text of the Mishnah indicates that in the absence of this consideration abortion is not sanctioned. Tosafot (Sanhedrin 59a; Hullin 33a) states explicitly that feticide, although entailing no statutory punishment, is nevertheless forbidden. Elsewhere we find that according to rabbinic exegesis (Mekhilta, this verse; Sanhedrin 84a) the killing of an unborn child is not considered to be a capital crime --an implication derived from the verse "He that smiteth a man so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death" [this verse]. Tosafot, on the basis of the Mishnah, apparently reasons that although feticide does not occasion capital punishment, the fetus is nevertheless sufficiently human to render its destruction a moral offense.

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EXOD545 Jewish courts must administer capital punishment by means of strangulation. Were crimes to go unpunished, lawlessness would reign and people would kill each other. Why a murderer is executed by strangulation: In most cases a murderer tries to kill his victim quickly so that death is immediate. For this reason, the Torah prescribes strangulation as the means of execution, for of the four methods of capital punishment, strangulation is the quickest and least painful. If violation of a sin gives pleasure to the offender and the sin carries the death penalty, the Torah prescribed slower and more painful methods of capital punishment, such as stoning or burning.

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