GEN167 The starting point for a religious consideration of man’s relations with his natural environment is the divine blessing to man in [this verse].  [This] passage, mandating man’s conquest of nature, has recently come under attack by those concerned with protecting natural resources and environment from the excesses and abuses of man.  Some theologians have even seen in this verse sanction for man’s mindless rape of nature and an impediment to the search for knowledge and the advancement of science.  This charge, particularly as it is refuted by an analysis of the manner in which the same Biblical verse is interpreted in the tradition, is an empty one.  The Torah’s respect for non-human nature is evident in the restrictions that follow immediately upon the “subdue” commandment: man is permitted only to eat herbs and greens, not to abuse the resources of nature Genesis 1:29.  Furthermore, this mastery over nature is limited to vegetables for the first ten generations.  Vegetarianism yields to carnivorousness only after the Floor when, as a concession, God permits the eating of meat by the sons of Noah.  Even then the right to devour flesh is circumscribed with a number of protective prohibitions, such as the warnings against eating blood and taking human life Genesis 9:2-6.  The law of kashrut preserves the kernel of that primeval vegetarianism by placing selective restrictions on man’s appetite for meat.  His right to “subdue” nature is by no means unlimited.  GOODSOC 214-5

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GEN160 [E]ven independent of the Israelites’ covenant with God, [Douglas] Knight [“Cosmogony and Order”] demonstrates, the biblical authors conceived of God as establishing a moral relationship with humanity and of human beings as creatures capable of moral discernment.  The fact the people are granted dominion over the natural world [this verse], he notes, is but one more indication of this for, in the ancient Near Eastern context, such dominion presupposed a duty of care and responsibility … it seems evident that the biblical writers conceived of humanity as possessing the capacity for moral decision and an awareness (however undefined) of right and wrong that predates the covenant with Israel and the revelation of Torah.  The text of Scripture, of course, does not provide an account of how humanity comes to know its moral responsibilities, or even exactly what they are. But just as clearly it assumes that they exist.  PASTIMP 124-5

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GEN159 [Article on Ethics of Animal Experimentation] On the other side of the spectrum is the group that supports animal experimentation. This group believes that human beings are superior to animals in the hierarchy of life, implying that humans have the right to use animals to serve humanity’s needs. This viewpoint is supported by the Judeo-Christian tradition as can be seen in such texts as [this verse]. Moreover, because human life is more sacred, the end goal of saving human lives justifies the means of animal experimentation. REFJEW 104

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GEN169 Two significant verses from Genesis help form the basis of the Rabbinic view of the relationship between humanity and the animal world. When God creates the first people, they are told [this verse]. Later, they are told “Every creature that lives shall be yours to eat; as with the green grasses, I give you all these.” Genesis 9:3-4  Clearly, the Biblical world-view inherited and adopted by the halakhah was one in which humanity was given dominion over the animal world. However this is itself problematic since dominion can infer both free usage and responsible guardianship. … both aspects of this relationship find their way into the halakhic material. A final significant Biblical vefrse states “When in your war against a city you have to besiege it a long time in order to capture it, you must not destroy its trees” and has been generalized and interpreted as the basis of the prohibition against bal taskhit, wanton destruction of all property or animals. Thus, Talmud Hullin 7b notes that the killing of animals for no purpose is prohibited based on this verse and Maimonides extends the verse to include all needless destruction in Mishneh Torah, Melakhim 6:10. These three Biblical verses and the prohibition against tzaar baalei hayim [compassion for animals; ban on needless animal suffering – AJL] whether Biblically or Rabbinically based, establish the basis tension between human domination of the world, the sanctity of human life and the responsibility of humanity toward the world. It is this tension that is the root of the struggle with the later source material. REFJEW 112-3

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GEN166 See [[GEN559]] Genesis 6:6 evil SACKS 11-12

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GEN163 Are GMOs (generically modified organisms) a Jewish issue? The steadily increasing presence of genetically modified foodstuffs on our supermarket shelves raises a number of important and difficult questions … most definitely worth asking because they touch upon some of the most central elements of our relationship as religious Jews to our tradition and to the natural world around us.  1. Are We Playing God?  Does genetic modification of existing species of plants and animals constitute an improper interference with the order of the universe (sidrei b’reishit)?  By engaging in these procedures, do we usurp the authority of God or of nature, arrogating too much power to ourselves? This is the sort of question that any religious tradition might ask, and ours is no exception.  We find a classic expression of this view in the commentary of Nachmanides (Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman, or Ramban) on the Torah’s prohibition of kilayim: “You shall not let your cattle mate with a different kind [kilayim]; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seeds” Leviticus 19:19.  This commandment teaches us, he writes, that God’s creation is perfect and that we deny this perfection when we engage in the mixing of the distinct animal and plant species. [Ramban, Commentary to Leviticus 19:19.] One could rely upon this insight concerning our relationship to the natural world in order to prohibit the new technologies of genetic engineering that blur the lines between existing species and that create new ones.  Yet Jewish tradition, in the main, does not take that step.  Most contemporary rabbinic authorities read the kilyaim texts strictly.  In their view, the mitzvah forbids only the actual physical mating of animals and the sowing of seeds, and it does not cover the sort of “mixing” that takes place in a laboratory and that we call genetic engineering or genetic modification. [See the CCAR Responsum no. 5768.3, "On Human Genetic Modification." Note, too, that Rashi, in his commentary to Leviticus 19:19, writes that the prohibition of kilayim has no discernible rationale (Taam).  Thus, not everyone agrees with Ramban that the prohibition has a specific “purpose” that we might use as a basis to oppose the genetic modification of species.]  This more restrictive reading of the text coheres with another traditional Jewish understanding of our relationship to nature.  That understanding is classically exemplified by none other than Nachmanides himself, in his commentary to [this verse], a verse in which God grants dominion over the earth to humans.  Nachmanides explains this “dominion” as the right of humans to “do as they wish” with the animals, “to build up, to tear down,” and to exploit the resources of the physical world.  His comment reflects an instrumental conception of the world-that is, that we are entitled to make use of nature and bend it to our purposes.  Such a conception is of pivotal importance in the history of our culture for if we did not view the world in an instrumental manner, we humans might never have felt entitled to pursue science and technology, activities that suggest a sense of mastery over nature.  With respect to our particular concern here, we should note that some contemporary authorities cite this latter comment of Nachmanides as evidence that Jewish tradition would permit us to engage in the processes of genetic modification. These two conflicting viewpoints present us with an interpretive dilemma.  Does Nachmanides to Leviticus 19:19 contradict Nachmanides to Genesis 1:28? Is there a way to accommodate both points of view in our Judaism, or does consistency demand that we choose one approach and reject the other? However we resolve this conflict, its existence indicates at the very least that Jewish thought does not obviously prohibit genetic engineering. There may be other reasons to worry about these technologies. … Perhaps even if we are entitled to manipulate the natural world for our own purposes, it is a good thing to do so in a spirit of humility, remembering at all times that it is God’s universe that we are manipulating.  Nonetheless, there is no convincing proof that our tradition rejects the genetic modification of existing species as an unwarranted transgression of the line that separates human action and divine prerogative. (By Mark Washofsky, "On High-Tech Science and Our Food: Three Questions") SACTAB 183-4

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GEN161 Morality As Grounded In The Nature of Man. What, then are the grounds of morality?  We have already referred to the morality of Judaism as being theonomous, or grounded in God. But since God created man in His image, morality may be said with equal validity to be grounded in the nature of man as well. What does Judaism teach us about the nature of man? Biblical and rabbinic literature make it clear that man is not like the other creatures, completely a part of nature, but like God stands apart from and, in some sense, transcends nature. This we learn not only from the specific instructions given to man in the Pentateuch to have “dominion over” the other orders of creation, but from an important stylistic innovation. [this verse]. All of the other portions of the universe, including living creatures, are brought into existence without any prefatory remarks as to what God has in mind or is intending to do. Only in the case of man is the description of the creative act preceded by the announcement: “And the Lord said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.’” Genesis 1:26  Furthermore, in bringing into existence all of the other living things, God, as it were, addresses portions of nature already in existence and commands, “Let the earth bring forth … Let the waters swarm …” Only in the case of man does God exercise His original creative power in a direct, unmediated fashion: “Then the Lord God formed man of the dust …” Genesis 1:11-20  In regard to the creation of man, we are told: “And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him.” “Then the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” Genesis 2:7  It is not clear whether “image of God” is identical with the inspiration of a divine soul. Rabbinic usage seems to indicate that the concept of “image of God” carries the additional implication of a special dignity which attaches itself to the body of the person as well as to his soul. Kariv, חכמים מסוד pp. 121-122.  The rabbis saw this mode of creation as expressive of a “special love” on the part of God which fashions man as a dual creature belonging to both the “lower” and “upper” orders.  Sifrei, Ha’azinu, sec. 306  There is something distinctive in man, which has its source in God, and which might be associated with the capacity to think and speak conceptually, to choose freely, and to be self-reflective, that makes man a responsible moral agent.  Thus, the passages which describe man as “giving names to all the beasts of the field” seem to suggest a degree of intelligence which involves empirical observation, conceptual power, and linguistic skills. Genesis 2:19-20  Furthermore, man is commanded, held responsible, and punished for disobedience, all implying the freedom that gives rise to moral agency. Deuteronomy 30:19  Finally, whatever the exact nature of the “knowledge of good and evil” acquired by man, it is evidently a sort of moral cognition that invites divine comparison: “Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil.” Genesis 3:22 This, of course, may not mean “one who is able to determine what is good and what is evil” but simply “one who knows that there is good and evil in the world.”  SPERO 75-6

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GEN165 See [[DEUT1493]] Deuteronomy 27:3 milk and honey TAMARI 28-9

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GEN170 God gave all human beings the mandate to “capture the world,” which, according to Nachmanides, mandates that man should use all his knowledge and all things physical in the world to benefit mankind in any way that man sees fit.  AMJV 54

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GEN172 R Soloveitchik understands this blessing [God conferred on Adam the first] as a divine mandate to mankind to subdue the earth and aster the environment (hereafter, kibbush).  In R. Soloveitchik’s thinking, the kibbush mandate amounts to a charge to man to self-actualize himself by realizing his God like potential as a creative being.  Fulfillment of the mandate bids man to achieve dignity but along with it to attain a rarefied sense of responsibility.  Man achieves dignity when he reclaims himself from coexistence with nature, rising from a helpless existence to a powerful existence that is intelligent, planned, and majestic.  … What emerges from the kibbush mandate is a criterion for evaluating the inherent worthiness of economic activity.  If an economic activity contributes neither to advancing man’s dignity nor to his sense of responsibility, it has no rational for existence.  Illustrating a perversion of the kibbush mandate is the production and sale of cigarettes.  This judgment is not predicated on the ability of Halakhah [Jewish law] to establish a clear-cut prohibition against smoking.  … the causative links medical science has established between cigarette smoking and various dreadful diseases is undeniable.  Far from advancing human dignity, the tobacco industry degrades human existence by causing disease, misery, and pain.  Its very existence perverts the kibbush mandate. … Investment in [a cigarette company] would represent a clear-cut perversion of the kibbush mandate and therefore should not be made.  CASE 373-4

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