DEUT667 How, though, were those who remained part of the Jewish people supposed to interact with those within the field with whom they disagreed? One rabbinic source addresses the degree to which a community can tolerate diversity of practice. In interpreting the play on words based on Deuteronomy 14:1 that leads the Rabbis to the principle that Jews should not split into factions, (Sifrei Devarim 96; 346). Rabbi Yohanan (third century, Israel) and Abayye (fourth century, Babylonia) proclaimed that that principle precludes multiple practices in one locale, but communities in distinct areas could follow disparate rulings in observing the law. Rava, Abayye’s contemporary and sparring partner, was more permissive. For him the principle only prohibits the members of a given court from issuing conflicting rulings; They may disagree in discussion, but they ultimately have to make one, coherent decision. Two courts, however, even within the same city, could issue conflicting rulings without violating the principle. In tolerating this, Rava may have been thinking of the circumstances in large cities, where differing groups of Jews may live in close proximity to each other but practice Jewish law in distinct ways. (J. Pesachim 4:1 (30d); B. Yevamot 14a.) Members of the schools of Shammai and Hillel, however, served on the same courts. How did they agree on a ruling-- and even permit each others’ children to marry one another? According to one talmudic opinion, since the Hillelites were in the majority, the Shammaites accepted their authority in practice while remaining opposed in theory. Pluralism, on this model, stops with thought; uniformity is necessary in action, and that must be determined by the majority of the rabbis charged with making the decision. A second talmudic solution is that God prevented any cases prohibited in one view but not in the other from occurring. The third explanation is that both parties kept each other informed of problematic cases, and thus marriages between the families associated with the two schools could continue. (J. Yevamot 1:6 (3b); B. Yevamot 14a-b. Compare also T. Yevamot 1:12) In other words, they trusted the majority, they trusted God, or they trusted each other. (Reuven Kimelman, “Judaism and Pluralism.” Modern Judaism 7, no. 2 (May, 1987): 131-150, 136, put it this way).