GEN323 Does a divorce sever all links between the couple? Legally yes, morally no. Rabbi Jose the Galilean (2nd cent.) was informed that his former wife was resorting to begging for subsistence. Having previously paid her, at the time of the divorce, the amount required by law, he had no further legal obligations for her support. Nevertheless, he felt morally bound to provide for her further needs Jerusalem Talmud, Ketubot 11. Rabbi Jose based his novel moral doctrine on a verse in Isaiah 58:7: “Thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh” The term “flesh” is a biblical synonym for “wife” [this verse]. Isaiah bracketed the moral duty of feeding the poor and clothing the naked with a similar obligation to be mindful of the needs of one’s “flesh.” Surely he was not referring to a wife to whom one is married and to whose care one is legally committed Exodus 21:10. Rabbi Jose apparently concluded that Isaiah had in mind a former wife who is still referred to as his “flesh.” The union of two people in marriage is legally different from the association of two individuals in a partnership. When a partnership is dissolved, the relationship between the partners comes to a complete end. On the other hand, a divorced mate is like a limb severed from a body. The limb remains forever part of the body and must be treated with respect.  Rabbi Jose’s perception has practical implications and gives a new dimension to the moral links which survive a divorce. This is particularly significant when the divorced couple have children who form a permanent bond between their parents. Due to the lingering moral relationship, a divorce must not be permitted to generate a state of festering animosity. The divorced partners must still treat each other with respect. A divorced parent who has custody of the couple’s children must not prejudice their minds against the other parent. Grown-up children occasionally reject a parent for whatever they consider justifiable grounds. That decision must be their own and not the result of prejudicial influences to which they were subjected in their childhood.  Divorced parents have an inherent right to participate in their children’s celebrations of important events. It is in this area where breaches of the surviving moral relationships between divorced people are most common. A parent who pays for a daughter’s wedding affair may, in a spirit of vindictiveness, bar the former spouse from attending the wedding. Such conduct is cruel and unethical. The part assigned to parents in a wedding ceremony is another area of potential conflict. Divorced parents have a moral right to escort their child and march together down the aisle. Such an arrangement is warranted by the surviving moral relationship between the parents which dictates consideration for one another’s feelings.  The propriety of having divorced parents join together in escorting their child is not affected by the remarriage of one or both of the parents. A remarried parent may bring his or her second spouse to the wedding affair of a child. The second wife or husband is entitled to an invitation as a matter of right. They are well advised, however, to try to be as unobtrusive as possible to spare the feelings of the part of the family which views their presence with distaste. Needless to say, under no circumstances should a second spouse take the place of a living parent in the wedding procession.  Judaic tradition does not attach any stigma to the status of a divorcee. However, the rabbis advised against marrying a divorcee in the lifetime of her previous husband. Their objection was based on social rather than moral grounds. They felt that a divorcee might still retain some affection for her previous husband and as a result be unable to develop a true physical and emotional intimacy with her second husband Pesachim 112a. The rabbis implied a similar objection to the marriage of a divorced man in the lifetime of his former wife. The rabbinic reservation about the wisdom of marrying a divorced person would seem to have little validity in the event where a divorce ended a marriage in an explosion of hostility. A number of medieval rabbis also opposed marrying a twice-divorced woman because her fitness for matrimony has been put in question Even HaEzer 9:1 BLOCH 229-31