NUM425 See [[NUM416]] Numbers 35:28 refuge SACKS 269

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NUM426 At times, one also violates the prohibition of flattery, which according to many Ge’onim (namely, the Tosafist Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, the Gaon, and Rabbi Shlomo ben Gevirol) is considered a full-fledged Torah prohibition, derived from the pasuk: וְלֹא־תַחֲנִ֣יפוּ אֶת־הָאָ֗רֶץ  “Do not corrupt the land” (Bamidbar 35:33). For example, if one speaks lashon hara or rechilus with the intention of flattering the listener--for he knows that this listener already hates the person being spoken about, and he hopes to find favor in the listener's eyes by disparaging that person—then he transgresses this prohibition. This is a terrible sin, for not only does the speaker fail to rebuke the listener for hating the other person--in fulfillment of the mitzvah of giving rebuke (which is a positive Torah commandment--his words also reinforce the hatred that already exists between the two. Because of him, the listener will repeat his sinful actions over and over again, and a new dispute will arise, as will several other problems; Hashem should save us. Note that unfortunately, this prohibition is violated very frequently. For instance, when someone speaks disparagingly of another person, then even though the listener realizes that what we said was against halachah, he might nevertheless nod his head in agreement. He might also embellish the story by adding a few negative words of his own, because at times the speaker is a prominent person from whom the listener has received favors, or because the listener is afraid that if he does not speak up he will be considered unintelligent or the like. The yetzer hara will therefore be able to convince him to yield to the pressure and show his approval to the speaker. However, my brother, you should know that this is essentially a violation of the prohibition of flattery, even if the listener adds only a few words. It is regarding such circumstances that the pasuk says: וְשַׂמְתָּ֣ שַׂכִּ֣ין בְּלֹעֶ֑ךָ אִם־בַּ֖עַל נֶ֣פֶשׁ אָֽתָּה׃ “And you shall place a knife in your throat if you are a man of spirit” (Mishlei 23:2). A person is obligated to endanger his life rather than incur such a grievous sin. According to the Torah, if a person finds himself in such a situation he must, at minimum, exert a great deal of self-control and ensure that he does not encourage the speaker by making even one gesture that indicates that he approves of his words. It is about situations like these that Chazal said (Eduyos 5:2): “Better that a person be called a fool his entire life than be considered wicked in the eyes of Hashem for even one moment.” This is relevant even when one knows that the speaker will not be influenced by his rebuke. However, if there is a possibility that his rebuke may be effective, then he is certainly obligated to reprove the speaker as well...

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NUM427 Blood-guilt required expiation with blood. In the case of an untraced and unavenged murder, the blood was "covered" or "wiped away" by means of a symbolic right of expiation (Deuteronomy 21:1-9). Deuteronomy 32:43 announces that the defilement of the land, caused by the slaughter of Israelites, will be removed by God's avenging their blood upon their enemies, thus making expiation for the land of His people. [This verse] lays down the principle that "no expiration can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but the blood of him who shed it." Consequently money compensation was ruled out in cases of murder. S.H. Langdon, H.E.R.E., V, p. 654. Offenses other than manslaughter could be propitiated by means of a gift, whether in the form of a sacrifice or a "forfeit money" (asham) and of "sin-money" (hattat) which were given to the priests in order to satisfy the offended God (II Kings 12:17; Amos 2:8).

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NUM429 Many people believe that if we want people to think well of us we must practice the art of flattery, for the truth is that most people don't feel properly appreciated. The skillful flatterer--and some people are so needy that we can just about eliminate the finesse of subtlety--helps to convince them that's not so. However, buttering up people usually means moving beyond honesty. How far should we go to win the favor of others? Should we lie? Suddenly we face two conflicting rabbinic values: ingratiating oneself with others and telling the truth. What should the caring Jew do? In matters of musar, our sages don't offer clear-cut guidelines that help us choose correctly in specific cases. Individual temperament and the human situation vary too greatly for that. Instead, our ethical teachers have left us a maze of differing opinions; we acquire wisdom in learning how to find our way through them. In the case of flattery, however, a specific path is mandated. We read in [this verse]: "Don't profane or (spiritually) pollute, tahanifu, the land in which you live." Since the word for flattery, hanufah, comes from the same root, h-n-f, as tahanifu, the rabbis rule that this biblical commandment prohibits verbal insincerity as well as profane actions. The midrash to the Book of Psalms demonstrates further the rabbis' revulsion at verbal deception. "R. Hiyya taught: Hypocrites may be exposed to publicly prevent a profanation of God's name.… But why does God allow people to sin publicly? In order that, when a misfortune occurs to the flatterer due to his wickedness, people should not blame God (Mid. Pss. 52.3). "Four kinds of people do not see the face of the Shekhinah: the mockers, the hypocrites, the slanderers, and the liars" (Mid. Pss. 101.3). Thus, aggadah, non-legal rabbinic lore, backs up halakhah, talmudic law, in its condemnation of flattery.

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NUM428 "You shall not pollute the land wherein you are". This verse forbids us to flatter a wrongdoer (The Gaonim RAM Baal Hatofos and RSH Ben Gabriol). If you know that Reuven dislikes someone, the correct thing to do is to admonish Reuven for his hatred. By speaking loshon hora to Reuven about his enemy in order to find favor in his eyes, you violate this prohibition. A listener to loshon hora can also be guilty of this prohibition. It is very common for people to nod their heads or vocally show approval when someone tells them loshon hora. This flattery is terms chanifas and is a very serious offence (see Shaarey Tshuvah 3:187-199).

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NUM430 We are forbidden to praise a wicked person. This verse forbids us to flatter a wrongdoer (Sifre). Flattering a wrongdoer is termed chanifus and is a very serious offense. Rabainu Yonah deals with this prohibition at length in Shaarey Tshuvah 3:187-199. Below are some essential excerpts: 1) The worst form of chanifus is when a person sees that someone has transgressed and tells him, "You have not done anything wrong." This will cost the transgressor to repeat his misdeeds. 2) It is considered chanifus to say that an evil person is a good man. Even if you do not actually say that his crimes were the proper thing to do, it is nevertheless wrong to praise him. The righteous despise the wicked, as it is written, "An unjust man is an abomination to the righteous" (Mishle 29:27). 3) failure to censure someone when you are in a position to do so is considered chanifus. Our Sages have said, "Whoever is able to protest against the wrong doings of his household and fails to do so, is held accountable for their behavior. If the person is able to protest against the wrongdoings of the inhabitants of his city and fails to do so, he is held accountable for their behavior. If a person is able to protest against the wrongdoings of the entire world and fails to do so, he is held accountable for their behavior" (Shabbos 44b). ... It is forbidden to flatter someone in order to take advantage of him (Orchos Tzadikim, ch. 24). Although insincere flattery is wrong, it is important that we praise others for their benefit. The late Telzer Rosh Hayeshiva, Rabbi Chayim Mordechai Katz, used to say that appreciative words help a person realize own inherent worth and will encourage him to utilize his attributes to the best of his ability. The Talmud (Eruvin 18b) states that we should say only a part of a person's praise in his presence. Excessive praise gives the appearance of being insincere flattery (Rashi). A sincere compliment, however, is a great chesed.

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NUM431 Judaism's discomfort with its own capital punishment laws is well-known. In the modern State of Israel, the death penalty may be invoked for only two crimes: genocide and treason during times of war. Moreover, the Torah itself, and the Rabbis to a great extent, adopted procedural rules designed to make the death penalty a rarity. Two witnesses to the crime are required (Numbers 35:30-34; Deuteronomy 17:5; 19:15). They may not be related to each other or to the defendant. M. Sanhedrin 3:4. No circumstantial evidence is permitted. M. Sanhedrin 4:5. A person may not be executed unless he has been warned by two witnesses before committing the offense. Deuteronomy 19:15. A person may not be executed as a result of the testimony of an informant (Haim H. Cohn, "Informer" in The Principles of Jewish Law, Menachem Elon, ed. (Jerusalem; Encyclopedia Judaica, 1975), pp. 507-8) or a confession. (Ein adam masim atzmo rasha ("A person may not make himself a criminal"), says the Talmud at B. Yevamot 25b, B. Ketubbot 18b, and B. Sanhedrin 9b and 25a. Confessions in civil matters, however, were legally determinative: hoda'ah k'me'ah edim dami ("Confession is like a hundred witnesses"); See B. Gittin 40b and 64a, B. Kiddushin 65b, and B. Bava Metzia 3b). A person may not be executed unless deliberations are conducted in a manner designed to find the redeeming value in a human being, including the requirement that the accused be set free if the vote to convict is unanimous, because the accused is entitled to at least one advocate among the panel of judges. B. Sanhedrin 17a. As the Mishnah records, a court that executes a person once in seven years is said he "a bloody court"; Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah would make that once in seventy years; and Rabbis Tarfon and Akiba say they would never impose the death penalty. M. Makkot 1:10. Viewed in this context, Judaism's designation of certain crimes as capital offenses represents not law in practice but rather an ethical ranking of violations. Some offenses pose a greater danger to individuals and societies than do others. The Jewish people reserve the right to protect themselves, but that protection must be both just and compassionate. The debate in Jewish sources and in modern times about capital punishment indicates that its use maybe too high a price to pay for protecting us, even from serious harm, because it asks us as a society to engage in behavior that we otherwise condemn. Society wants to hold individuals responsible for their actions, but it too must be held responsible for its judgments. Discriminatory enforcement and errors in imposing the death penalty are too costly to measure or tolerate. (By Laurie L. Levenson, "Judaism and CriminalJustice"

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