LEV485 The claim to privacy is set aside when it is necessary to protect an individual, family, or group. So for example the Torah imposes a duty to testify in court when one knows relevant facts, even though they may be incriminating. (Leviticus 5:1. see also B. Bava Kamma 56a; Tucker (1984), 105; and Cohen (1949), 307. This may be parallel to the U.S. Supreme Court's concept, quoted earlier, of rights having effect only within a context of "ordered liberty.") In private settings as well, Jewish law insists on breaking confidentiality when keeping the secret would harm someone. This is based, in part, on the balance that the tradition strikes between the Torah's command, "Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (this verse) with its prohibition of lashon ha-ra, "speaking of the bad " or "evil speech." Under the first law, we have a positive duty to come to the rescue of another person's life or property, and that would argue for divulging whatever is necessary to accomplish those aims. Under the second law, though, one may not slander someone else –– that is, tell truths about someone that will cast a negative light on that person. That would apparently argue for never saying anything negative about anyone else. The tradition balances these two rules by limiting the latter rule. Specifically, the prohibition of defamation is not violated, according to the Rabbis, when there is a practical need for the hearer to know the negative truth. So, for example, under the Torah's rule, "Reprove your kinsman," [Leviticus 19:17], later Jewish sources specify that leaders' sins should be revealed when that is necessary to dissuade people from following their example in committing those sins.