GEN685 Jewish teaching with regard to [prolongation of the life of the terminally ill] is shaped by the principle not only that human life in general is of infinite and inestimable value, but that every moment of life is of infinite value as well.  Accordingly, obligations with regard to treatment and cure are one and the same regardless of whether the patient’s life is likely to be prolonged for a matter of years or merely for a few seconds. Thus, on the Sabbath, no less than on a weekday, efforts to free a victim buried under a collapsed building must be continued even if the victim is found in circumstances such that survival for longer than a brief time is impossible. See Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 329:4 Life with suffering is regarded, in many cases, as preferable to cessation of life and with it the elimination of suffering.  The Gemara in Sotah 22a, followed by Rambam, Hilkhot Sotah 3:20, indicates that the woman required to drink “the bitter waters” (Numbers 6:11 – 31) did not always die immediately. If she was guilty of the offense with which she was charged but had some other merit, the waters did not cause her to perish immediately, but instead produced a debilitating and degenerative state which led to a protracted termination of life. The added longevity, although accompanied by pain and suffering, is deemed a privilege bestowed in recognition of meritorious actions. Life accompanied by pain is thus viewed as preferable to death.  See also Tosefot Yom Tov, Sotah 1:9.  This sentiment is reflected in the words of the Psalmist, “The Lord has indeed chastised me, but He has not left me to die” (Psalms 118:18). The practice of euthanasia, whether active or passive, is contrary to the teachings of Judaism. Any positive act designed to hasten the death of the patient is equated with murder in Jewish law, even if death is hastened by only a matter of moments. No matter how laudable the intentions of the person performing an act of mercy killing maybe, the deed constitutes an act of homicide. One nineteenth-century commentator finds this principle reflected in [this verse].  Fratricide is certainly no less heinous a crime than ordinary homicide. Why then, having already prohibited homicide, is it necessary for Scripture to prohibit fratricide as well? R. Jacob Zevi Mecklenburg, in his commentary on the Pentateuch, Ha-Ketav ve-ha-Kabbalah, astutely comments that, while murder is the antithesis of brotherly love, in some circumstances the taking of the life of one’s fellow man may be perceived as an act of love par excellence.  Euthanasia, designed to put an end to unbearable suffering, is born not of hatred or anger, but of concern and compassion. It is precisely the taking of life and circumstances in which it is manifestly obvious that the perpetrator is motivated by feelings of love and brotherly compassion that the Torah finds necessary to brand as murder pure and simple.  Despite the noble intent that prompts such action, mercy killing is proscribed as an unwarranted intervention in an area which must be governed by God alone. The life of man may be reclaimed only by the Author of life. So long as man is yet endowed with the spark of life, as defined by God’s eternal law, man dare not presume to hasten death, no matter how hopeless or meaningless continued existence may appear to be in the eyes of a mortal. Hurwitz 58-9