NUM431 Judaism's discomfort with its own capital punishment laws is well-known. In the modern State of Israel, the death penalty may be invoked for only two crimes: genocide and treason during times of war. Moreover, the Torah itself, and the Rabbis to a great extent, adopted procedural rules designed to make the death penalty a rarity. Two witnesses to the crime are required (Numbers 35:30-34; Deuteronomy 17:5; 19:15). They may not be related to each other or to the defendant. M. Sanhedrin 3:4. No circumstantial evidence is permitted. M. Sanhedrin 4:5. A person may not be executed unless he has been warned by two witnesses before committing the offense. Deuteronomy 19:15. A person may not be executed as a result of the testimony of an informant (Haim H. Cohn, "Informer" in The Principles of Jewish Law, Menachem Elon, ed. (Jerusalem; Encyclopedia Judaica, 1975), pp. 507-8) or a confession. (Ein adam masim atzmo rasha ("A person may not make himself a criminal"), says the Talmud at B. Yevamot 25b, B. Ketubbot 18b, and B. Sanhedrin 9b and 25a. Confessions in civil matters, however, were legally determinative: hoda'ah k'me'ah edim dami ("Confession is like a hundred witnesses"); See B. Gittin 40b and 64a, B. Kiddushin 65b, and B. Bava Metzia 3b). A person may not be executed unless deliberations are conducted in a manner designed to find the redeeming value in a human being, including the requirement that the accused be set free if the vote to convict is unanimous, because the accused is entitled to at least one advocate among the panel of judges. B. Sanhedrin 17a. As the Mishnah records, a court that executes a person once in seven years is said he "a bloody court"; Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah would make that once in seventy years; and Rabbis Tarfon and Akiba say they would never impose the death penalty. M. Makkot 1:10. Viewed in this context, Judaism's designation of certain crimes as capital offenses represents not law in practice but rather an ethical ranking of violations. Some offenses pose a greater danger to individuals and societies than do others. The Jewish people reserve the right to protect themselves, but that protection must be both just and compassionate. The debate in Jewish sources and in modern times about capital punishment indicates that its use maybe too high a price to pay for protecting us, even from serious harm, because it asks us as a society to engage in behavior that we otherwise condemn. Society wants to hold individuals responsible for their actions, but it too must be held responsible for its judgments. Discriminatory enforcement and errors in imposing the death penalty are too costly to measure or tolerate. (By Laurie L. Levenson, "Judaism and CriminalJustice"