DEUT1026 See [[DEUT33]] Deuteronomy 1:17 partial LEHRMAN 264-5

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DEUT1028 (Continued from [[DEUT703]] Deuteronomy 15:2 remission LEHRMAN 181-3). When R. Johanan b. Zakkai abolished the laws governing the Sotah (The unfaithful woman whose Ordeal by the Bitter Waters is described in Numbers v.), on account of the spread of immorality in his day (Sotah 47a), he followed a natural process of growth and expansion whereby Judaism developed into a living religion that aimed to regulate all the details of daily life. When this renowned Rabbi saw that murder was raising its head among the dissident groups (sicarii) embittered by the fall of the Second Jewish State, he abolished the laws of the Red Heifer (Deuteronomy xxi. 1-9). His aim was to show that Jewish law is elastic and pliable; but he made one important caveat. This was: provided such changes were undertaken by a trusted Rabbinical Court ever mindful of the original purpose of the Torah and eager to adapt the divine principles to the fluctuating circumstances of the age.

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DEUT1032 Respect for others was fostered by the teaching that man was created alone. The world should be reminded that to save the soul of one person is equivalent to preserving humanity. Did not all "the families of the earth" proceed from Adam? We mourn the dead with such customs as Keriah, Shivah, Kaddish, Yahrzeit and Yizkor, for these emphasize the importance of the soul that has winged its flight heavenwards. When a man was found slain outside the boundaries of the nearest city, the elders thereof had to declare in all solemnity: "Our hands have not shed this blood, neither have our eyes seen it." [this verse and vv. 1-9]. This was not because they were suspected of being directly concerned with the murder, but because they must clear their conscience before the entire assembly that the death was not the direct consequence of a failure on their part to provide shelter and hospitality for the wayfarer.

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DEUT1087 "Who is honoured?" asked Ben Zoma (Abot iv. i.) It was a rhetorical question, for he himself knew the only true answer. "He who honors others; as it is said (I Sam. ii. 30): For I will honour them that honor Me, but those that despise Me shall be held in contempt'." The Talmud is emphatic that the honour of others should be a prime concern (Ber. 28b). One is absolved of a command of the Torah if its fulfillment be at the expense of one's own prestige. For though we are told ... [this verse]..., in the case of an old man, a scholar or a woman, the fulfillment of such a command, involving effort and loss of dignity, is not expected (B. Metz. 30a. Cf. Hoshen Mishpat 263. Ber. 43b). Far better than a man throw himself into a burning furnace then put his friend to shame. This opinion is expressed several times in the Talmud (B.M. 59a; Sot. 6a).

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DEUT1111 (Continued from [[LEV862]] Leviticus 20:26 apart LEHRMAN 66). Instructive is the Rabbinic interpretation of the concluding words lo tukhal lehitalaym -- "thou mayest not hide thyself" of [this verse]. In the Torah, the words lo tukhal refer both to physical, as well as to moral inability. A good example of the former is in Exodus xviii. 18: "Thou will surely wear away, both thou, and this people that is with thee; for the thing is too heavy for thee. Thou art not able to perform it thyself alone." The Hebrew reads: kee kaved mimecha hadavar, lo tukhal asehu levadecha. It is obvious from the context that not being able, in this instance, means sheer physical inability. On the other hand, the inability mentioned in [this verse], of not turning "a blind eye" to the stray ass or lost article of "thy brother", can only refer to moral inability. For physically it is possible to do so; moral compunctions, however, make this impossible. The word tukhal, though strictly unnecessary in this context, was inserted to emphasize the moral compunction and the religious imperative. "Thou art not (morally) able to hide thyself." Physically you can. To all outward appearances you can. But being an ethical command, you may not and must not hide yourself. (Continued at [[DEUT678]] Deuteronomy 14:21 eat LEHRMAN 67).

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DEUT1182 The Talmud cites two instances in which the husband was denied the right of divorcing his wife. The first was the case described in the Bible [Deuteronomy Xxii. 13-19], when the accusation of pre-marital immorality brought by him against his wife proved untrue; the second was when he himself had seduced his wife before marriage. In that case, it was an act of justice that he should not be allowed to shame her by summarily dismissing her.

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DEUT1232 Gratitude for what others have done was indicative of the health of the soul. The Rabbis expressed this in a proverb: "Into the well from which you have drunk, throw no stones". (B.K. 92b) Does not scripture tell us not to despise the Egyptian "because thou wast a stranger in his land"? [this verse]. It is imperative that we ourselves do not suffer from the defects of which we complain in another. (B. Metz. 107b; B.B. 60b: ["Rabbi Natan used to say: Whatever defect is in you, do not call your fellow"] -- Is it not ridiculous when the pot calls the kettle black? We must take care to speak about a thing only when we know it for certain; at no time must you repeat anything about another, especially if it be derogatory to him and of which the truth is doubtful. (Yeb. 65b).

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DEUT1260 See [[DEUT542]] Deuteronomy 11:22 keep LEHRMAN 27 and [[EXOD158]] Exodus 12:23 home LEHRMAN 27-8

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DEUT1322 The high ideal of married life inculcated by Judaism, added to the experience that an irksome marriage could be ended if absolute necessity arose, raised the lofty standard of Jewish marriage to a very high-level. Though the ethical principles of Judaism are against dissolution, life reveals circumstances, the influences of which sometimes so undermined the basis of marriage as to make any modus vivendi almost impossible. In such cases, it was contended that divorce was the external dissolution of a relation which had already inwardly been destroyed. From the Codes, it would appear that our divorce laws did not press heavily to the disadvantage of woman. Despite the facility with which a union could be dissolved (as would appear from a hurried glance at the sources), the evidence does not suggest that this facility was abused. In the figurative words of one teacher, the alter weeps when a man divorces his first wife (Gittin 90). The Jew, despite the utterances of his detractors, could not divorce his wife upon any slight pretext or whim. He had to find some serious flaw in her [this and following verse]. What this uncleanness was is the theme of a much Talmudic debate. He could not banish her from his home just by mere word of mouth and in an unceremonious, preemptory manner, but after a long and dreary formality which ended in the placing in her possession of a Get. This process was made odious and laborious for two reasons: one, to prevent an undue haste to divorce occasioned by an outburst of anger; two, to afford an opportunity to either party, even at the twelfth hour or during the actual writing of the Bill of Divorcement, to become reconciled.

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DEUT1332 (Continued from [[DEUT678]] Deuteronomy 14:21 ate LEHRMAN 67). Another example of the Hebrew verb Yakhol (to be able) being used of moral inability is in [this verse]. Here, too, it is not the physical inability that is alluded to in the words lo yukhal, but the moral imperative that is stressed. Her former husband cannot remarry her after she had married again and was released by her second husband's divorce or death. Such an act would be deemed an "abomination" (toavah) before the Lord." The lesson stressed is that a moral imperative shall make a base action as impossible of fulfillment just as a total lack of physical strength incapacitates action -- an idea which raises Jewish teachings to sublime pinnacles.

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