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DEUTERONOMY — 20:10 peace

DEUT989 Principles of Waging War. Given the essential commitment both to self-defense and to the defense of what is just and right, let us consider three examples of how war is to be initiated and conducted according to Jewish law. The first principle of war established by the Torah and reinforced by the Rabbinic tradition is that it must truly be a last resort. We are enjoined to work to exhaust all diplomatic options in an attempt to avoid violent conflict. (E.g., see Deuteronomy Rabbah 5:13). In the Torah, emissaries of peace are sent to hostile cities to search for any alternative to war. (Deuteronomy 20:10). If diplomacy ultimately proves unsuccessful, however, one is not permitted to attack unless the enemy initiates hostilities. And even then, one is forbidden to commit any acts of unwarranted cruelty against the inhabitants of enemy territory. Jewish law even goes so far as to require that an escape route be provided for those who desire to leave a besieged city at any point. [Maimonides (Rambam), Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 6.] Permitting war only as a last resort minimizes the likelihood of violent engagement and creates a cultural aversion to warfare. War may be a necessary evil; it is never something to relish. The second principle of warfare laid out in Jewish tradition is that war must be conducted in a way that preserves the humanity of the soldiers and civilians on both sides. This requires great moral sensitivity and vigorous protection against the dehumanization that typically characterizes warfare. Nahmanides (Ramban) taught that even the “most refined of people become possessed with ferocity and cruelty when advancing upon the enemy... [Torah wants the soldier] to learn to act compassionately with our enemies even during wartime.” (Nahmanides (Ramban), Commentary on the Torah (Bi’ur), Deuteronomy 23:10). Part of the Jewish resistance to fighting is rooted in the humble awareness that more than life is lost in warfare--that violent conflict often comes with devastating moral compromise. In response to this moral challenge, nations that go to war must do everything in their power to ensure that their soldiers are trained with sensitivity and compassion, and that they are reminded, even amidst violent conflict, of the humanity of their enemies. In fact, the Torah offers specific rules intended to prevent the degradation of the enemy, even in the midst of dangerous conflict. (e.g., Deuteronomy 21:10). The assumption is that this moral training will ultimately preserve a soldier's own humanity as well. A third guiding principle of war is the obligation to protect against unnecessary destruction--of human life, of the enemy's property, of the environment--during violent struggle. The call for soldiers to cultivate sensitivity toward the enemy renders wanton destruction thoroughly indefensible. “When in your war against a city,” the Torah teaches, “… you must not destroy its trees, wielding the ax against them. You may eat of them, but you must not cut them down. Are trees of the field human to withdraw before you into the besieged city?” (Deuteronomy 20:19-20). Maimonides (Rambam) extends this prohibition: “Also, one who smashes household goods, tears clothes, demolishes a building, stops up a spring, or destroys articles of food with destructive intent transgresses the command, You shall not destroy.” (Maimonides (Rambam), Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 6:10). As Reuven Kimelman writes in his extensive treatment of the parameters of war from a Jewish perspective, “If one can control destructive urges provoked by a war against non-human objects, there is a chance of controlling destructive urges against humans.” Reuven Kimelman, “War,” Frontiers of Jewish Thought, Steven Katz, ed., (Washington, DC: B’nai Brith Books, 1992), 315. (By Sharon Brous)

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DEUTERONOMY — 20:11 forced

DEUT992 The most conspicuous presentation of a Jewish biblical conception of a religious duty to restrain warfare is a cluster of commandments in Deuteronomy 20, the fifth book of the Pentateuch, the Torah, which Jews regard as the fundamental and most sacred part of the Bible. The activities to be governed by these commandments are: waging a war, exempting some combatants from participating in it, offering the enemy peaceful surrender, treating captives and booty, and conducting a siege. Additional Deuteronomy 21 verses govern the case of a combatant desiring to have a captive beautiful woman as a wife. The ethics of warfare embodied in these norms rests on a fundamental religious strategy that permeates the whole body of Jewish commandments: Jews may be involved in every human sphere of activity, whether individual or collective, except for idol worship, but their activity within each sphere is significantly restrained. Thus, for example, setting a siege around a town is permitted, being an ordinary, non-idolatrous act of warfare, but the siege ought not to involve cutting down fruit trees. Any moral evaluation of this ethics of warfare should consist of two parts: a moral evaluation of the imposed constraint, and a moral evaluation of what is permitted. The first evaluation involves the following consideration: If (a) the cause of war is good and (b) a constraint imposed on warfare activities does not eliminate the ability to gain victory, then (c) the imposed constraint presumably helps alleviate the calamities of war and therefore (d) is morally worthy. It seems that the Deuteronomy 20 "you shall not" constraints are all morally commendable. The second evaluation focuses on the constrained dimension of the sphere of activity in order to determine whether it permits activities that are morally unjustifiable. The results of this evaluation of the norms of Deuteronomy 20 are mixed. On the one hand, the exemption of certain men, such as one who has betrothed a wife and has not taken her," delineates the corps of combatants in a just and effective way. On the other hand, the association of proclaiming peace with the requirement "that all people that are found therein shall serve you at forced labor" [this verse] is indeed morally unjustifiable. Other commandments are even worse, for example, the norm that when a town will make no peace, "you shall put all its males to the sword" (v. 13). (Continued at [[DEUT996]] Deuteronomy 20:13 sword OXFORD 488-9). (By Aaron S. Gross, "Jewish Animal Ethics")

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DEUTERONOMY — 20:11 peaceably

DEUT993 As to the evils of war, the prophet had foreseen war's ultimate abolition; but, in the Talmud, wars were considered legitimate undertakings, even if their objective was to acquire booty and slaves. Berochot 3b. A "permitted war" (milhemet horeshut) was distinguished from a "mandatory war" (milhemet mizva), the former might be waged for such purposes as enlarging the boundaries of the country, or in order to subject a foreign city to slavery and to the payment of tributes. "If the city thus attacked offers to pay tribute, but does not accept enslavement, or if it accepts enslavement without paying tribute, its terms are not accepted until it undertakes to pay both."(This verse; Sifri, ad loc.) In the Mishnah, implements of war were deemed disgraceful reminders of human rapacity; hence, it was considered unlawful to wear a sword on the Sabbath. Shabbat 63a

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DEUTERONOMY — 20:13 sword

DEUT996 (Continued from [[DEUT992]] Deuteronomy 20:11 forced OXFORD 488-9). Because Deuteronomy 20-21 is an element of the Jewish Holy Writ, a question arises as to what lessons should be drawn, within the Jewish religious tradition, from the ethical norms of these chapters. A plausible answer would involve a clarification of the above-mentioned fundamental Jewish religious strategy: Except for idolatry, Jews may be involved in every human sphere of activity, as it is practiced under the circumstances, but the activity within each sphere is significantly restrained. This is why the Bible includes, for instance, norms of slavery and norms of marriage and divorce that prescribe unequal treatment of persons according to their gender. The same applies to warfare practices. The moral evaluation of the constrained activities permitted by Jewish biblical ethics is actually a moral evaluation of warfare practices of the time. Accordingly, current Jewish warfare ethics should rest on a modern conception of warfare, one that embodies some variant of the Just War doctrine, and imposes constraints on its application. Unlike Deuteronomy 20-21, it will involve, for example, a principle of distinction between combatants and others and be as morally justifiable as Just War norms. This is one example of a much larger phenomenon--namely, that what constitutes the Jewish tradition, and Jewish ethics in particular, is not the Bible alone, but rather is based on how rabbis and lay Jews have interpreted and applied the Bible and subsequent traditions over the centuries. This includes not only how Jews have developed their tradition internally, but also what they have learned from others and made part of the Jewish tradition--in this case, Just War theory. (By Asa Kasher, "Jewish Ethics and War")

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