GEN54 I want to suggest that, for Jewish ethicists, the sacredness of human life translates into several distinct but related sets of principles that, in turn, are exemplified in a variety of specific rules.  While the following analysis is sketchy, it should suffice to demonstrate some of the way in which a Jewish theology of creation shapes biomedical ethics. [This verse]. In the Genesis account only human beings are singled out as reflections of God’s own image. Human life is holy because it shares something of the essence of divinity. That human life is sacred means, in the first place, that it possesses intrinsic and infinite value.  Its value is absolute, not susceptible to quantification and not relative to the value of anything extrinsic to it.  Thus, Jewish scholars traditionally have rejected any argument evaluating human life in terms of its “quality,” for this implies that its value is relative to some other good, such as health or happiness or consciousness.  Accordingly, rabbinic authorities have not sanctioned measures that shorten one’s life simply because ordinary physical or mental capacities have been compromised.  Similarly, they have not supported the abortion of fetuses with known or suspected abnormalities, since low quality of life in no way diminishes its sacredness. The sanctity of life generates a second major principle of Jewish ethics, that the preservation of life is the highest moral imperative.  The rabbis were especially sensitive to those situations in which obedience to the law conflicted with the preservation of life.  Since the law, like life itself, comes from God a moral conflict between them is especially profound.  But the tradition resolves all such conflicts in favor of the preservation of life.  Thus, to treat a critically ill person one can violate the laws of the Sabbath, prepare non-Kosher food, and so on.  [B. Shabbat 16:17; principle of pikuah nefesh]  Moreover, if there is any doubt whatsoever as to the condition of the patient, we err on the side of preserving life.  By the same token, Jewish law proscribes individuals from engaging in life-threatening activities, unless of course they do so in the interest of saving another life.  Thus, experimental procedures with significant (or unknown) risks are never mandatory and often not recommended, except in cases where performing the procedure is necessary for saving a life.  The view that human life is sacred implies a third central principle, that all lives are equal.  Because Jewish tradition offers no criteria for valuing one life more highly than another, issues of triage are especially problematic.  As one handbook of Jewish medical ethics puts it, “This is the foundation for the practice of triage, and is fundamentally incompatible with Jewish values and Jewish law. Since, in Judaism, all human life is equally sacred including each moment of an individual’s life…no selection is justifiable among those with the need for, and the possibility, however slim, of cure.  [Citing Feldman and Rosner, Compendium on Medical Ethics, 105]. It seems that only a random or arbitrary system of allocating scarce medical resources (among patients who need the resource equally) is compatible with the sanctity of life, as Jewish scholars have understood it.  The sanctity of human life gives rise to a fourth important tenet of Jewish medical ethics, that our lives are not really our own.  Human life is not even a gift so much as a loan, which we possess conditionally and ultimately must return to its source.  Thus, Jewish ethics allows little room for notions of personal autonomy that figure so prominently in Kantian ethics.  The implications of this perspective are especially evident in discussions of abortion.  Rabbinic authorities over the centuries have tended to permit abortion in cases where the mother’s life or health (including possibly her psychological health) is endangered.  In this sense, and only in this sense, the tradition does recognize the distinctions between lives – the actual life of the mother clearly takes precedence over the potential life of the fetus.  But the notion that a mother could terminate a pregnancy for any reason on the grounds that she has a right to control what happens to her own body is entirely foreign to Jewish tradition.  The fetus, though not regarded as fully a “person,” is still alive, and insofar as all human life is sacred, it can be terminated only for the most compelling reason, in order to preserve other lives.  This same principle emerges in Jewish discussions of suicide.  One does not have a right to take one’s own life, even under the most debilitating circumstances.  Similarly, we do not control the timing or the circumstances of our death.  This undergirds the leniency among many traditional authorities with respect to treatment of the dying.  When a person is in a moribund state, we are not required to prolong the moment of death.  The principle of “sit and do nothing” is consistent with the view that God controls the ultimate disposition of our lives.  When death is imminent, it is a sign of humble resignation before God’s will to refrain from action.  PASTIMP 108-10