DEUT41 Does God interfere with the mechanisms of volition and the decision-making process that is within man? One would think that to do so would surely compromise the integrity of man's freedom and the inviolability of his very selfhood! Yet the Torah records several instances of what is described as God "hardening the heart" of an individual or nation [this verse, Joshua 11:20]. The classic case of this is, of course, the Pharaoh of the Exodus. Time after time, God hurls devastating plagues upon Pharaoh and Egypt, but no sooner is the plague removed in response to Pharaoh's plea, than he reverts to his stubbornness and refuses to let the Israelites go. But if Pharaoh's stubbornness is due to God's "hardening of the heart," and not to his own volition, how can he continue to be punished for his refusal? In response to this problem, Maimonides develops a new doctrine to the effect that sometimes, in punishment for a particularly grievous transgression, God indeed removes a person's freedom, making it impossible for him to repent. Nevertheless, the blows he continues to receive are deserved because of the evils he performed while he still had his freedom (Rambam, Hilkhot Teshuvah 6:3). A number of other writers, however, are uncomfortable with the idea that God should ever deprive any person of his power or interfere with his freedom (See Abarbanel). Therefore, they interpret the "hardening of the heart" to the contrary; not as interfering with his volitions but actually as making it possible for Pharaoh to carry out his true inclinations. The earlier plagues had created personal and social pressures which Pharaoh would have found hard to withstand. One more blow and Pharaoh would have released the Israelites, although he did not really want to and was thoroughly unrepentant of the cruelty he had committed. Thus, the "hardening" did not constitute the actual decision but merely was an artificial stiffening to offset the corrosive effects of the plagues so that Pharaoh could again do what he wanted to do.