LEV282 See [[EXOD63]] Exodus 3:6 hid DORFFLOV 38

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LEV300 Clearly, it is best to honor one's parents out of love and to love them while fulfilling the duties of honoring them, but that is not always how a child feels. The law demands honor and respect of parents, but, at least according to Maimonides, it does not demand love of them. It does, however, require not only honor and reverence for God but also love of God, even when, as in the case of the biblical Job, one feels anything but love. There is another way in which honor and respect for God supersedes that for parents, and that is derived from the juxtaposition of the commands to revere one's parents and to keep My Sabbaths [this verse]. The Rabbis read the "and" of this verse such that the second clause is a condition for the first: "You shall each revere his mother and his father and [that is, on condition that or as long as] you keep My Sabbaths." ... Based on this general principle, Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel [the Rosh, d. 1327, Germany and Spain) ruled that a man should disregard his father's insistence that he not make peace with an enemy, because "the father who commanded his son to hate a man does not have the right to command him to violate the Torah." The Torah commands, after all, "You shall not hate your brother in your heart," and the Rabbis derived from the verse in Psalms, "Seek peace and pursue it" that we actively must try to make peace with our enemies. (Responsa Rosh (1881), 15:5, cited in Herring (1984), 208. The verses cited are Leviticus 19:17 and Psalms 34:15, the latter of which the Rabbis understood to be a positive command to seek peace; see J. Pe'ah 1:1). Despite parental objections to a particular school, most scholars permit an adult son to study Torah where he wishes, even though the parents do not object to his studying Torah altogether (See, for example, Rabbi Israel Isserlien (1390-1460), Responsa Trumat ha-Deshen, no. 40 and S.A. Yoreh De'ah 240:25); and most permit a son or daughter to immigrate to Israel over parental objections so as to fulfill the commitment to live there [lengthy footnote omitted].

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LEV304 …the Torah specifically mentions that mothers as well as fathers are to be revered and honored, and the Rabbis construed these commands to be demanded of daughters as well as sons. (For the biblical command to honor parents, see Exodus 20:12 and Deuteronomy 5:16. For the command to respect parents, see Leviticus 19:3. That daughters as well as sons are commanded to honor and respect their parents, see M. Kiddushin 1:7 and B. Kiddushin 29a).

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LEV311 See [[EXOD410]] Exodus 20:12 honor DORFFLOV 57

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LEV410 … Jewish law specifically provides for a transfer of care to others when the child cannot tolerate the parent's mental state. The first exception thus depends on the parent's mental state and/or the child's reaction to it; the second exception is based instead on the relationship between the parent and child. While parents and children ideally get along well with each other, that is not always the case. As we have seen, Jewish sources specifically demand that a parent not make overly burdensome or provocative demands on a child so that the child is tempted to dishonor and disrespect the parent or perhaps even assault him or her, because in making a demand that evokes that response, the parent would thereby transgress the biblical command of not putting a stumbling block before the blind [this verse. See B. Mo'ed Katan 17a; B. Kiddushin 32a; M.T. Laws of Rebels (Mamrim) 6:8,9; and S.A. Yoreh De'ah 240:19,20.] Thus if the relationship between the parent and child is not good, Jewish law would find it better for the child to transfer the care of the parent to someone else, as long as the parent ensures that the care fulfills the parent's physical and psychological needs at a reasonably good level. Thus, while Sefer Hasidim required generally that children live in the vicinity of their parents to minister to their needs, it said this: "It is best that a father and son separate if they quarrel with each other, for much pain is caused; and I do not mean only the pain of the father or the teacher, but even the pain of the son." [Attributed to Rabbi Judah ben Samuel He-Hasid, Sefer Hasidim (ed. Margoliot, 1957), 371, #564,; see also 257, #343).

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LEV416 One other important principle in regard to honor and respect of parents emerges from the sources--namely, that the parents should not make unreasonable demands of their children or punish their children in a way that will lead the child to rebel against them and dishonor them. The Rabbis deduced this from the Torah's command, "Do not put a stumbling block before the blind," which they interpret to include not only the physically blind but also those blinded by their lack of information or by the temptation to do something improper. (The verse is Leviticus 19:14. In addition to its literal reference to the physically blind, the Rabbis interpreted it to demand also that we not mislead those who lack information or who are morally blind by tempting them to do what is a violation of the law. See Sifra Kedoshim on Leviticus 19:14; B. Pesachim 22b; B. Mo'ed Katan 17a; B. Kiddushin 32a; and B. Bava Metz'ia 75b.) This is an instance of the latter case, by which unreasonable demands of children or striking an adult child will tempt the child to say or do things that are in violation of the Commandments demanding honor and respect for parents.

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LEV478 God's ownership of our bodies is also behind every Jew's obligation to help other people escape sickness, injury, and death. (Leviticus 19:16). This duty does not rest on some general (and vague) humanitarian reason or on anticipated reciprocity; it rather grows out of our role in helping God preserve what is His. Specialized training makes physicians especially able and, therefore, especially obligated to aid people in overcoming illness (S.A. Yoreh De'ah 336:1), but we all share in that duty. On the basis of (this verse, "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow"), the Talmud proclaims that obligation to provide medical aid encompasses expenditure of the community's financial resources for this purpose. And Nahmanides understood the community's obligation to provide medical care as one of many applications of the Torah's principle "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." (Leviticus 19:18). Conversely, the individual Jew, when ill, has the reciprocal obligation to seek medical care.

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LEV484 See [[LEV39]] Leviticus 5:1 testify DORFFLOV 181-2

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LEV488 Witnesses to the Act or Results of Abuse. As I mentioned earlier, the Talmud interprets the Torah's command not to stand idly by the blood of our neighbor [this verse] to mean that we must take positive steps to save people's lives. Furthermore, the Torah's command to come forward with testimony (Leviticus 5:1-6) would make it seem obvious that Jews who witness abuse or its results must testify to it and help people extricate themselves from it. The following four commands within Judaism, though, are sometimes misinterpreted to prevent witnesses to abuse from testifying to government officials or to others in authority about an abusive situation: • The prohibition against defaming another human being (lashon ha-ra) • The prohibition against shaming someone else (boshet) • The prohibition against handing a Jew over to non-Jewish authorities (mesirah) • The prohibition against desecrating God (hillul ha-Shem). In addition, in the specific case of child abuse, some Jews worry that informing the authorities will violate the prerogatives of parents and make it impossible for them to carry out their biblical duties to educate their children. I shall examine each of these concerns in turn.

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LEV485 The claim to privacy is set aside when it is necessary to protect an individual, family, or group. So for example the Torah imposes a duty to testify in court when one knows relevant facts, even though they may be incriminating. (Leviticus 5:1. see also B. Bava Kamma 56a; Tucker (1984), 105; and Cohen (1949), 307. This may be parallel to the U.S. Supreme Court's concept, quoted earlier, of rights having effect only within a context of "ordered liberty.") In private settings as well, Jewish law insists on breaking confidentiality when keeping the secret would harm someone. This is based, in part, on the balance that the tradition strikes between the Torah's command, "Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (this verse) with its prohibition of lashon ha-ra, "speaking of the bad " or "evil speech." Under the first law, we have a positive duty to come to the rescue of another person's life or property, and that would argue for divulging whatever is necessary to accomplish those aims. Under the second law, though, one may not slander someone else –– that is, tell truths about someone that will cast a negative light on that person. That would apparently argue for never saying anything negative about anyone else. The tradition balances these two rules by limiting the latter rule. Specifically, the prohibition of defamation is not violated, according to the Rabbis, when there is a practical need for the hearer to know the negative truth. So, for example, under the Torah's rule, "Reprove your kinsman," [Leviticus 19:17], later Jewish sources specify that leaders' sins should be revealed when that is necessary to dissuade people from following their example in committing those sins.

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