DEUT1055 It, therefore, must be granted to the determinist, as one of the requirements of moral agency, that there are wide areas of human conduct within which free will as a rule is not exercised and human behavior flows in its predictable course (See J. Grunlatt, "Freedom of the Will--A Traditional View," Tradition 10, no. 4.) The Talmud in general and the halakhic process in particular are replete with instances where assumptions are made as to how people will behave in certain situations. "If a person transgresses and repeats the transgression, it becomes as if permissible to him," and "If a person had the opportunity to sin once and again and resists the temptation, he is assured not to sin." Most revealing is the rabbinic discussion on the question of the law of the "rebellious son" [this verse and 19-21]. The harsh punishment ordained by the Torah was explained on the basis of a projection of this person's future. Although at the moment he is guilty of disobeying his parents and of stealing in order to satisfy his appetite, transgressions which hardly justify the death penalty, the Torah judged him according to the way he will end up. A person such as this, it said, will in the end kill people to get what he wants. There are also a number of halakhic principles based on assumptions of psychological regularity which the rabbis relied upon in establishing the law. Free will does not operate in a vacuum. It operates only within the limits and possibilities of my given wants, abilities, understanding, and environment. "Our free will is freedom within limits of a person's inborn capabilities and of the world in which he lives" (C.A. Campbell, "Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?" in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards and A. Pap, Glencoe, Ill.: 1960), p. 368). Ample room can thus be provided for the social sciences and for all those activities which rely on predictability in human affairs. The one area that must be reserved for the possibility of contra–causal freedom is in the moral realm: "Situations in which the agent is aware of a conflict between strongest desire and duty," or situations where the agent believes that his essential character or integrity as a self hangs on his decision.